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1 ACCUSATIONS OF INCONSISTENCY AS A RESPONSE TO CRITICISM  
 
1.1 A common argumentative practice in Prime Minister's Question Time  
Responding with accusations of inconsistency to criticism is a common 
argumentative practice in Prime Minister’s Question Time in the British House of 
Commons. Especially when responding to questions critical of a certain policy, 
action or plan of the Government, it is not at all uncommon for the Prime 
Minister to accuse his opponents of being inconsistent. The Prime Minister, who, 
more or less by definition, will not agree with the criticism expressed by 
Members of Parliament (MPs) from the Opposition, may rather attempt to avoid 
discussing such criticism. He attempts to exclude from the discussion standpoints 
of the Opposition in which such a criticism is expressed, and justifies the 
exclusion by pointing out that the current positions of the MPs are inconsistent 
with other positions they have assumed. The following exchange between the 
current Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and the Leader of the Opposition, David 
Cameron is an example. 
(1)  David Cameron (Leader of the Opposition):  
In January last year, the Government were sent details of 4,000 dangerous foreign 
criminals and for an entire year they did absolutely nothing with that information. Can 
the Prime Minister explain how such a catastrophic failure to protect the public took 
place? 
Gordon Brown (Prime Minister):  
The Attorney-General has asked the Crown Prosecution Service to conduct an inquiry 
into this matter. A request was made by the Dutch authorities for us to look through our 
DNA records. Some 4,000 names were put to us by the Dutch, and 11 cases have been 
discovered as a result of the investigation. The inquiry will cover all the details of what 
happened. I must tell the right hon. Gentleman that it was possible for the Dutch to ask us 
to look at our DNA records only because we are keeping full DNA records. The 
Conservatives opposed that legislation. 
(House of Commons official report, 2008b) 
The exchange is about a disk that contains DNA profiles of 4,000 foreign 
criminals. In January 2007, the disk was sent to the British Crown Prosecution 
Service by the Dutch authorities. The DNA information on the disk was supposed 




who are in the United Kingdom. But the check did not start until January 2008.1 
In his question, Mr. Cameron implies that the failure of the Government to 
check the DNA data of 4,000 serious criminals for more than a year is 
catastrophic. In his answer, Mr. Brown does not address the standpoint implied. 
Instead, he announces that an investigation is being conducted, explains the 
details of the case and accuses Mr. Cameron of being inconsistent in an attempt to 
avoid the discussion of his standpoint. In his explanation, Mr. Brown stresses the 
importance for the case concerned of keeping full DNA records, and emphasises 
that this is a government policy which the Opposition opposed. This emphasis 
paves the road for the charge of inconsistency that the Prime Minister makes 
against his opponent.  
Mr. Brown accuses Mr. Cameron of being inconsistent about the benefits 
of keeping full DNA records. He implies that in order for Mr. Cameron to have a 
right to criticise the Government for failing to check DNA data, Mr. Cameron 
needs to believe that keeping DNA records is beneficial. Yet, Mr. Cameron’s 
previous actions, namely his opposition to the government policy of keeping full 
DNA records, imply that he does not believe keeping DNA records to be 
beneficial. By means of this alleged inconsistency, the Prime Minister seems to 
attempt to exclude the standpoint of the Leader of the Opposition from the 
discussion. Mr. Brown’s non-acceptance of Mr. Cameron’s standpoint initiates an 
argumentative confrontation. However, instead of proceeding with the 
argumentative discussion of the standpoint he does not accept, Mr. Brown 
attempts to rule the standpoint out.2 
When a discussant attempts to exclude a standpoint from the discussion 
by means of an accusation of inconsistency, the discussant claims that the 
proponent of the standpoint cannot be committed to this standpoint because he 
1 For more information about this case, see the coverage of BBC News at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7253989.stm 
2 The exchange of questions and answers about the DNA data check goes on for two more rounds, 
in which the two parties reformulate their positions and advance new ones. However, the first 
round, which is examined here, can be considered independently for the sake of illustrating how 
the Prime Minister employs a charge of inconsistency in an attempt to rule out a standpoint of the 
Opposition. In addition, the first round can be considered a complete independent exchange 
because it is very common in Question Time that the question-answer exchange about an issue is 
one round only. The Prime Minister takes that into account as he provides answers to the 




                                                 
can also be held committed to a position that is inconsistent with it. By means of 
the accusation of inconsistency, the discussant attempts to rule out a standpoint as 
untenable, lead its proponent to retract it and consequently put an end to the 
initial disagreement about it in the argumentative confrontation. The latter is 
beneficial for a discussant who does not accept a standpoint and yet finds it 
difficult to refute it. Also beneficial is the resort to accusations of inconsistency as 
a means to rule out standpoints that one wishes not to discuss. That is so at least 
because it seems fair to assume that a discussant cannot maintain two mutually 
inconsistent positions simultaneously.  
The Prime Minister’s responses to standpoints from the Opposition by 
accusations of inconsistency seem particularly opportune in the kind of 
parliamentary session in which they here occur. In Question Time, parliamentary 
rules and conventions restrict the discussants’ range of the argumentative 
positions they can adopt. For example, as Head of Government, the Prime 
Minister is required to defend his Government’s plans, policies and actions 
against criticism. He is, consequently, expected to assume a position in which he 
refutes standpoints of MPs from the Opposition whenever these express criticism 
of his Government. In the exchange above, for example, Mr. Brown is required to 
refute Mr. Cameron’s standpoint that the failure of the Government to check the 
DNA data of 4,000 serious criminals for more than a year is catastrophic. The 
exclusion of this standpoint, which is not easy to refute, is particularly beneficial 
to the Prime Minister in view of his institutional obligation.  
Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s choice of accusations of inconsistency 
as a means to exclude opposition standpoints seems particularly opportune 
considering how crucial for public political discussions the value of political 
consistency is. The damage a charge of inconsistency can cause to the public 
image of the politician accused goes way beyond the scope of the exchange in 
which it occurs.  Mr. Brown’s accusation of inconsistency above is an example. 
By implying that the Leader of the Opposition cannot be for and against keeping 
full DNA records at the same time, Mr. Brown attempts not only to avoid a 
discussion of the criticism that he cannot refute but also to damage the image of 
the Leader of the Opposition as a high profile politician seeking the leadership of 




policy cannot be expected to provide better governance.  
Even though it is in principle not unreasonable to request the proponent of 
a standpoint to be consistent, attempting to exclude a standpoint from the 
discussion by means of an alleged inconsistency can be a case of the ad hominem 
fallacy. The infamous tu quoque variant is typically associated with discussants’ 
attempts to silence their co-discussants by pointing out inconsistencies between 
the co-discussants’ words and deeds. The question may therefore be raised as for 
when the Prime Minister’s accusation is a reasonable attempt to rule out an 
untenable standpoint of the Opposition, and when it is a fallacious attempt to 
silence the Opposition. This question gets more complicated once institutional 
political considerations are taken into account. Given that holding the 
Government to account is central to the argumentative practice of Question Time, 
is it at all reasonable to rule out a standpoint in which criticism of the 
Government is expressed? Conversely, given that political consistency is 
particularly significant in government-related discussions, is it not justifiable to 
consider all inconsistent positions untenable and to rule them out consequently?  
In order to shed light on the Prime Minister’s responses, described above, 
this study was undertaken.  
 
1.2 A pragma-dialectical approach to the Prime Minister’s accusations 
The Prime Minister’s accusations of inconsistency in response to standpoints 
from the Opposition will be examined from the perspective of the pragma-
dialectical approach to argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2003a). This approach is particularly useful for the 
intended examination because it provides a view and tools that are instrumental 
for an analytically insightful and critically evaluative account of the Prime 
Minister’s responses at issue. 
In pragma-dialectics, argumentation is viewed as “a verbal, social and 
rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a 
standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting 
the proposition expressed in the standpoint” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 




starting points, according to which argumentation as a subject matter is 
functionalised, externalised, socialised and dialectified (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1984, 2004). As explained by van Eemeren and Grootendorst,  
Functionalisation means that we treat every language activity as a 
purposive act. Externalisation means that we target the public 
commitments entailed by the performance of certain language activities. 
Socialisation means that we relate these commitments to the interaction 
that takes place with other people through the language activities in 
question. Finally, dialectification means that we regard the language 
activities as part of an attempt to resolve a difference of opinion in 
accordance with critical norms of reasonableness (2004: pp. 52-53). 
The principles of functionalisation and socialisation are particularly relevant for 
the study of the Prime Minister’s responses at issue. These two principles 
contribute significantly to a view of argumentation that encompasses all the 
elements of argumentative discourse that are relevant to the defence or refutation 
of a point of view and accounts well for the interactional aspect inherent in such 
discourse. Both principles are necessary for the examination of the Prime 
Minister’s responses at issue.  
The principle of functionalisation allows for an analysis of the Prime 
Minister’s responses as part of an argumentative discourse. In spite of their 
importance in argumentative practice, the Prime Minister’s responses at issue 
would not be taken into account by many approaches to argumentation. Because 
they are attempts to avoid the discussion of a standpoint, rather than to provide a 
defence of it, the Prime Minister’s responses at issue would fall outside the scope 
of examination of product-oriented approaches, the subject matter of which is 
restricted to the constellations of statements that constitute a defence of a point of 
view. In contrast, because the pragma-dialectical approach adopts a 
functionalised view of argumentative discourse, in this approach, the subject 
matter includes the whole process through which points of view are defended or 
refuted. The subject of investigation in a pragma-dialectical approach 
encompasses all the speech acts that are functional to the defence or refutation of 
a point of view. These include not only the speech act complex of argumentation, 
but also speech acts such as asserting a standpoint and expressing doubt about it. 
The interactional aspect of the Prime Minister’s responses at issue can be 
accounted for in a pragma-dialectical examination thanks to the meta-theoretical 




convincing, rather than merely justifying or refuting, takes argumentation to 
involve not only a party that defends a point of view, but also a party that needs to 
be convinced of this point of view, i.e. the critic. Argumentation can thus be seen 
as a dialogic exchange of speech acts between a party that defends a standpoint 
and a party that doubts it underlies. The speech acts performed by both parties 
communicate information, incur commitments and obligations that guide the 
development of the interaction and shape the argumentative discourse 
accordingly. Such a social and interactional view of argumentation allows for 
investigating the Prime Minister’s accusations of inconsistency in a way that does 
justice to their function in discourse, i.e. as critical responses to standpoints 
expressed by the Opposition. 
In addition to the beneficial view of argumentation that the pragma-
dialectical approach offers, the approach provides theoretical tools that are useful 
for the investigation of the Prime Minister’s responses at issue. Three of such 
tools are particularly relevant for this study: first, the ideal model of a critical 
discussion designed to describe the different stages an ideal argumentative 
discourse needs to pass through and the dialectical obligations according to which 
ideal arguers need to act (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984); second, the 
concept of strategic manoeuvring coined to account for the tension between 
arguers’ ideal dialectical obligation and their actual concern with being 
rhetorically effective (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999); and third, the concept 
of argumentative activity types, introduced to address the (mostly 
institutionalised) conventional aspects of argumentative practice (van Eemeren & 
Houtlosser, 2005). 
The pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion is a procedural 
model that describes how argumentative discourse would be structured were such 
discourse to be solely aimed at resolving differences of opinion. The model spells 
out four stages that are necessary for a dialectical resolution of differences of 
opinion, i.e. the resolution of a dispute by means of critically testing the 
standpoints at issue. In the first stage of a critical discussion, the difference of 
opinion needs to be externalised: clarity must be achieved as to which standpoints 
are to be defended and what doubt or criticism has to be overcome (the 




procedural starting points of the discussion are (the opening stage). The 
arguments advanced in support of the standpoint(s) at stake need to be 
systematically tested (the argumentation stage) based on which the outcome of 
the discussion can be established (the concluding stage). For each of the stages, 
the model specifies the types of speech acts that can contribute to the resolution 
of the difference of opinion. On the basis of these types, the discussant’s 
dialectical obligations pertinent to each of the dialectical stages are specified. For 
example, in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, the party who 
challenges an expressed standpoint needs to express clearly what kind of 
challenge is involved: it should advance either the speech act of casting doubt 
upon the standpoint expressed or the speech act of advancing the opposite 
standpoint.3  
As a heuristic and analytic tool, the model provides a template against 
which argumentative practice is to be compared in order to recover its underlying 
argumentative organisation. In a pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative 
exchanges, actual exchanges are first reconstructed in terms of the ideal model of 
a critical discussion. The reconstruction reveals the argumentative function of the 
different contributions discussants make as part of an argumentative exchange.4 
The Prime Minister’s responses at issue respond to a standpoint of the Opposition 
by casting doubt on it. Because the responses do not provide arguments in support 
of standpoints but cast doubt on them instead, the argumentative function of the 
responses might not be easily recognisable. Viewed in light of the ideal model, 
the responses can be seen to occur in those parts of argumentative exchanges in 
which differences of opinion come about and which are to be reconstructed as 
part of the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, hereafter argumentative 
confrontations. Seeing the responses as part of argumentative confrontations 
reveals the role they play in the definition of the difference of opinion, and traces 
the effect they can have on the argumentative resolution of the difference of 
opinion. 
3 According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), the speech act of casting doubt is an 
illocutionary negation of a commissive speech act by means of which a speaker expresses his non-
acceptance of the speech act he reacts to. 
4 Elaborate discussions of the merits and problems of reconstruction can be found in 




                                                 
As a critical evaluative tool, the model provides a template against which 
argumentative practice is to be compared in order to assess its reasonableness. In 
the ideal model, the exchange of speech acts is regulated by a discussion 
procedure motivated by a dialectical notion of reasonableness, in which 
reasonable argumentative discourse is taken to be geared towards a resolution of 
the difference of opinion that is achieved by critically testing the standpoints at 
stake (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: pp. 135-157). The procedure 
incorporates fifteen rules that need to be followed in order for a discussion to 
proceed reasonably. As van Eemeren and Grootendorst explain, “the rules specify 
in which cases the performance of certain speech acts contributes to the (critical) 
resolution of the difference of opinion” (2004: p. 135). In a pragma-dialectical 
evaluation of a piece of argumentative discourse, reasonableness is assessed by 
checking the extent to which actual argumentative moves adhere to the rules for a 
critical discussion and contribute positively to the resolution of the difference of 
opinion. In light of this dialectical conception of reasonableness, argumentative 
moves such as the Prime Minister’s responses at issue would be judged as 
reasonable moves whenever they constitute argumentative contributions that 
further the critical testing of points of view. If they constitute contributions that 
hinder the testing, they will be judged as fallacious. Given that critical testing can 
be highly instrumental in achieving political accountability by subjecting the 
performance of the Government to the utmost of scrutiny, it will be particularly 
beneficial to judge the reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s responses at issue 
on the basis of their contribution to the critical testing of the standpoints that are 
being discussed. 
While the ideal model of a critical discussion provides a tool to take into 
account the discussants’ interest in critically testing standpoints, when analysing 
and evaluating the Prime Minister’s responses at issue,5 the concept of strategic 
manoeuvring provides a tool to do justice to the discussants’ interest in winning 
the discussions in which they get involved. As van Eemeren and Houtlosser 
(2003a) observe, discussants in actual argumentative practice are not only 
5 The pursuit of a critical resolution of differences of opinion is not merely ideal. In a number of 
studies, van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels (e.g. van Eemeren et al. 2009) have shown that the 
dialectical norm is intersubjectively valid among normal language users. In other words, the 
critical resolution of differences of opinion is an ideal the pursuit of which can be attributed to 




                                                 
concerned with critically testing their standpoints, but they are also concerned 
with getting these standpoints accepted (p. 391).  
The concerns with critical reasonableness and with rhetorical 
effectiveness can be at odds with each other. It is not unusual that critical testing 
steers the discussion away from the favourable outcome of getting one’s point of 
view accepted: a standpoint might not pass the critical testing, in which case it is 
to be retracted rather than accepted. Neither is it unusual that discussions are 
steered towards a favourable outcome by hindering the critical testing procedure: 
standpoints might get accepted as a result of silencing critical reactions rather 
than addressing them. And yet, balancing the two concerns is not out of the 
question: it is perfectly possible for discussants to win discussions by means of 
reasonable argumentation. It is the pursuit of such balance that van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser call strategic manoeuvring.  
According to van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2000, 2002c, 2006), in 
argumentative practice, discussants attempt to strike a balance between 
(dialectical) reasonableness and (rhetorical) effectiveness with every move they 
make. In every move, discussants make opportune choices of topics, audience 
frames and stylistic devices in an attempt to critically test the standpoints at issue 
and steer the discussion towards a favourable outcome. This view sheds 
significant light on the Prime Minister’s responses at issue. Seen from the 
perspective of strategic manoeuvring, the Prime Minister’s resort to an accusation 
of inconsistency can be viewed as a potentially reasonable and opportune choice. 
The accusation has the potential to steer the discussion towards the favourable 
outcome of ruling out standpoints of the Opposition in a reasonable way: it 
declares them untenable on the –in principle– reasonable ground that one cannot 
maintain two mutually inconsistent positions simultaneously. 
The concept of strategic manoeuvring does not only refine the pragma-
dialectical analysis of argumentative practice, but also the evaluation of such a 
practice. The pragma-dialectical view of fallacies as argumentative moves that 
hinder the critical testing of standpoints can be refined in view of the tension 
inherent in the simultaneous pursuit of dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical 
effectiveness. In view of the concept of strategic manoeuvring, fallacies can be 




with that of dialectical reasonableness and allowing the former to override the 
latter.6 In such cases, where the balance is distorted in favour of rhetorical 
effectiveness, a discussant’s strategic manoeuvring is said to have derailed (van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2003b). Seeing unreasonable argumentative moves as 
derailments of strategic manoeuvring allows for a more adequate evaluative 
account of the Prime Minister’s responses at issue. It then becomes possible to 
explain why the Prime Minister’s responses at issue are reasonable in some cases 
and unreasonable in others: in principle, the response can be a sound instance of 
strategic manoeuvring when the accusation is employed in an attempt to rule out 
an untenable standpoint without obstructing the critical testing procedure. It can, 
however, also be an instance of derailed strategic manoeuvring if the accusation 
silences the proponent of a standpoint and hinders the critical testing procedure. 
While the ideal model of a critical discussion and the concept of strategic 
manoeuvring provide insight into the argumentative dimension of the Prime 
Minister’s responses at issue, the concept of argumentative activity types (van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005) provides insight into the institutional dimension of 
the responses. The concept was introduced into the pragma-dialectical framework 
in order to account for those aspects of argumentative practice that are 
conventionalised, typically as a result of rules and conventions of a more or less 
formalised institutional context in which argumentation takes place. As 
introduced by van Eemeren and Houtlosser, argumentative activity types are 
“cultural artifacts that can be identified on the basis of careful empirical 
observation of argumentative practice” (2005: p. 76).7 Van Eemeren and 
6 According to van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003b), an argumentative move is reasonable as long 
as the critical testing of standpoints is not hindered by the discussants’ pursuit of rhetorical 
effectiveness, i.e. as long as the balance between dialectical soundness and rhetorical effectiveness 
is not disturbed in favour of the latter. In the case that it is the pursuit of dialectical soundness that 
overrules the pursuit of rhetorical effectiveness, van Eemeren and Houtlosser do not talk of 
unreasonable moves, but of misfires instead.  
7 In their article ‘Theoretical Construction and Argumentative Reality’, where they introduce the 
concept of argumentative activity types into the pragma-dialectical framework, van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser state that they view argumentative activity types as somehow different from 
Levinson’s (1979, 1991) activity types (2005: p.76). Levinson’s concept of activity type refers to  
[a] culturally recognised activity, […] a fuzzy category whose focal members are goal-
defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraints on participants, setting, 
and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contributions 
In spite of the similarity between the two –they both describe conventionalised communicative 
rule-governed practice–, the concepts refer to descriptions that differ in their degree of abstraction 




                                                 
Houtlosser observe that rules and conventions of the contexts in which 
argumentation occurs create preconditions for argumentation that constrain 
arguers’ strategic manoeuvring. The rules and conventions limit the arguer’s 
choice of topics, audience frames and stylistic devices. Consequently, some of the 
arguers’ possibilities to steer the discussion in their own favour in a reasonable 
way are closed off while other possibilities open up (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 
2007b).  
Taking the rules and conventions of Prime Minister's Question Time into 
account seems of major importance when studying the Prime Minister’s 
responses at issue. It is crucial, for example, that the Prime Minister has the 
institutional obligation to defend his Government against the criticism of his 
fellow MPs. Such a convention seems to close off the Prime Minister’s –usually 
open– possibility to accept opposition standpoints without challenge. The Prime 
Minister’s attempt to rule out opposition standpoints seems more opportune in 
view of such a limitation. By shedding light on the institutional dimensions of the 
strategic function of the Prime Minister’s response at issue, the concept of 
argumentative activity types contributes to an empirically adequate analytic 
account of the responses at issue. The concept provides insight that can also 
refine the evaluative account of the Prime Minister’s responses at issue. Rules 
and conventions can be the source of criteria for assessing the reasonableness of 
argumentative moves. In the case of the Prime Minister’s response at issue, it 
seems for example plausible that, in order to judge whether the inconsistencies 
alleged by the Prime Minister are relevant to the discussion of opposition 
standpoints or not, one needs to consider the extent to which discussants are 
expected to be consistent in the specific context of Question Time. 
 
1.3 Objectives and organisation of this study 
This study comes as part of a larger pragma-dialectical project to examine 
argumentation in institutionalised contexts. Like the other studies in the project, it 
examines the influence of the rules and conventions of institutionalised contexts 
on arguers’ attempts to balance dialectical soundness and rhetorical effectiveness. 




attempts to balance dialectical soundness and rhetorical effectiveness when he 
responds by accusations of inconsistency to opposition standpoints in the 
particular context of Question Time in the British House of Commons. The 
account to be given will encompass an analytic view of the responses, in which 
their strategic function as a particular way of manoeuvring is spelled out, as well 
as an evaluative view, in which the conditions are specified that need to be 
fulfilled in order for the response to be considered reasonable.  
To achieve the main objective of this study, I shall first give an account of 
the particular way of strategic manoeuvring in which a discussant responds to a 
standpoint he does not accept by an accusation of inconsistency. By taking the 
pragma-dialectical approach to activity types as a starting point for a thorough 
examination of the argumentative practice of Prime Minister’s Question Time, I 
shall then systematically derive institutional insights for the analysis and 
evaluation of this way of strategic manoeuvring. Finally, these institutional 
insights will be applied in the analysis and evaluation of the Prime Minister’s 
responses to opposition standpoints by accusations of inconsistency, leading to a 
more empirically adequate and consequently more critically insightful account of 
these recurrent argumentative moves.  
I intend to achieve the main objective of the study by answering the 
following research questions. 
(1) What strategic function can in general be ascribed to accusations of 
inconsistency that come in response to contested standpoints? 
(2) How is the arguers’ simultaneous pursuit of critical reasonableness and 
rhetorical effectiveness in defining their difference of opinion constrained 
by the rules and conventions of Prime Minister's Question Time? 
(3) What is, in the specific context of Prime Minister's Question Time, the 
strategic function of the Prime Minister’s responses with accusations of 
inconsistency to standpoints from the Opposition?  
(4) Under which conditions are the Prime Minister’s responses at issue 
reasonable? 
The study is divided accordingly into six chapters. Except for the introductory 
and concluding chapters, each chapter addresses one of the research questions 




In order to answer the first question, Chapter 2 characterises accusations 
of inconsistency that come in response to critical standpoints, such as the Prime 
Minister’s responses at issue, as instances of a particular way of strategic 
manoeuvring that occurs in argumentative confrontations. The responses are 
examined in the context of the discussants’ pursuit of defining their differences of 
opinion in a way that is at the same time both reasonable and favourable to them. 
Responding to a standpoint by an accusation of inconsistency is in this chapter 
analysed as a way of expressing doubt in an attempt to make the proponent of the 
standpoint retract his standpoint, and consequently, terminate the dispute about it 
at the early stage of argumentative confrontation. The accusation is discussed as 
an opportune choice by means of which a discussant attempts to steer the 
argumentative confrontation about a standpoint that he does not accept towards 
the favourable outcome of an elimination of the initial disagreement about this 
standpoint, in what can in principle be a reasonable way. 
In Chapter 3, the argumentative practice of Prime Minister's Question 
Time is examined as an argumentative activity type. The practice is described, 
discussed and characterised in terms of the ideal model of a critical discussion. 
Special attention is devoted to the argumentative confrontations in Question 
Time. The characterisation is intended to identify the preconditions for 
argumentation that result from the rules and conventions of the parliamentary 
session.  
In Chapter 4, the Prime Minister’s responses at issue are particularly 
examined in view of the insights gained from Chapter 2 about the argumentative 
strategic function of responses to standpoints by accusations of inconsistency, 
combined with the insights gained in Chapter 3 about the argumentative practice 
of Prime Minister's Question Time. The examination is aimed at providing a 
detailed analytic account of the Prime Minister’s responses at issue, in which the 
institutional dimension of their strategic function is highlighted.  
In Chapter 5, the reasonableness of the response at issue is discussed. 
First, pragmatic and dialectical perspectives on reasonableness are combined in 
the investigation of the reasonableness of accusations of inconsistency as an 
expression of doubt in response to contested standpoints. Starting from the 




sound if the pursuit of a favourable definition of the difference of opinion does 
not override the pursuit of a definition that furthers the critical testing of points of 
view (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2003a), and taking the characteristics of the 
speech act of accusation of inconsistency into account, general soundness 
conditions are set for the way of strategic manoeuvring at issue. By also taking 
characteristics of the activity type of Prime Minister's Question Time into 
account, the soundness conditions will be made more specific. By formulating 
these soundness conditions, I aim at providing a critically insightful evaluative 
account of the Prime Minister’s response at issue.  
In the last chapter of this study (Chapter 6), the findings of the previous 
chapters will be discussed. These findings are summarised and their significant 
implications are pointed out and assessed, based on which suggestions for further 






2 STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING WITH ACCUSATIONS OF INCONSISTENCY 
 
2.1 Explicit attempts to avoid a discussion 
It may very easily happen in Question Time that the Prime Minister is confronted 
with criticism that he would rather not discuss. For example, he may have no 
strong defence against a point of view of the Opposition that is critical with 
respect to the consequences of a government policy or plan, but still would rather 
not admit that things are not going as they should. In such cases, it seems 
advantageous for the Prime Minister to avoid a discussion about the criticism 
expressed. Sometimes, the Prime Minister’s attempt to avoid the discussion of a 
certain point of view is discreet. The Prime Minister may for instance respond to 
the initial critical standpoint of the Opposition by advancing and defending an 
alternative standpoint of his own that is different from the initial standpoint but 
related to the same issue. Cases of evasion arise from these discreet attempts. The 
exchange below, between Ian Duncan Smith, the leader of the Opposition, and 
Tony Blair, the Prime Minister, is an example. 
(1)  Ian Duncan Smith (Leader of the Opposition):  
May I join the Prime Minister in congratulating Her Majesty on the 50th anniversary of 
her accession? Will the Prime Minister tell the House whether the number of cancelled 
operations has risen or fallen since he came to power?  
Tony Blair (Prime Minister):  
It has risen; however—[Hon. Members: "How much?"] It has risen by about 20,000; 
however, the number of operations as a whole has also risen by more than 500,000; 19 
out of 20 operations are done on time; the average waiting time for an operation has 
fallen since 1997; and, therefore, although it is correct that the number of cancelled 
operations has risen, if we look at the number of operations as a whole—more than 5.5 
million in this country—I think that the national health service has a record to be proud 
of.  
Mr. Duncan Smith:  
The answer is quite correct: 50 per cent. I have to tell the Prime Minister that that is not 
just a figure. He talks about the rise in the number of operations done, but the numbers 
that have been cancelled have risen as well, and that is a real tragedy for those who have 
to wait. [Interruption.] Well, the reality—he may not want to hear this—is that this is not 
one or two cases, but 80,000 people who have had their operations cancelled on the day 
when they were expecting to have them. That is a matter of fear and anxiety for 80,000 
people—many more than when he came to power. So, as those numbers have risen and 






As I explained a moment ago, far more operations have been done by the national health 
service—about 500,000 more. Less than 2 per cent. of operations are cancelled, which 
should put the matter in perspective. The only answer is indeed to increase the capacity 
of the health service, including more nurses, doctors and consultants, as well as other 
staff, and more beds. That is precisely why we are increasing investment in the national 
health service. The right hon. Gentleman is in favour of cutting that investment. 
Therefore, whatever the problems of cancelled operations—I say that they should be put 
in perspective—the remedy that he has, which is to cut that investment, is the wrong 
remedy. The remedy that we have—invest and reform—is the right one.  
(House of Commons official report, 2002) 
Mr. Duncan Smith’s question, in his first turn, whether the number of 
cancelled operations has risen or fallen since the Prime Minister came to power 
cannot be meant literally. There is no doubt that the Leader of the Conservative 
Opposition knows well that the number of cancelled operations has risen under 
the Labour Government. In fact, by means of the question, Mr. Duncan Smith 
means to imply a critical standpoint regarding the National Health Service (NHS), 
namely that there is a problematic rise in the number of cancelled operations. In 
his response, Mr. Blair answers the literal question but avoids discussing the 
critical standpoint implied. He admits that the number has risen, but does not 
want to discuss whether this is a problematic rise or not. From his answer, it 
seems that Mr. Blair would rather discuss the performance of the NHS in general. 
The figures he presents of the number of operations carried out by the NHS in 
general, the percentage of operations carried out on time and the average waiting 
time are all arguments that he presents in defence of an alternative standpoint, 
namely that the NHS has a record to be proud of. By portraying the rise in the 
number of cancelled operations as trivial in comparison with the record of the 
NHS, Mr. Blair attempts to avoid a discussion about the standpoint of the 
Opposition without the need to express explicitly that he is not willing to discuss 
the rise itself.  
Mr. Blair’s attempt to avoid discussing Mr. Duncan Smith’s standpoint 
about the problematic nature of the rise in the number of the cancelled operations 
is not really successful. In his next turn, Mr. Duncan Smith persists in expressing 
his standpoint, and cites the actual number of cancelled operations, 80,000 cases, 
arguing that such a huge number cannot be considered trivial. Mr. Duncan 
Smith’s persistence gets Mr. Blair to discuss, in the turn that follows, the 




turn, Mr. Blair concedes that the rise can be considered a problem but he does so 
only to criticise the Opposition and justify the policies of his own Government; 
he says ‘whatever the problems of cancelled operations –I say that they should be 
put in perspective– the remedy that he has, which is to cut that investment, is the 
wrong remedy. The remedy that we have—invest and reform—is the right one’. 
In spite of this criticism, Mr. Blair’s concession is important for Mr. Duncan 
Smith, who uses it, eventually, to support yet another critical standpoint: 
government policies are damaging the NHS. This standpoint is hinted at when 
Mr. Duncan Smith says ‘So, as those numbers have risen and 80,000 people have 
had their operations cancelled, will he now tell us the reason why?’ in his second 
turn. In his third turn which will be discussed in example (3) to come, this 
standpoint is expressed explicitly. 
 The Prime Minister’s attempt to avoid the discussion can also be far less 
discreet. The Prime Minister might for example attempt to exclude from the 
discussion a critical standpoint of the Opposition by portraying the standpoint as 
not worth any discussion. In such attempts, the Prime Minister expresses 
explicitly that he is not willing to discuss a certain critical standpoint of the 
Opposition even though he does not accept it. In this study, I shall refer to the 
Prime Minister’s explicit attempts to avoid discussing a standpoint of the 
Opposition as attempts to exclude that standpoint from the discussion. I take the 
explicit unwillingness to discuss a certain standpoint to be central to the attempt 
of a discussant to exclude another discussant’s standpoint from the discussion. In 
fact, it is this explicit unwillingness that distinguishes the attempt to exclude a 
standpoint from the discussion from the mere evasion of a standpoint, both being 
attempts to avoid the discussion about a certain standpoint.  
The expression of unwillingness usually involves some justification for 
excluding from the discussion the standpoint that is not accepted. For example, 
the Prime Minister often portrays the standpoint he wishes to exclude as 
ridiculous, inappropriate or even illegitimate. The exchange below is an example 
of the Prime Minister’s attempts to justify excluding from the discussion a 






(2)  David Cameron (Leader of the Opposition):  
There are currently six police investigations under way into the conduct of 
government in London. The most recent allegations are that the London Mayor’s 
director for equalities and policing has been channelling public funds into 
organisations run by friends and cronies. Does the Prime Minister agree with me that 
that is completely unacceptable? 
Gordon Brown (Prime Minister): 
As on any occasion when a matter referring to a police investigation is raised, I have 
to say this is a matter for the police. It should be fully investigated, but it is not a 
matter for this House until the police complete their investigations. 
(House of Commons official report, 2008c) 
Mr. Cameron’s question to the Prime Minister addresses the conduct of 
the Government in London in light of a heated controversy over an alleged 
misuse of public funds by Lee Jasper, the London Mayor’s Senior Policy Advisor 
on Equalities. In his question, Mr. Cameron implies that it is unacceptable that 
the London Mayor’s director for equalities and policing -Lee Jasper- has been 
channelling public funds into organisations run by friends and cronies. A 
difference of opinion is presumed to arise in relation to this standpoint. Mr. 
Brown can be expected not to accept the standpoint implied, if only because he 
would not want to agree with a point of view that is negative of a civil servant 
who is a fellow member of the Labour Party. Mr. Brown is, however, unwilling to 
engage in a discussion about the standpoint implied. The case mentioned should 
not be the subject of a discussion in Parliament because it is being investigated by 
the police, he argues. By referring to the Parliament’s sub judice rule, according 
to which Houses of Parliament must not discuss current or impending court cases 
(Rogers & Walters, 2006: p. 303), Mr. Brown attempts to exclude from the 
discussion a standpoint that he does not accept. Regardless of the reasons behind 
this attempt –it could be that, on the one hand, the Prime Minister finds it difficult 
to engage in a discussion about Mr. Cameron’s standpoint because he has no 
evidence against the alleged corruption, but that, on the other hand, he would not 
want to seem hesitant about the unacceptability of the alleged corruption– Mr. 
Brown’s response is an example of a very common (and institutionally 
acceptable) way of excluding standpoints expressed by the Opposition in 
Question Time.  
Another common way of excluding standpoints expressed by the 
Opposition in Question Time is when the Prime Minister justifies the exclusion of 




latter’s position. These attempts constitute the focus of this study. The following 
is an example: 
(3)   Ian Duncan Smith (Leader of the Opposition): 
[…] The answer that he did not give to my question is that hospital beds are in short 
supply because they are being blocked by people who cannot get a care home or nursing 
home bed. The figure that he did not want to provide is that 40,000—nearly 10 per 
cent.—fewer care home beds are available since 1997 when he took over. Age Concern 
says that the care sector is in crisis. The head of the Registered Nursing Homes 
Association said that Government policy was to blame. The Government's policies are 
damaging the NHS. Is not the Prime Minister's real achievement after five years to have 
increased both the queue to get into hospital and the queue to get out?  
Tony Blair (Prime Minister):  
Public sector investment in the health service has increased under the Government and is 
continuing to increase. We are roughly the only major industrial country anywhere in the 
world that is increasing expenditure on health and education as a proportion of national 
income. Is it the Conservative party's case that we are not spending enough on health and 
education? When we announced our spending plans, Conservatives called them reckless 
and irresponsible. We know that the right hon. Gentleman wants to run down the national 
health service because he does not believe in it. The clearest evidence of that came 
yesterday, when the Leader of the Opposition said:  
"The health service doesn't serve anybody . . . It doesn't serve doctors or nurses. 
It doesn't help the people who are treated."  
What an insult to the NHS and the people who work in it! Conservatives denigrate the 
health service because they want to undermine it. We want to increase investment, 
whereas the right hon. Gentleman would cut it. 
(House of Commons official report, 2002) 
The question and answer are part of the same exchange as example (1) earlier. 
After the Leader of the Opposition had managed to get the Prime Minister to 
concede that the rise of cancelled operations is problematic (example (1)), he 
advances in his question, in example (3) above, the standpoint that government 
policies are damaging the NHS.  
Mr. Blair’s response is again an attempt to avoid discussing the critical 
standpoint of the Opposition, this time by an explicit attempt to exclude this 
standpoint from the discussion. Referring to the Conservatives’ opposition to 
more investment in health, as well as quoting Mr. Duncan Smith about the 
worthlessness of the NHS, Mr. Blair claims that Mr. Duncan Smith cannot be 
critical of government policies in relation to the NHS. As presented by Mr. Blair, 
the view that government policies are to blame for damaging the NHS, which was 
put forward in the question of Mr. Duncan Smith, is inconsistent with Mr. 
Duncan Smith’s previous positions, namely that the NHS does not deserve to be 
taken care of. By presenting the current point of view of Mr. Duncan Smith as 




Duncan Smith’s current point of view as a position that is untenable. In other 
words, Mr. Blair points out an inconsistency in Mr. Duncan Smith’s position in 
an attempt to exclude his standpoint from the discussion. 
 
2.2 The elimination of the initial disagreement  
The attempts of the Prime Minister to exclude from the discussion a standpoint of 
the Opposition occur in argumentative confrontations. In these confrontations, 
there is an initial disagreement between the Prime Minister and the Opposition 
about a critical point of the Opposition. This disagreement can give rise to an 
externalised difference of opinion to be resolved by means of argumentation if the 
Prime Minister and the Opposition maintain their points of view and express 
commitment to them. The Prime Minister’s attempts to exclude opposition 
standpoints from the discussion are attempts to do away with the initial 
disagreement without argumentation. The Prime Minister wants to point out the 
untenability of the standpoint of the Opposition, aiming to lead the MP from the 
Opposition to retract it. The retraction of the standpoint is favourable to the Prime 
Minister: it eliminates the initial disagreement that triggered the argumentative 
confrontation and creates a situation in which the Prime Minister does not need to 
refute the criticism he does not accept.  
The Prime Minister’s attempts to eliminate his disagreement with the 
Opposition about standpoints expressed by the latter, by means of accusations of 
inconsistency, can be considered as instances of confrontational strategic 
manoeuvring. As defined by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2003b) strategic 
manoeuvring refers to the arguers’ attempt to reasonably steer the discussion 
towards a favourable outcome. It is the attempt with every argumentative move in 
a discussion to strike a balance between the aim of critically testing a point of 
view, i.e. the dialectical aim, and the aim of winning the discussion, i.e. the 
rhetorical aim. Confrontational strategic manoeuvring, which is the arguers’ 
strategic manoeuvring in argumentative confrontations, concerns the definition of 
the difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007b). In argumentative 
confrontations, arguers are expected to pursue the dialectical aim of defining the 




procedure. In this stage of an argumentative discussion, arguers are also expected 
to pursue the rhetorical aim of defining the difference of opinion in the most 
opportune way in order to win the discussion. To strategically manoeuvre in this 
stage is to attempt to strike a balance between these two specific aims and attempt 
to reach a definition of the difference of opinion that is opportune without 
hindering the critical testing procedure. 
Argumentative confrontation can lead to different outcomes. That is to say 
that different types of disputes (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992a: pp. 16-22) 
can result from the different ways in which an initial disagreement between two 
arguers evolves in their confrontation. For example, arguers arrive at a definition 
of their difference of opinion as a non-mixed dispute when the standpoint at issue 
is (merely) not accepted, i.e. is faced with mere doubt. In such cases, one of the 
arguers expresses a certain standpoint and upholds it while the other expresses 
and upholds doubt concerning this expressed standpoint. In other cases, the 
standpoint at issue is also rejected. In that case, the definition of the difference of 
opinion obtained is a mixed dispute, in which one of the arguers expresses and 
upholds a certain standpoint against the (expressed and upheld) doubt of the other 
arguer who expresses and upholds an opposite standpoint. There are, however, 
also cases in which the argumentative confrontation evolves in a way that 
eliminates the disagreement. For example, the arguer who has advanced a certain 
standpoint may realise, once his standpoint is faced with doubt, that he cannot 
commit himself to the defence of this standpoint, and may therefore retract (rather 
than uphold) the standpoint that he has advanced. The outcome of the 
confrontation in such a case is a definition of the difference of opinion as no 
dispute.8  
The Prime Minister’s attempts to eliminate his disagreement with the 
Opposition, in the examples (2) and (3) above, are examples of confrontational 
strategic manoeuvring that aims at arriving at the definition of the difference of 
opinion as no dispute. In these attempts, the Prime Minister casts doubt upon the 
critical standpoint of the Opposition by pointing out reasons for considering this 
8 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a) do not mention no dispute as one of the types of 
disputes that can result from argumentative confrontations; however, the retraction of a standpoint 
advanced and the retraction of the doubt cast are listed as options that are available to arguers in 
the confrontation (1984: p. 101). The definition of the difference of opinion as a no dispute is the 




                                                 
standpoint untenable, aiming to lead the Opposition to retract it. In example (2), 
Mr. Brown’s reference to the sub judice rule provides support for considering Mr. 
Cameron’s point of view about the Lee Jasper case untenable: Mr. Cameron 
cannot have a claim about a matter that is still undergoing a police investigation. 
Likewise, in example (3), Mr. Blair’s pointing out of an inconsistency in Mr. 
Duncan Smith’s position provides support for considering the latter’s position 
untenable: Mr. Duncan Smith cannot uphold a claim that is inconsistent with 
another position that he can be held committed to.  
In both cases, above, the retraction of the critical standpoint by the 
Opposition would bring about an outcome of the argumentative confrontation that 
is favourable to the Prime Minister. Mr. Brown would not need to engage in a 
discussion concerning the behaviour of Lee Jasper, and yet he might be 
considered to have defeated Mr. Cameron who had to give up his critical 
standpoint. Similarly, the success of Mr. Blair’s accusation of inconsistency 
against Mr. Duncan Smith would spare him the need to discuss whether or not 
government policies are to blame for damaging the NHS because Mr. Duncan 
Smith’s retraction of his critical standpoint would eliminate the initial 
disagreement about this standpoint. The definition of the difference of opinion as 
no dispute, which results from Mr. Duncan Smith’s retraction of his standpoint, is 
very likely to be considered a victory for Mr. Blair. In both cases, the Prime 
Minister seems to have managed to steer the argumentative confrontation towards 
the favourable outcome of identifying no dispute about the Opposition’s retracted 
critical standpoint, and therefore would be considered to have defeated the 
Opposition without the need to engage in a discussion concerning this standpoint. 
The Prime Minister’s resort to parliamentary rules (example (2)) or to 
accusations of inconsistency (example (3)) to rule out a standpoint of the 
Opposition provide good examples of arguers’ attempts to remain within the 
boundaries of reasonableness while steering argumentative confrontations 
towards favourable outcomes. Referring to the sub judice rule of Parliament 
seems to be a reasonable way for the Prime Minister to exclude a standpoint of 
the Opposition which concerns a case that is under police investigation. Similarly, 
pointing out an inconsistency between the Opposition’s point of view at issue and 




Opposition to retract the standpoint at issue. After all, one cannot maintain two 
mutually inconsistent positions about the same matter simultaneously. In view of 
the alleged inconsistency, it becomes in principle reasonable to consider the point 
of view at issue untenable and in need of retraction.  
As can be seen from examples (2) and (3) above, the Prime Minister’s 
explicit attempts to exclude opposition standpoints from the discussion are not 
necessarily unreasonable. Argumentative confrontations can evolve reasonably 
and yet yield a definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute. In order to 
establish in a more systematic way how reasonable argumentative confrontations 
may evolve, and how they may lead to the definition of the difference of opinion 
as no dispute, the dialectical profile of the confrontation stage of a critical 
discussion can be useful. 
 
2.3 A dialectical profile of the confrontation stage 
Dialectical profiles are heuristic tools developed within the pragma-dialectical 
framework in order to provide a step-by-step specification of the moves that the 
two discussants in a critical discussion can make or have to make (van Eemeren, 
Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007a, 2007b). The profiles represent in the 
form of dialogical trees the moves that are relevant to the critical resolution of the 
difference of opinion. For every stage of the resolution process, a dialectical 
profile can be designed to represent the sequential patterns of moves that 
contribute to the realisation of a particular dialectical aim in this stage. The 
dialectical profile of the confrontation stage would, for example, spell out the 
different procedural ways in which the difference of opinion can be defined.  
It is crucial to emphasise that dialectical profiles are not designed to 
provide a descriptive representation of how argumentative exchanges actually 
proceed; they are rather designed to provide a normative representation of how 
such exchanges ought to proceed in order for a particular dialectical aim of a 
particular dialectical stage to be realised. For example, the dialectical profile of 
the confrontation stage is designed to represent how argumentative confrontations 
ought to proceed if arguers aim at defining their difference of opinion in a 




stage of a critical discussion are expressed in terms of turns in a tree-like 
dialogical diagram.9 
In what follows, I shall propose a design for the dialectical profile of the 
confrontation stage. In designing the profile, I shall follow the principles of (a) 
systematicity, (b) comprehensiveness, (c) analyticity, (d) economy and (e) 
finiteness as suggested by van Eemeren et al. (2007b). By operating in this way, 
the presentation of sequential moves will include all the moves that are necessary 
for the achievement of every definition of the difference of opinion that is 
achieved in accordance with the ideal dialectical procedure of critical testing, 
without becoming too complex, repetitive or infinite. A basic dialectical profile 10 
of the confrontation stage of a single dispute is presented below (Figure 1) 
followed by a step-by-step specification of how an ideal confrontation can 
proceed.  
9 The idea of dialectical profiles was inspired by Walton and Krabbe’s idea of a profile of 
dialogue (Krabbe, 1992, 2002; Walton & Krabbe, 1995; Walton 1999). However, unlike profiles 
of dialogue, dialectical profiles are always supposed to be normative (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & 
Snoeck Henkemans, 2007a). That eventually makes the heuristic functions of the two concepts 
significantly different. 
10 The profile suggested is basic in the sense that it expresses the basic dialectical procedure. 
Based on it, extended profiles can be designed to highlight specific extra elements such as the 




                                                 
 
 
The confrontation stage of a critical discussion is initiated by an arguer, 
discussant 1 (D1), expressing a standpoint (turn 1), and another arguer, discussant 
2 (D2), casting doubt on it (turn 2, right branch). In these first two turns, an initial 
disagreement is externalised concerning a certain standpoint. This externalised 
initial disagreement triggers the critical discussion aimed at critically resolving 
the difference of opinion. However, the externalisation of this initial disagreement 
is not enough for a complete confrontation; the discussants need to arrive at a 
 
D1 : MP from the Opposition 
D2 : The Prime Minister  
+/p : Advance a positive standpoint concerning the proposition p 
?/(+/p) : Cast doubt on the positive standpoint 
-/p : Advance a negative standpoint concerning the proposition p 
?/(-/p) : Cast doubt on the negative standpoint 
rud/p : Request a usage declarative concerning the proposition p 
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Figure 1: Basic dialectical profile of the confrontation stage of 






definition of their difference of opinion. In order for that to happen, D1 is required 
in his next turn to either uphold his expressed standpoint or retract it (turn 3). 
Because ideally the discussants are voluntarily engaged in a critical discussion 
about a certain standpoint, both options should be allowable to D1 in response to 
the doubt of D2. While upholding the expressed standpoint would be a step 
towards confirming the initial disagreement, the retraction of the expressed 
opinion would terminate it. Retracting the expressed standpoint at this turn would 
leave the discussants with no externalised disagreement, and would therefore end 
the confrontation stage with no dispute to resolve (turn 3, right branch).11 
In response to D1 upholding his expressed opinion, D2 should also be 
given the chance to either maintain or retract his expressed doubt concerning D1’s 
expressed opinion (turn 4). Here too, both options should be granted to D2 in 
order to guarantee the discussants’ freedom of engagement in a discussion. The 
retraction of the expressed doubt by D2 would leave the discussants with no 
disagreement to resolve, and therefore end the confrontation stage with a 
definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute (turn 4, right branch). The 
upholding of doubt by D2 would in contrast confirm the difference of opinion 
between the discussants: there would then be an elementary difference of opinion, 
a non-mixed dispute in which D1 has a positive standpoint that D2 doubts (turn 4, 
left branch).  
In response to D1’s upheld standpoint, D2 can go one step further in 
externalising the disagreement: instead of merely upholding his doubt concerning 
the expressed and upheld standpoint, he could also express its opposite (turn 4, 
middle branch). Supposing that D1’s expressed standpoint is a positive standpoint 
concerning a proposition p, D2 can at this turn of the confrontation respond to 
D1’s maintained positive standpoint by advancing a negative standpoint 
concerning the same proposition p. In contrast with the simple move of upholding 
doubt, the move of advancing a negative standpoint in response to D1’s 
11 The retraction of doubt or of the standpoint advanced, at this point of the argumentative 
exchange, does not fall under the problematic cases of retractions discussed by Krabbe (2001). At 
this point, the retraction does not remove a commitment that is necessary for the other party to 
build a case. It is, consequently, not a retraction that hinders the critical testing procedure and 




                                                 
maintained positive standpoint is a complex move. It is complex in the sense that 
it involves two simple moves: upholding doubt and expressing a negative 
standpoint. This complex move by D2 has the potential to turn the disagreement 
between D1 and D2 into a mixed dispute in which the discussants have opposite 
standpoints concerning the same proposition.  
In response to D2’s expressed negative standpoint, D1 has only one option: 
to doubt it (turn 5). Given that a standpoint implies doubt concerning its opposite, 
and that D1 has expressed and upheld a positive standpoint concerning a 
proposition p, D1 can be held committed to an implied doubt concerning the 
opposite standpoint as soon as this standpoint is expressed by D2. In response to 
D1’s doubt concerning his negative standpoint, D2 should be allowed to either 
retract or uphold his advanced negative standpoint (turn 6). Here again, D2 should 
have these options in order to guarantee that the externalisation of the 
disagreement remains voluntary. Retracting the negative standpoint will terminate 
the disagreement about it and leave the discussants with an externalised 
disagreement about the positive standpoint only, i.e. a non-mixed dispute (turn 6, 
right branch). Maintaining the negative standpoint (turn 6, left branch) will in 
contrast move the disagreement about the negative standpoint one step further: 
the disagreement has the potential to become fully externalised in the following 
turn.  
In response to D2’s upheld negative standpoint (turn 6, left branch), D1 is 
granted, in line with the voluntariness requirement, the freedom of either 
upholding or retracting his doubt concerning the negative standpoint advanced 
(turn 7). If D1 maintains his doubt concerning the negative standpoint of D2, the 
disagreement about this standpoint is confirmed. Confirming the disagreement 
about the negative standpoint closes the confrontation stage with a definition of 
the difference of opinion as a mixed dispute in which the discussants have 
opposite standpoints, each doubted by the other discussant (turn 7, left branch). If 
D1 retracts his doubt concerning the negative standpoint of D2, the disagreement 
about this standpoint ceases to exist. Furthermore, the retraction of doubt 
concerning the negative standpoint by D1 requires him to retract his own positive 




about its opposite. After all, when a discussant expresses a positive standpoint 
concerning a proposition, doubt regarding the negative standpoint is implied, and 
he can be held committed to it as soon as this negative standpoint is expressed. 
Without having doubt concerning an existing negative standpoint, a discussant 
cannot uphold a positive standpoint.12 Retracting doubt concerning the negative 
standpoint is in this case another complex move in the confrontation stage: it 
implies the retraction of the positive standpoint as well. Opting for this complex 
move, D1 eventually puts an end to his disagreement with D2 and closes the 
confrontation stage with no dispute to be resolved by means of argumentation 
(turn 7, right branch). 
The profile also includes the option for D2 to respond to the initial 
expression of the positive standpoint of D1 by requesting the latter to define or 
clarify some terms or to be more precise or detailed in expressing his standpoint. 
This is achieved by performing a request for a usage declarative (D2, turn 2, left 
branch) that promotes mutual comprehension of the expressed standpoint (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984: p. 109). In response to this request, D1 has to 
provide the requested usage declarative, which results in a reformulation of the 
initial standpoint that is clearer, more precise or more detailed (D1, turn 3, left 
branch). In response to this reformulated standpoint, D2 can either express doubt, 
or request another usage declarative to which D1 has to respond by a once more 
reformulated standpoint which can be faced with either doubt or yet another 
request for a usage declarative, and so on. Eventually, every reformulated 
standpoint of D1 becomes an initial standpoint from which the confrontation can 
proceed (turn 1).  
Even though it is in principle the right of any of the discussants to request 
the other to perform a usage declarative that provides further definition, 
precisation, amplification, explication or explicitisation (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1984), in the confrontation stage, this move can be performed only 
by D2 as a response to the initial expression of the positive standpoint by D1. The 
12 If D1 and D2 have a disagreement concerning a positive point of view, it is not possible for 
them to have no disagreement concerning the negative point of view, unless this negative point of 




                                                 
reason for this is that all the other moves in the confrontation stage are about a 
specific proposition p about which D1 expresses a standpoint. Ideally, the need for 
a usage declarative to promote mutual understanding arises only as a response to 
the expression of the (positive) standpoint by D1 in his first turn. Once D2 
understands D1’s expressed standpoint, there should no longer be any room for 
misunderstanding. If D1’s expressed standpoint is understood by D2, all the 
remaining moves become clear: upholding the expressed standpoint, retracting it, 
doubting it or retracting the doubt cast on it, as well as the expression of its 
opposite, retracting it, doubting it or retracting the doubt cast on it; there should 
be no need for a usage declarative with respect to any of these.  
The specification presented above describes the different ways in which 
an ideal confrontation can proceed; an actual confrontation hardly ever proceeds 
as described. Actual argumentative confrontations are never ideal in the sense that 
they do hardly ever aim solely at defining the difference of opinion between the 
arguers in a way that does not hinder critical testing. Furthermore, actual 
argumentative confrontations are not always reasonable, in the sense that even 
when arguers are actually geared towards achieving a clear definition of the 
difference of opinion, their efforts need not always be successful and they might 
well fail to achieve the definition they pursue. Moreover, arguers can even be 
geared towards a reasonable definition of their difference of opinion, and argue 
reasonably, without necessarily performing all and only those moves that are 
prescribed in the ideal model and represented in the dialectical profile. An arguer 
can for example express his doubt by means of a question or a request for 
justification, and he may also respond to an initial expression of a positive 
standpoint by the immediate expression of the opposite standpoint.  
In spite of the gap that exists between ideal and actual argumentative 
exchanges, dialectical profiles are instrumental for the examination of actual 
argumentative confrontations. Every move in the profile is in fact a slot that 
expresses the (dialectical) function of a multitude of actual argumentative moves 
that can be considered analytically relevant, and is in that sense a slot for 
analytically relevant moves (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006). As van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst (1992b, 2000) explain, a particular argumentative move can be 




resolution of a difference of opinion. For example, asking a question in response 
to an expressed opinion is often analytically relevant because the question can 
function as an expression of doubt concerning the expressed opinion.13 
Because dialectical profiles are derived from the ideal model of a critical 
discussion, which includes all moves that are relevant to the resolution process, 
these profiles taken together represent every move in actual argumentative 
discussions that is relevant to the resolution of the difference of opinion. Under 
the basic assumption that arguers are expected to pursue a critical resolution of 
their difference of opinion, the profiles guide the analyst into a methodological 
interpretation of the moves in actual argumentative exchanges. For example, with 
the help of the dialectical profile of the confrontation stage, the analyst can assign 
an argumentative function to the actual argumentative moves that play a role in 
the definition of the difference of opinion between the arguers. Every actual 
argumentative move that is analytically relevant can, from this perspective, be 
considered a realisation of a certain slot for analytically relevant moves in the 
dialectical profile.14 
Viewed in light of the dialectical profile of the confrontation stage, the 
Prime Minister’s attempts to exclude opposition standpoints in examples (2) and 
(3) can be viewed as attempts to reach the outcome of no dispute at turn 3 of the 
dialectical profile of the confrontation stage. The attempts can be considered 
cases of a particular type of confrontational strategic manoeuvring in which a 
discussant who casts doubt on an expressed opinion aims to lead the other 
discussant, who is the proponent of this expressed opinion, to retract it in order to 
define the difference of opinion as no dispute. In general, a type of 
confrontational strategic manoeuvring can be viewed as the attempt, at a certain 
slot for analytically relevant moves in the confrontation stage, to bring about the 
performance of a preferred analytically relevant move in a turn that follows, in 
order to reach a favourable definition of the difference of opinion. Like all types 
of confrontational manoeuvring, the type at issue aims at a favourable definition 
13 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992b) draw a distinction between analytic and evaluative 
relevance. While it is enough for a move to play a role in the critical testing procedure to be 
analytically relevant, a move needs to play a positive role, i.e. to be a positive contribution to the 
critical testing procedure, in order for it to be also evaluatively relevant.   
14 The profile can also be insightful in making explicit the moves that are left implicit in the 




                                                 
of the difference of opinion within the boundaries of critical reasonableness. This 
particular type of manoeuvring can however be distinguished from other types in 
terms of (a) the particular point in the dialectical procedure where it occurs, (b) 
the specific outcome that is pursued, and (c) the dialectical route15 that is 
favoured to reach the pursued outcome. 
 
2.4 Strategic manoeuvring to rule out a standpoint 
The type of confrontational strategic manoeuvring at issue occurs at the slot for 
the analytically relevant move of casting doubt by D2 on a positive standpoint that 
has just been expressed by D1. In both examples (2) and (3), the Prime Minister 
reacts to the expression of a critical standpoint by the Opposition by providing 
justification for not accepting the expressed standpoint. In example (2), he points 
out that the standpoint of the Opposition violates the rules of Parliament by 
bringing into discussion a matter that is under police investigation, and in 
example (3) he points out that the standpoint of the Opposition is inconsistent 
with some other position that the Opposition assumes. Both of these moves 
convey that the Prime Minister does not accept the standpoint of the Opposition; 
they therefore function as expressions of critical doubt about it.  Thus, the type of 
strategic manoeuvring at issue realises the slot for the analytically relevant move 
of casting doubt at turn 2 of the dialectical procedure (see Figure 1). 
The type of confrontational strategic manoeuvring at issue aims at 
defining the difference of opinion as no dispute, to the favour of D2. As can be 
seen from the dialectical profile of the confrontation stage, a no dispute outcome 
can be reasonably achieved at three points of the dialectical procedure of the 
confrontation: turns 3, 4 and 7. At turn 3, D1 can retract his expressed positive 
standpoint. That would eliminate the initial disagreement between D1 and D2 
leaving them with no dispute to argue about. At turn 4, D2 can retract his 
expressed doubt about the positive standpoint of D1, which would also eliminate 
the initial disagreement between D1 and D2 leaving them with no difference of 
15 A dialectical route is a sequence of analytically relevant moves that needs to be performed in 





                                                 
opinion to resolve by means of argumentation. While the definition of the 
difference of opinion as no dispute resulting at turn 3 is to the favour of D2 who 
would not have to give up his doubt, the definition of the difference of opinion as 
no dispute resulting at turn 4 is to the favour of D1 who can in fact maintain his 
positive standpoint. Consequently, the definition of the difference of opinion as 
no dispute reached at turn 4 cannot be considered to be the favourable outcome 
pursued in a type of strategic manoeuvring of D2. Another definition of the 
difference of opinion as no dispute can result at turn 7 where D1 retracts his doubt 
concerning D2’s negative standpoint and consequently withdraws his own 
positive standpoint. This no dispute definition of the definition of the difference 
of opinion is also favourable for D2 because it enables him to maintain his 
negative standpoint without the need to discuss it. 
Because the definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute, 
favourable to D2, can be achieved at two different points of the dialectical 
procedure, two different dialectical routes that lead to it can be favoured by D2 
(Figure 2, below).  
 
Figure 2:  Dialectical routes that lead to the definition of the difference of 
opinion as no dispute favourable to D2 
Dialectical route 1: 
1. D1: +/p advance a positive standpoint 
2. D2: ?/(+/p) advance doubt in respect of the advanced 
positive standpoint 
3. D1: retract +/p retract the positive standpoint 
=> No dispute 
 
Dialectical route 2: 
1. D1: +/p advance a positive standpoint 
2. D2: ?/(+/p) advance doubt in respect of the advanced 
positive standpoint 
3. D1: maintain +/p maintain the advanced positive standpoint 
4. D2: -/p advance a negative standpoint 
5. D1: ?/(-/p) advance doubt in respect of the advanced 
negative standpoint  
6. D2: maintain -/p maintain the advanced negative standpoint 
7. D1: retract ?/(-/p) Retract doubt in respect of the advanced 
negative standpoint, which implies retracting 




=> No dispute 
 
In principle, it is possible that either of these routes is D2’s favourite when 
he casts doubt on the expressed opinion of D1 attempting to bring about the 
definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute, favourable to him. However, 
for the Prime Minister’s attempts to exclude a standpoint of the Opposition 
described above, route 2 cannot really be the Prime Minister’s favourite. Route 2 
requires the Prime Minister to assume a standpoint that is the opposite of the one 
he wants to exclude from the discussion, and that is a commitment that we may 
assume he would rather avoid. The Prime Minister’s attempts are, therefore, best 
represented by the type of strategic manoeuvring that takes route 1 to achieve a 
definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute. The particular type of 
strategic manoeuvring at issue is represented in Figure 3 below.   
 
The Prime Minister’s attempts to exclude the standpoint of the Opposition 
in examples (2) and (3) were both instances of this type of strategic manoeuvring. 
In each of these instances, the Prime Minister casts doubt on a standpoint 
expressed by the Opposition in a way that is very likely to lead the Opposition to 
retract the standpoint at issue in the next turn. The Prime Minister thereby aims to 
reach a definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute, which is favourable 
to him. 
This type of manoeuvring can be referred to, either by mentioning the slot 
for analytically relevant moves that it realises, as strategic manoeuvring in  
casting doubt, or by mentioning to the slot for analytically relevant moves that it 
aims at bringing about, i.e. the preferred analytically relevant response, as 
strategic manoeuvring to lead the proponent of a standpoint to retract his 
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in an attempt to lead the proponent of a standpoint to retract his standpoint. Even 
though the latter is the most accurate of the three, for the sake of simplicity, I 
shall opt for a slightly less complicated way of referring merely to this type of 
manoeuvring by mentioning the aim of the arguer in this type, that of ruling out a 
standpoint. 
Different types of strategic manoeuvring result from variations in the slot 
for the analytically relevant move that is realised, the outcome that is pursued or 
the dialectical route that is favoured. For example, there can be a type of 
confrontational strategic manoeuvring in which D1 aims at a defining the 
difference of opinion as no dispute, and, in order to achieve this outcome, 
maintains his positive standpoint at turn 3 in a way that leads D2 to retract his 
advanced doubt at the next turn. This type is represented in Figure 4.  
 
 
Another type of confrontational manoeuvring that is available to D1 
(Figure 5) is one that brings about a definition of the difference of opinion as a 
mixed dispute, which can also be a favourable outcome of the confrontation stage 
for D1. D1 then maintains the positive standpoint in a way that leads D2 to express 
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As suggested above, a type of confrontational manoeuvring is an attempt 
to strike a balance between arguers’ dialectical and rhetorical aims at a certain 
slot for analytically relevant moves in the dialectical procedure of the 
confrontation stage. While the concern for rhetorical effectiveness directs the 
arguer’s choices towards a favourable definition of the difference of opinion and 
a particular dialectical route that leads to it, i.e. a preferred dialectical route, the 
concern for critical reasonableness restricts their choices to those outcomes and 
routes that are in accord with the dialectical norm of critical testing. 
The main advantage of identifying types of confrontational strategic 
manoeuvring in terms of analytically relevant moves is that at this level of 
characterisation it is possible to generate, in a systematic way, a finite list of types 
of strategic manoeuvring within the category of confrontational manoeuvring. 
That is because, as van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2007b) observe, the dialectical 
profile indicates a finite set of routes that arguers can take if they want to achieve 
the outcome of a certain dialectical stage in a reasonable way (p. 376).  
In contrast with the finite number of analytically relevant moves that are 
available to the discussants in a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 
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argumentative discussions is infinite. In fact, in every actual move in an actual 
discussion a choice is made from countless possibilities for realising a slot for 
analytically relevant moves in the dialectical procedure. Because every actual 
argumentative move is an opportunity for strategic manoeuvring in realising a 
slot for analytically relevant moves in a certain dialectical stage (van Eemeren & 
Houtlosser, 2006), the countless possibilities for realising a certain slot of 
analytically relevant moves are in fact countless ways of strategic manoeuvring. 
In other words, every type of strategic manoeuvring, which is identified in terms 
of analytically relevant moves, can be realised in an indefinite number of ways in 
an actual argumentative discussion. The Prime Minister’s resort to an accusation 
of inconsistency in an attempt to exclude standpoints of the Opposition can be 
considered as a particular way of strategic manoeuvring, in which the particular 
type of strategic manoeuvring characterised above is realised by means of 
accusations of inconsistency. 
 
2.5 Accusations of inconsistency to rule out a standpoint  
While both examples (2) and (3) discussed earlier are cases of the same type of 
strategic manoeuvring, which is aimed at excluding a standpoint from the 
discussion, the two examples differ in the way the slot for the analytically 
relevant move of casting doubt is realised in the actual confrontation. In example 
(2), Mr. Brown casts doubt by referring to the sub judice rule, while, in example 
(3), Mr. Blair casts doubt by pointing out an inconsistency in Mr. Duncan Smith’s 
position. This difference in the actual argumentative move that realises the slot 
for the analytically relevant move of casting doubt results in two different ways 
of strategic manoeuvring. In example (2), the Prime Minister’s attempt to rule out 
a standpoint of the Opposition is an instance of a particular way of manoeuvring 
in which reference to parliamentary rules is employed to exclude a certain 
standpoint from the discussion. In example (3), the Prime Minister’s attempt is an 
instance of another way of manoeuvring, one in which an accusation of 
inconsistency is employed to exclude the standpoint.  
A particular way of strategic manoeuvring is in this sense a particular way 




attempts to exclude standpoints of the Opposition by means of accusations of 
inconsistency are to be viewed as instances of a particular way of strategic 
manoeuvring in which a particular type of manoeuvring to rule out a standpoint is 
realised by means of an actual accusation of inconsistency. It is this particular 
way of manoeuvring that will be the subject of examination in this study. 
While a type of strategic manoeuvring can be referred to by reference to 
the slots for analytically relevant moves it involves, the reference to a particular 
way of manoeuvring needs to include reference to the actual moves that are 
performed by the arguer in a discussion. The particular way of manoeuvring, 
subject of examination in this study, can thus be referred to by mentioning the 
actual move that is performed as strategic manoeuvring by accusation of 
inconsistency. Reference to actual moves is however not sufficient in depicting 
the particular way of manoeuvring; there also needs to be a reference to the 
analytically relevant function of the move and the outcome it pursues. An 
adequate way to refer to the way of strategic manoeuvring at issue would hence 
be to refer to it as strategic manoeuvring in casting doubt by an accusation of 
inconsistency to rule out a standpoint. Here too, I opt for simplicity by referring 
to the way of confrontational manoeuvring at issue as strategic manoeuvring by 
accusation of inconsistency to rule out a standpoint. This way of referring to the 
manoeuvring reflects both the actual argumentative move that is performed and 
the favourable outcome that is aimed at. Furthermore, referring to the way of 
strategic manoeuvring at issue as proposed above mentions, as van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser (2007b) recommend, the most conspicuous manifestation of the 
manoeuvring at issue, i.e. the accusation of inconsistency.  
In light of the view that an instance of strategic manoeuvring is actually a 
speech act that realises a slot for analytically relevant moves of the dialectical 
procedure (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006), the particular way of strategic 
manoeuvring that is the subject of this study can be viewed as the one in which 
the speech act of accusation of inconsistency realises the particular type of 
manoeuvring to rule out a standpoint. With the help of the characterisation of an 
accusation of inconsistency as a speech act (Andone, 2008) and in light of the 
account given by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) for speech acts in 




manoeuvring at issue and analyse the Prime Minister’s responses in example (3) 
as a case of this particular way of manoeuvring.  
The account Andone provides of the speech act of accusation of 
inconsistency is central to the intended characterisation and analysis because it 
makes it possible to link the perlocutionary effects of the speech act of accusation 
of inconsistency to the Opposition’s retraction of their standpoint, which the 
Prime Minister’s manoeuvring aims at. As characterised by Andone (2008), “an 
accusation of inconsistency counts as raising a charge against an addressee for 
having committed himself to both A and –A, in an attempt to challenge him to 
provide an answering response to the charge” (p. 155).16 
According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), the minimal 
perlocutionary effect of an illocutionary act is acceptance; illocutionary acts can 
however have optimal perlocutionary effects as well. For example, the 
illocutionary act of a question has the minimal perlocutionary effect of getting 
itself accepted as such, but also the optimal perlocutionary effect of securing an 
answer. As for all other illocutionary acts, the minimal perlocutionary effect of 
accusations of inconsistency is acceptance. The optimal effect of this speech act 
(also referred to as consecutive perlocutionary effect or consecutive consequence) 
is what Andone refers to in the essential condition as providing an answering 
response to the charge. In line with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1995), who 
understand an accusation of inconsistency as an attempt to get the accused to 
eliminate the inconsistency by retracting one of the inconsistent commitments (p. 
195), I suggest that such an answer needs to be the retraction of either of the two 
mutually inconsistent commitments expressed, i.e. either the commitment to A or 
the commitment to –A.  
In the exchange between Mr. Blair and Mr. Duncan Smith examined 
earlier, Mr. Blair accuses Mr. Duncan Smith of an inconsistency concerning the 
latter’s attitude towards the NHS. On the one hand, the position implied in the 
16 Andone (2008) lists the following conditions for the speech act of accusation of inconsistency: 
the addressee has committed himself to both A and –A (propositional content condition); the 
speaker believes that the addressee will (1) acknowledge that the presence of an inconsistency 
obstructs the argumentative exchange that he and his interlocutor are engaged in, and (2) be 
committed to provide an answering response to the charge of inconsistency (preparatory 
conditions); the speaker believes that (a) the addressee has committed an inconsistency, and (b) 




                                                 
question of Mr. Duncan, namely that the Government is to blame for damaging 
the NHS, entails an interest in the NHS. On the other hand, the Conservatives’ 
opposition to the government’s plans to increase investment in the health sector 
as well as the quoted point of view of Mr. Duncan Smith commit him to an 
opposite attitude, Mr. Blair implies.  In support of the alleged inconsistency, Mr. 
Blair says that ‘we know that the right hon. Gentleman wants to run down the 
national health service because he does not believe in it’, and he quotes Mr. 
Duncan Smith as saying that ‘the health service does not serve anybody’ to 
conclude that the Opposition wants to undermine the NHS.  
As characterised by Andone, the accusation of inconsistency attributes to 
the accused the commitments to A and –A. In the case at issue, Mr. Blair 
attributes to Mr. Duncan Smith a commitment to the NHS deserves to be taken 
care of (A) and to its opposite. The commitment to A is presented as following 
from the Opposition’s critical standpoint that government policies are to blame 
for damaging the NHS, and the opposite commitment is attributed to Mr. Duncan 
Smith on the basis of his previous positions, especially his quoted words that the 
NHS does not serve anybody. The accusation also requires the accused to retract 
one of the inconsistent commitments. Upon acceptance of the accusation, Mr. 
Duncan Smith needs to act in accordance with one of the consecutive 
consequences of his acceptance, i.e. he must either retract his current position 
(and therefore his commitment to A) or to admit that he does not maintain his 
other position (and therefore retract the attributed commitment to –A). 
Once the expression of a standpoint and the response with an accusation 
of inconsistency in the actual dialogue between Mr. Blair and Mr. Duncan Smith 
are viewed as part of an argumentative exchange, these two actual moves can be 
viewed as realisations of the slots in the dialectical profile for advancing a 
standpoint and for casting doubt respectively. These slots are represented in turns 
1 and 2 of the dialectical profile. The accusation of inconsistency can be the 
realisation of an expression of doubt concerning the standpoint of the Opposition 
that the Government’s policies are to blame for damaging the NHS because an 
implication of this accusation is that the Opposition cannot express this 
standpoint. More precisely, in presenting the previous positions of Mr. Duncan 




down the national health service), Mr. Blair implies that the commitment that Mr. 
Duncan Smith cannot maintain is the commitment to the NHS deserves to be 
taken care of. Since this commitment, which needs to be retracted according to 
Mr. Blair, follows from the standpoint of the Opposition, Mr. Blair’s accusation 
can be taken to convey his doubt concerning the standpoint of the Opposition. 
When an accusation of inconsistency is employed in an argumentative 
discussion, arguers usually aim to bring about one particular consecutive 
consequence of the illocutionary act: either the retraction of the commitment to 
A, or the retraction of the commitment to –A. The particular consecutive 
consequence that an arguer aims at will be hereafter referred to as the preferred 
consecutive consequence. Considering that the speech act of accusation of 
inconsistency is a realisation of a certain slot for analytically relevant moves in a 
particular type of strategic manoeuvring, the preferred consecutive consequence 
will realise the preferred analytically relevant move in that particular type of 
manoeuvring. When an accusation of inconsistency is employed to rule out a 
standpoint, I take the preferred consecutive consequence to be the retraction of 
the commitment that follows from the standpoint of the proponent, i.e. the 
commitment to A, because such a retraction entails the retraction of the expressed 
standpoint itself, which is the preferred analytically relevant response in the type 
of strategic manoeuvring at issue (see Figure 6, below). 
 
Figure 6:  Actual preferred route taken in the strategic manoeuvring by 
accusation of inconsistency to rule out a standpoint 
1. D1: Advance a standpoint 
(+/p) 
 
2. D2: Accusation of inconsistency 
(?/(+/p)) 
 
3. D1: Retracting commitment to A 
(retract +/p 
 






The retraction of the commitment to the NHS deserves to be taken care of 
by Mr. Duncan Smith is clearly the response preferred by Mr. Blair. In his 
response to the standpoint of Mr. Duncan Smith, Mr. Blair seems to imply that 
the Opposition cannot criticise the government for having policies that damage 




commit to the NHS deserves to be taken care of therefore requires the Opposition 
to retract the standpoint that government policies are to blame for damaging the 
NHS. In other words, the retraction of the commitment to the NHS deserves to be 
taken care of by Mr. Duncan Smith would be a realisation of the slot for 
retracting the expressed standpoint in the dialectical procedure.  
As it has been characterised above, Mr. Blair’s attempt to rule out a 
standpoint of the Opposition by means of an accusation of inconsistency is an 
instance of a particular way of realising the type of confrontational manoeuvring 
characterised earlier as strategic manoeuvring to rule out a standpoint. In this way 
of manoeuvring, the accusation of inconsistency is a particular realisation of the 
slot for expressing doubt. The preferred consecutive consequence of the 
accusation, the retraction of the commitment to A, would be a realisation of the 
slot for retracting the positive standpoint, which is the preferred analytically 
relevant move. An arguer’s strategic manoeuvring in this particular way would 
consist of making the most opportune choices from the topical potential, audience 
frames and stylistic devices that are available in order to lead the proponent to 
retract his commitment to A, and to portray the retraction of the proponent’s 
standpoint to be due as a consequence of the retraction of the commitment to A. 
In example (3), for instance, Mr. Blair exploits the three aspects of strategic 
manoeuvring in an attempt to appear reasonable while leading Mr. Duncan Smith 
to retract the standpoint that government policies are to blame for damaging the 
NHS through the retraction of his commitment to the proposition that the NHS 
deserves to be taken care of.  
From the topical potential available to Mr. Blair, he has chosen to express 
his doubt about the opposition standpoint by reference to a relevant inconsistency 
in the position of the Opposition. From all the propositions that follow from the 
Opposition’s (current) standpoint, Mr. Blair selected a proposition A (the NHS 
deserves to be taken care of) that is inconsistent with another position of the 
Opposition, namely the one against investment in the health sector. The 
accusation of inconsistency puts pressure on the Opposition to retract one of the 
inconsistent commitments. The Prime Minister’s choice of the previous position 
puts pressure on the Opposition to retract the commitment that follows from the 




assumed. In other words, the choice of the previous position directs the 
Opposition towards Mr. Blair’s preferred response. Mr. Blair chooses to refer to a 
particular position of the Opposition that is not easy to abandon. He refers to one 
of the Conservative Party’s principal positions, one that is very unlikely to 
change: the opposition to more investment in public sector. From this position, 
Mr. Blair draws an opportune implication that is inconsistent with the 
Opposition’s current position, namely that the Opposition can be held committed 
to –A (the NHS does not deserve to be taken care of). He further quotes Mr. 
Duncan Smith as saying that the NHS does not serve anybody to support the 
attribution of the latter commitment. Given that Mr. Duncan Smith is very 
unlikely to give up the Conservatives’ position against investment in the public 
sector, there is little chance that he would retract the commitment implied in the 
other position. It is rather the commitment that follows from the current 
standpoint that Mr. Duncan Smith will have to retract if he accepts the alleged 
inconsistency. 
Mr. Blair’s choice from the topical potential becomes an even more 
effective means of directing Mr. Duncan Smith towards the retraction of his 
standpoint thanks to an opportune choice of stylistic devices in presenting the 
alleged inconsistency. For example, Mr. Blair’s presents Mr. Duncan Smith’s 
commitment to the NHS does not deserve to be taken care of as beyond doubt 
when he says ‘we know that the right hon. Gentleman wants to run down the 
national health service’. Such a presentation is opportune because it creates the 
impression that the accusation of inconsistency will be acceptable, i.e. the 
minimal perlocutionary effect of the speech act will be achieved, and that 
therefore Mr. Duncan Smith will have to make a choice between the two 
inconsistent commitments, i.e. the optimal perlocutionary effect of the speech act 
is expected. In other words, the way the accusation is formulated makes it not 
easy for the accused to deny it. 
Furthermore, Mr. Blair attempts to present his accusation in a way that 
supports his interpretation of the Opposition’s previous position as implying the 
commitment to –A. As he presents the Conservatives’ opposition to an increase 
of investment in the health sector, Mr. Blair repeats in different formulations the 




they do not believe in it, they say it does not serve anybody, they insult it, 
denigrate it and want to undermine it. To attribute these different and yet much 
related attitudes towards the NHS to the Conservatives strengthens the 
implication that the Opposition does not think that the NHS deserves to be taken 
care of. Mr. Blair presents these different and yet very related attitudes as 
variations of the same commitment, namely that the NHS does not deserve to be 
taken care of, in order to compensate for the absence of an explicit 
pronouncement where this commitment is clearly taken by the Opposition. 
The Prime Minister’s choices of the topic and presentation of the 
accusation of inconsistency are in fact strategic only in combination with a 
particular choice of audience frame: the Conservative Party as a proponent of the 
critical standpoint that the Prime Minister wishes to exclude from the discussion. 
Had the proponent of the standpoint that government policies are to blame for 
damaging the NHS been an MP from a party that does not oppose investment in 
health, the Prime Minister would not have been capable of pointing out an 
inconsistency in the position of this proponent concerning the commitment as to 
whether or not the NHS deserves to be taken care of. With such a proponent, it 
would not have been possible for Mr. Blair to express doubt by means of the 
accusation of inconsistency that he employs to doubt Mr. Duncan Smith’s 
standpoint.  
Not only the appropriateness but also the effectiveness of employing the 
particular accusation which Mr. Blair employs depends on the proponent of the 
standpoint that he attempts to rule out. For example, suppose the proponent had 
been some other MP from the Conservative Party, an MP who is not the leader of 
the party or someone who had not expressed his standpoint against investment in 
health so strongly. For such a proponent, it would have been easier to change his 
mind concerning the Party’s original position against the investment in health. 
There is a quite good chance that such a proponent would retract the commitment 
to –A instead of retracting the commitment to A as Mr. Blair’s strategic 
manoeuvring intends. Because of the personal nature of commitments, strategic 
manoeuvring by means of accusations of inconsistency is more audience-frame-









3 PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME  
  
In the previous chapter, the Prime Minister’s responses with accusations of 
inconsistency to the criticism expressed by the Opposition were characterised as a 
particular way of strategic manoeuvring. This characterisation highlighted the 
strategic argumentative function of the responses as attempts to rule out, in what 
is in principle a reasonable way, a standpoint that is not accepted. Because 
institutional considerations are central to the discussants’ attempts to win 
discussions within the boundaries of reasonableness, an adequate account of the 
strategic function of the responses at issue cannot be achieved without taking into 
account characteristics of the institutional context in which the responses occur. 
In this chapter, I shall, therefore, discuss the institutional context in which these 
attempts occur, i.e. that of the parliamentary session of Prime Minister's Question 
Time in the British House of Commons. 
I shall start by discussing the concept of argumentative activity types (van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005) in terms of its contribution to a more empirically 
adequate account of argumentative exchanges that occur in institutionalised 
contexts. Then, I shall describe and discuss the argumentative practice of 
Question Time and characterise it as an argumentative activity type, in order to 
shed light on the opportunities and constraints that the rules and conventions of 
the session provide for arguers’ confrontational manoeuvring. The insights gained 
from the activity type perspective will, in the next chapter, be integrated into the 
analysis of attempts of the Prime Minister to exclude opposition standpoints from 
the discussion, in order to provide an empirically adequate analytic account of the 
Prime Minister’s attempts at issue. 
 
3.1 Towards an empirically adequate account of institutionalised 
argumentative practices  
The integration of institutional considerations into the analysis of argumentative 




van Eemeren and Houtlosser observe, argumentation typically takes place in 
contexts that are to a greater or lesser degree institutionalised. The contexts in 
which argumentative exchanges typically occur are regulated by rules and 
conventions that establish preconditions for those argumentative exchanges. 
These preconditions eventually shape argumentative exchanges by creating 
opportunities and constraints for the arguers’ strategic manoeuvring (van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006). For example, as a consequence of the convention 
of not allowing arguments from analogy in a Dutch criminal trial, certain strategic 
possibilities are closed off, mainly in relation to the evidence furnished by the 
prosecution, and at the same time other strategic possibilities open up, mainly for 
the defence (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009).17 It is in the pursuit of tracing the 
influence of institutional considerations such as these that van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser introduced the concept of argumentative activity types. 
Within the pragma-dialectical framework, the concept of argumentative 
activity types was introduced to represent the more or less institutionalised 
communicative practices in which argumentation plays a central role and which 
manifest themselves in more or less fixed formats that are culturally established 
(van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005, 2009; van Eemeren & Garssen, 2008). Van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser discuss the institutionalised argumentative practices of 
mediation, adjudication and negotiation as examples of argumentative activity 
types. They describe each of these practices in view of its aim and the means to 
reach this aim given the rules and conventions that regulate it. Starting from this 
description, they identify the resulting conventional preconditions for 
argumentative exchanges that take place as part of the practices concerned. For 
example, the activity type of negotiation is described as the argumentative 
practice that is triggered by a conflict of interests and which aims at a 
compromise.  
As van Eemeren and Houtlosser observe, the acceptable starting points, 
the allowable argumentative means and the possible ways to determine the 
outcome of the discussion are preconditioned by the rules and conventions that 
regulate negotiation practice. For example, the interests of the negotiating parties 
and their concessions are conventionally accepted as common starting points. So 




                                                 
are the laws, conventions and agreements that are relevant to the issues that are 
being negotiated; for instance, international trade agreements are typically the 
source of much of the common ground in a session of international trade 
negotiation. Also typical of negotiation is the practice of embodying arguments in 
exchanges of bids and offers, and their achieved outcome in a mutually accepted 
compromise.18 
Using the concept of argumentative activity types, preconditions that 
apply to conventionalised argumentative practices can be methodically identified. 
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser identify the general preconditions that are 
applicable to the argumentative exchanges in the activity types of adjudication, 
mediation and negotiation by characterising each of the conventionalised 
argumentative practices at issue in terms of the four stages of critical testing.  
They identify preconditions that apply to (a) the initial situation which triggers 
the argumentative exchanges in the conventionalised practice, viewed in terms of 
the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, (b) the procedural and material 
starting points that are mutually accepted in the practice concerned, viewed in 
terms of the opening stage, (c) the argumentative means allowable and employed 
by the arguers in the practice examined, viewed in terms of the argumentation 
stage, and (d) the possible outcomes of the argumentative exchanges in the 
practice at issue, viewed in terms of the concluding stage of a critical discussion. 
The preconditions so identified are represented in the table below. 
18 On the basis of van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005), Mohammed (2007b) presents an elaborate 
account of the argumentative activity type of negotiation as the argumentative practice in which 
negotiators externalise their interests in positions that they adopt, and engage in an argumentative 
discussion about the contribution of these positions to a compromise that satisfies the maximum 
of their conflicting interests. The characterisation of the activity type of negotiation suggested had 
been kept general to cover the different variants of negotiation encounters. As van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser (2008) observe, negotiation encounters can have different formats, each with their own 
more specific rules and conventions. The parties are usually free in their choice of the format they 




                                                 
Figure 7:  Three types of argumentative activity related to the model of a 
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The identification of institutional preconditions for argumentative 
practices, achieved in the characterisation of argumentative activity types in terms 
of the four stages of critical testing, sheds light on the potential effects that the 
pursuit of institutional aims has on the different stages of argumentative 




types are structured through rules and conventions that are adapted to advance the 
realisation of a goal that the participants have in the specific context of the 
activity at issue. As Levinson (1992) puts it, the “structural elements [of activity 
types are] […] rationally and functionally adapted to the point or goal of the 
activity in question, that is the functions that members of the society see the 
activity as having” (p. 71). Given that argumentative activity types describe the 
argumentative practice in contexts that are to a greater or lesser extent 
institutionalised, an argumentative activity type is structured through rules and 
conventions that are adapted to advance the realisation of an institutional goal that 
can be attributed to the arguers in the specific context of the activity at issue. For 
example, the rules and conventions of a negotiation encounter are adapted to the 
goal of reaching a compromise that satisfies the maximum of the parties’ 
conflicting interests, which is the point of the activity. As arguers get engaged in 
a negotiation encounter, their argumentation is supposed to be geared towards the 
satisfaction of this goal. In light of such a view, one can say that what the theory 
of argumentative activity types actually describes is the conventionalised 
argumentative practices in terms of their institutional aims and the argumentative 
means available to realise these aims given the institutional rules and conventions 
of the practice concerned. 
By highlighting the significant role that institutional aims play in shaping 
argumentative exchanges, the concept of argumentative activity types contributes 
to an empirically adequate analysis of institutionalised argumentative practices. 
Because the empirical aims of arguers, i.e. the aims that they actually pursue in 
practice, play an important role in shaping argumentative exchanges, a more 
realistic examination of argumentative exchanges needs to take those empirical 
aims into account. In the pragma-dialectical pursuit of a more realistic account of 
argumentative exchanges, the concept of argumentative activity types 
complements the concept of strategic manoeuvring. While the concept of 
strategic manoeuvring provides the means to highlight the role that the arguers’ 
empirical aim of being rhetorically effective plays in shaping argumentative 
exchanges, the concept of argumentative activity types highlights the role that 
institutional aims play in shaping arguers’ strategic manoeuvring, i.e. their pursuit 





As van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) explain, the concept of strategic 
manoeuvring came in response to the realisation that arguers are usually not only 
concerned with being reasonable but also with being effective (p. 383). In view of 
the concept of strategic manoeuvring, arguers’ concerns with reasonableness and 
effectiveness are translated into dialectical and rhetorical aims respectively. The 
dialectical aims are specifications of the normative aim of critical testing and each 
of these aims pertains to a particular point in a stage of the procedure for critical 
resolution of a difference of opinion. They embody the obligations that the parties 
of a difference of opinion need to meet in order for the aim of critical testing to be 
achieved. The general dialectical aim attributed to the arguers is the aim to 
resolve the difference of opinion by critically testing the points of view at stake. 
The rhetorical aims are specifications of the descriptive aim to get one’s own 
point of view accepted. In pragma-dialectical terms, the general rhetorical aim 
attributed to the arguers is the aim to resolve the difference of opinion to one’s 
own favour. Similar to the dialectical aims, rhetorical aims that relate to each of 
the stages of critical testing can be formulated. Such aims are characterised as 
counterparts of the dialectical aims. For every dialectical aim that is derived from 
the arguers’ normative concern with critical reasonableness there is a rhetorical 
complement that is derived from the arguers’ descriptive concern with rhetorical 
effectiveness.19 Despite their different origins, dialectical and rhetorical aims are 
both empirical aims that are attributed to arguers in argumentative practice. 
Dialectical and rhetorical aims are aims that arguers are assumed to have 
in all argumentative exchanges. Whether they are arguing in a negotiation, 
mediation, adjudication encounter, or in a parliamentary debate, arguers should 
ideally be attempting to critically test their points of view, and they are usually 
also attempting to get their points of view accepted. Dialectical and rhetorical 
aims of the arguers can thus be considered to be the intrinsic aims of 
argumentation. In contrast, institutional aims, which are attributed to arguers as 
19 An account of the specification of the dialectical and rhetorical aims according to the stages of 
critical resolution of differences of opinion can be found in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002c). 
Even though the pragma-dialectical rhetorical aims originate from a descriptive assumption about 
the practice of argumentation, these aims are not entirely descriptive; they are in fact a normative 
conceptualisation of the descriptive aim of pursuing rhetorical effectiveness, performed in light of 




                                                 
they engage in argumentative exchanges in a specific conventionalised context, 
vary from one context to another. For example, the aim of reaching a compromise 
that satisfies the maximum of the parties’ interest is an aim that arguers are 
assumed to have only when they argue in a negotiation encounter, and the aim to 
convince a judge to resolve a disagreement to one’s own favour is specific to 
adjudication encounters. Unlike dialectical and rhetorical aims, institutional aims 
are in this sense extrinsic aims of argumentation. They are derived from the 
context in which argumentative exchanges occur and they relate to the function 
that argumentation is supposed to have in that context. In view of the concepts of 
strategic manoeuvring and argumentative activity types, argumentative exchanges 
are perceived as the result of the interaction of, on the one hand, the dialectical 
and rhetorical intrinsic aims of argumentation, and on the other hand, the 
institutional aims, as one of the main extrinsic aims of argumentative 
exchanges.20  
The integration of rhetorical and institutional insights into the dialectical 
framework enhances the empirical adequacy of the examination of argumentative 
exchanges. A dialectical framework that incorporates rhetorical insights enables 
the analyst to capture elements of the argumentative discourse that are motivated 
by the concern for effectiveness, in addition to those elements that are motivated 
by their concern for reasonableness. By incorporating institutional insights, the 
framework enables the analyst to capture also those elements that are motivated 
by institutional concerns, i.e. concerns that are related to the function that 
argumentation fulfils in the more or less institutionalised context in which it 
occurs. 
 
3.2 The argumentative practice of Question Time 
Prime Minister’s Question Time in the British House of Commons is the 
parliamentary session in which the Prime Minister provides oral answers to 
20  In contrast to other approaches, where the institutional aims are integrated into the rhetorical 
aims of the arguers (see Jacobs 2002), pragma-dialectics maintains a distinction between the aims 
of being rhetorically effective and being institutionally effective. Such a distinction allows for 
tracing the influence of extrinsic characteristics of argumentative discourse, basically those 
derived from its context-dependent institutional aims, on the ways of realising its intrinsic aims, 




                                                 
questions of his fellow MPs. The practice of having a regular session in which the 
Prime Minister provides oral answers to questions from the House of Commons 
started in 1961. Until Tony Blair became Prime Minister in 1997, Prime Ministers 
used to answer questions from MPs twice a week, on Tuesdays and Thursdays, at 
a session of fifteen minutes on each day. However, since Wednesday 21 May 
1997, which was Mr. Blair’s first Question Time session as a Prime Minister, 
Prime Minister's Question Time has become a weekly session of thirty minutes. 
The new ‘arrangement’, which was highly criticised by the Opposition who saw it 
as a way for the Prime Minister to reduce his presence in the House of Commons, 
was presented by the new Government as a reform that would provide MPs with 
the chance ‘to probe the Prime Minister in depth’ (House of Commons official 
report, 1997). In either of the arrangements, for almost 50 years now, Prime 
Ministers and MPs have been engaging in sessions of heated argumentative 
exchanges that are conveyed by means of questions and answers. The highly 
confrontational sessions, described by the BBC as ‘the modern equivalent of the 
Roman games, only more brutal’, are among the most media-covered 
parliamentary events. They are among the most attended sessions in the House, as 
well. 
The procedure of Question Time is regulated mainly by Standing Orders, 
which are the rules made by Parliament in order to regulate its procedure. Other 
sources for regulating parliamentary procedure are practice, which refers to the 
general understanding established over the centuries and not necessarily written 
down, as well as the House of Commons Rulings from the Chair, which refer to 
the clarifications provided by the Speaker of the House regarding decisions on 
procedure. Both can be found in the regularly revised Erskine May’s Treatise on 
the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (UK Parliament Web 
Site, 2006).21  
Two central provisions regulate parliamentary questions (House of 
Commons Procedure Committee, 2002). First, questions must either press for 
action or seek information, and second, questions that have been recently 
21 In addition to the three sources mentioned, Rogers and Walters mention Acts of Parliament as a 
fourth source for Parliamentary Procedure (2006: 185-186). There are, however, no Acts of 
Parliament that regulate matters related to Prime Minister's Question Time; the acts regulate 




                                                 
answered may not be asked again. The report further explains that the other rules 
that regulate the practice of parliamentary questions “depend on these central 
provisions and are intended to ensure that orderly questions are not crowded out 
by those relating to matters of debate for which other parliamentary opportunities 
are available” (House of Commons Procedure Committee, 2002: p. 11). 
In Question Time sessions, the Prime Minister provides oral answers to 
tabled as well as supplementary questions. Tabled questions are submitted to the 
Clerks in the Table Office of the House of Commons at least three sitting days 
before the session. Because the number of submitted questions usually exceeds 
the number of questions that can realistically be expected to get answers, the 
submitted questions are put to a random shuffle and only fifteen of them are 
printed in the Commons Questions Book to be actually asked during the session. 
When asked in the House, every tabled question is followed by at least one 
supplementary question in which the MP who tabled the question can follow up 
on the same topic. After the first supplementary question has been answered, MPs 
who would like to pose more supplementary questions stand up trying to ‘catch 
the eye’ of the Speaker who decides who next will be given the chance to pose a 
question. The Speaker is also to decide when enough supplementary questions 
have been addressed. Because the Prime Minister is given prior notice of tabled 
questions, his answers to them are prepared in advance. In contrast, his answers to 
supplementary questions require some improvisation, since no prior notice is 
required for these questions. However, prior to Question Time sessions, the Prime 
Minister receives briefings from Government departments on the most topical 
matters of high political significance (House of Commons Information Office, 
2005: p. 10). Consequently, even though MPs have the chance to ask the Prime 
Minister questions without prior notice, supplementary questions hardly ever 
surprise the Prime Minister or get him to make up a completely ‘improvised’ 
answer.  
Depending on the specificity of their content, questions for oral answer 
can be either open or closed. Closed questions ask for specific information about 
a specific policy or action of the Government. In contrast, open questions address 
government policies or actions generally. As a result of a prime-ministerial 




and the early 1970s, open questions have become dominant in Question Time 
(House of Commons Procedure Committee, 2002: p. 18). Even though the 
transferring practice ended in the late 1970s, open questions remain dominant in 
Question Time, today. Such dominance contributes significantly to the 
argumentative nature of the question answer exchange in Prime Minister's 
Question Time. Not only is it much easier for MPs to convey opinions about 
government policies and actions by means of open questions, it is also easier to 
ask supplementary political questions about almost anything that falls under the 
responsibility of the Government when these supplementaries come after open 
questions. 
The first tabled question in every Question Time session is the 
engagements question, which is a routine question about the Prime Minister’s 
official engagements of the day. Both the question and the answer to it are 
conventionally standardised: an MP asks the Prime Minister to ‘list his official 
engagements’ for that day, and the Prime Minister replies: ‘This morning, I had 
meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in this 
House, I shall have further meetings later today’. Often, though, the Prime 
Minister starts with a brief official statement, also on behalf of the House of 
Commons, addressing occasions of national or international interest, such as 
expressing congratulations or condolences or paying tribute. Below is an example 
of Gordon Brown’s answer to the engagements question on 5 November 2008, 
the morning after the presidential elections in the United States of America: 
(1)  Gordon Brown (Prime Minister): 
I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in sending our profound condolences 
to the family and friends of the soldier from 2nd Battalion the Royal Gurkha Rifles who 
was killed in Afghanistan yesterday. In the week leading to Remembrance Sunday, we 
should remember the debt of gratitude that we owe to all those who have laid down their 
lives in service of our country. 
Before I list my engagements, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in 
sending our sincere congratulations to Senator Barack Obama on winning the presidency 
of the United States and writing a new chapter in history in doing so. The bonds that 
unite the United States and the UK are vital to our prosperity and security and I know 
from talking to Senator Obama that he will be a true friend of Britain. The Government 
look forward to working with the new Administration as we both help people fairly 
through the downturn. I also want to pay tribute to Senator McCain, who has shown the 
characteristic dignity that has marked a lifetime of service to his country. 
This morning I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my 
duties in the House, I shall have further such meetings later today. 





After the Prime Minister’s answer to the engagements question, the room 
is open for MPs to ask supplementary questions. Even though the engagements 
question is in itself a mere routine, the question is important because of the 
supplementaries that follow. The engagements question is a special open question 
that arose out of the prime-ministerial practice described above, of transferring 
specific questions to ministerial departments, and was maintained after this 
practice was abandoned. As Rogers and Walters (2006) explain, in order not to 
lose their chance of receiving an answer from the Prime Minister, which would 
happen if the latter transferred their questions to the responsible Government 
departments, MPs started asking the Prime Minister one of two main tabled and 
open questions: whether he would list his engagements for the day or whether he 
would visit their constituencies (pp. 229-230). Given that such a question cannot 
be transferred, asking it would guarantee that MPs get answers after which they 
have the chance to pose supplementary questions. The latter would be the real 
questions they wanted to ask, and for which they would receive an answer 
because supplementary questions are non-transferable either.  
Even now, after the transferring practice has been abandoned, the 
engagements question remains important. Because the supplementary is a follow-
up question, its scope depends on the scope of the original question. Since the 
scope that the engagements question covers is so wide, a supplementary question 
after the engagements question has an almost unlimited scope (House of 
Commons Information Office, 2005: 9). Supplementaries after the engagements 
question can be about almost anything that falls under the responsibility of the 
Government. That allows MPs to tackle topics of the highest current significance 
in their contributions. The exchange below, which includes the engagements 
question and answer as well as the following supplementaries, is an example. In 
the first supplementary, a Labour MP asks the Prime Minister about the measures 
that the Government is taking to save small businesses during the global financial 
crisis, which was the prime topic of discussion at the time of the session. While 
this supportive contribution gives the Prime Minister the chance to present the 
efforts and achievements of his Government in addressing the crisis, the next 




Minister to defend his Government against an accusation of incompetence. 
(2)  Adrian Bailey:  
If he will list his official engagements for Wednesday 29 October. 
 
Gordon Brown (Prime Minister): 
This morning I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my 
duties in the House, I shall have further such meetings later today. 
Mr. Bailey: 
Small businesses, which are essential to jobs in my constituency, are suffering from high 
raw material prices, high energy prices and, in some cases, reduced demand. What steps 
is my right hon. Friend taking to ensure that the support that we have given to the banks 
is reflected in the support that banks give to small businesses during this difficult time? 
Mr. Brown: 
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Central to the recovery of jobs is the resumption of 
lending by banks to businesses. I discussed that not only as a national problem, but a 
problem in many countries, with President Sarkozy when I met him last evening. We 
have all taken measures to recapitalise our banks and to ensure stability. We continue to 
work on increasing access to funding. Having recapitalised the banks, we want to ensure 
that they will extend availability of credit at competitive prices. Further announcements 
will be made tomorrow when we have a meeting with the banks. 
We are also considering new mechanisms by which, for example, the European 
Investment Bank can give financial support where traditional institutions are not able to 
do so. We urge banks not to change the terms and charges for existing lending to small 
businesses in our country. The President and I also talked about the role of fiscal policy 
in the future. I have been discussing that with other leaders. It is right that fiscal policy 
supports monetary policy at this time. 
David Cameron (Leader of the Opposition): 
If the Prime Minister wants to help small business, he can start by cancelling his plan for 
putting up the rate of corporation tax for small business. 
In the past fortnight we have learned that housing repossessions are up 71 per cent., 
unemployment is rising at its fastest rate for 17 years and the economy is shrinking. Will 
the Prime Minister now finally admit that he did not abolish boom and bust? 
  (House of Commons official report, 2008e) 
In fact, for a few weeks before and after this session, the Leader of the Opposition 
made use of his right to ask supplementary questions in order to criticise the 
reaction of the Government to the financial crisis, as he did in the exchange 
above. 
After the supplementary questions are over, the Speaker moves to the 
second tabled question by calling the number of the question and the name of the 
MP who has tabled it. After the answer of the Prime Minister, the MP who has 
advanced the question gets the opportunity to ask a supplementary question, as a 
follow up to his initial question, which the Prime Minister then answers as well. 
More supplementary questions and answers follow, until the Speaker announces 
the next tabled question. This goes on until Question Time is over (House of 




2006: pp. 229-232). 
In view of the purpose of this study, the most interesting parts of Question 
Time are the question-answer encounters between the Prime Minister and the 
Leader of the Opposition. It is in these encounters that the Prime Minister’s 
attempts to exclude opposition standpoints from the discussion by means of 
accusations of inconsistency, the focus of my interest in this study, are most 
recurrent. The encounters, which always start by a supplementary that the Leader 
of the Opposition poses, often after the engagements question as in the example 
above, are also the most confrontational of all the exchanges in Prime Minister's 
Question Time. They can go up to six rounds in which the Leader of the 
Opposition continues to supplement one question after the other, criticising the 
Prime Minister and his Government, while the Prime Minister responds by 
defending his Government and often also by attacking the Opposition. Although 
it is often these exchanges that are meant when Prime Minister's Question Time is 
criticised for being a “partisan joust between the noisier supporters of the main 
political parties” (House of Commons Procedure Committee, 2002: p. 18), it is 
also acknowledged that in these encounters between the Head of Government and 
the Leader of the Opposition the most important political argumentative 
exchanges take place. The encounters between the Prime Minister and the leader 
of the third largest party are also important. These can go up to three rounds, as 
parliamentary conventions restrict the number of contributions for the leader of 
the third largest party to a maximum of three questions. 
Even though Prime Minister’s Question Time proceeds via a sequence of   
questions and answers, the session is so argumentative that it has been widely 
considered as a mini-debate about the performance of the Government (Beard, 
2000; House of Commons Information Office, 2005; Rogers & Walters 2006; 
Wilson, 1990). In fact, Question Time can hardly be considered as an information 
seeking session. It is almost always the case that the questions of MPs are posed 
in such a way that an answer cannot really be expected. As Wilson (1990) 
observes, the questions are usually preceded by a set of assertions (both 
presuppositions and propositions) that constitute argumentation in defence of a 
standpoint, which is usually left implicit. The question itself is most of the time 




the preceding assertions (pp. 131-178). In addition to the argumentative nature of 
questions, the debate-like character of Question Time is also manifested by the 
way the questions of MPs are divided: MPs in favour of the Prime Minister’s 
policies pose supportive questions, and MPs against him pose challenging ones. 
The Speaker of the House is expected to keep a balance between the two sides as 
he invites MPs to take the floor (House of Commons Information Office, 2005).  
By emphasising the overall argumentative nature of Question Time one 
does of course not exclude the occurrence of non-argumentative exchanges. Such 
exchanges are, however, very infrequent and marginal, especially when 
considering supplementary questions. As described by Civil Service Guidance, 
supplementaries are the means for MPs from the Opposition to put the Minister 
questioned ‘on the defence’ (Rogers & Walters, 2006: p. 317); they are occasions 
to make political points. The supplementary questions posed by the Leader of the 
Opposition always convey a critical point of view about some policy or action of 
the Government. Because of their undisputed argumentative nature as well as 
their dominantly confrontational characteristics, the encounters between the 
Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition are the prime subject of 
examination in this study. 
 
3.3 The institutional aims of the argumentative practice  
The function of parliamentary questions is generally expressed as to seek 
information, or to press for action, in order to hold the Government to account 
(House of Commons Information Office, 2005: p. 1; House of Commons 
Procedure Committee, 2002; Rogers & Walters, 2006: pp. 311-312). The House 
of Commons Information Office factsheet on parliamentary Questions (2005) 
explains that addressing questions obliges “Ministers to explain and defend the 
work, policy decisions and actions of their departments” (p. 2). It is through this 
obligation to explain and defend policies and actions that the Government is held 
to account by MPs as representatives of the general public of voters.  
Over the years, the nature and function of questions for oral answer have 
diverged considerably from those of questions for written answer. While both are 




been mainly concerned with obtaining information and questions for oral answer 
have become more and more concerned with pressing for action. As explained 
earlier, the latter concern contributes significantly to the argumentative nature of 
oral questions and answers. In order for MPs to press for a certain course of 
action effectively, it is usually necessary to justify the promoted course of action, 
and often also to criticise the actions that need to be replaced. Similarly, in order 
to respond properly to such questions, Ministers need to justify their actions and 
sometimes even argue against the alternative actions proposed by MPs. 
Furthermore, within the category of oral questions, Prime Minister's 
Question Time and ministerial departments’ Question Time have also diverged. 
The Select Committee report on parliamentary questions notes that the 
“distinction between Prime Minister’s Questions and departmental Question Time 
is sufficiently fundamental that special provisions for the former would be 
justified” (House of Commons Procedure Committee, 2002: p. 19). As the report 
explains, the distinct nature of Prime Minister's Question Time is dictated by the 
scope of the Prime Minister’s responsibilities. On the one hand, the Prime 
Minister’s responsibility is vast: he is the Head of Government and is therefore 
responsible for all that is done in the name of it. But on the other hand, the Prime 
Minister’s immediate responsibility is so general that there are very few things for 
which he has a direct administrative responsibility (p. 18). The vast and yet 
general nature of the responsibility for the policies and actions of the Government 
that the Prime Minister has, limits the specificity of the actions that MPs can 
press for when posing questions for oral answer to the Prime Minister. This 
limitation, in turn, dictates a certain scope for the accountability of the Prime 
Minister that can be pursued through questions for oral answer: when questioning 
the Prime Minister in a Question Time session, MPs try to hold the Prime 
Minister accountable for the general performance of his Government. The 
scrutinising argumentative question-answer exchanges in which MPs press for 
action and the Prime Minister defends and justifies the actions and policies of his 
Government are eventually aimed at holding the Government to account for its 
general performance. 
Because it is the purpose for which Question Time was established, the 




the Prime Minister as participants in this kind of parliamentary sessions. Many of 
the rules and conventions that regulate the practice of Question Time are intended 
to further the achievement of this aim. For instance, one of the main rules 
mentioned in the Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and 
Usage of Parliament in relation to Prime Minister's Question Time is that 
questions need to address the responsibilities of the Prime Minister in his capacity 
as Head of Government only, and not in his capacity as a party leader, for 
example (McKay et al., 2004). Another rule proscribes questions that address 
matters of legal controversy, the discussion of which does not contribute to 
holding the Government to account (House of Commons Information Office, 
2005: p. 4).22 The Speaker of the House as well as the Clerks in the Table Office 
see to it that the practice adheres to the rules and lives up as much as possible to 
the expectations ensuing from such an aim.  
The Clerks make sure that all tabled questions are in conformity with the 
relevant rules and conventions and the Speaker of the House sees to it that 
supplementary questions as well as answers are so, too. The exchange below is an 
example. In it, Mr. Duncan Smith asks Mr. Blair a question that seems to violate 
the rules of Question Time by not being related to the responsibilities of the Head 
of Government. 
(3)  Ian Duncan Smith (Leader of the Opposition):  
[…] The truth is that the Prime Minister has had to climb down. Let us ask why. Perhaps 
the Prime Minister can tell us, as leader of the Labour party, how much money the 
unions gave his party last year.  
Tony Blair (Prime Minister):  
In no shape or form are we giving way on the reform programme in the health service 
and the education service. [Hon. Members: "How much?"] Well, the amount of money 
given to the Labour party—thanks to the procedures we introduced—is there for people 
to see.  
It is important that we carry on with the reforms in health, education, transport, and law 
and order, but the reforms should be matched by investment. I will take on either people 
like the right hon. Gentleman who want to cut investment, or people in the trade union 
movement or elsewhere who want to halt the advance of reform. "Invest and reform" is 
right. Now perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will tell us what his position is.  
Mr. Duncan Smith:  
The Prime Minister took a long time not to answer the question. Let us now give him the 
answer. The figure is £8 million, in a six-month period last year—and in the case of two 
22 Not all the rules applying to the practice of Question Time are intended to further the process of 
holding the Government to account. Some rules are motivated by a concern about other processes, 
which are external to Question Time. For example, the sub judice rule, which does not allow 
parliamentary discussions of matters that are under police investigations, is intended to protect the 
independence of police investigations. Such rules are usually not specific to Question Time, but 




                                                 
unions that are either on strike or about to strike, it is nearly £1.25 million.  
Mr. Speaker:  
Order. I am reluctant to interrupt the Leader of the Opposition, but I must tell him that 
the Prime Minister is here to answer questions as Prime Minister, not as leader of the 
Labour party. [Interruption.] Order. I am talking about the rules of the House, which the 
House has given me to protect. Perhaps the Leader of the Opposition could ask another 
question.  
Mr. Duncan Smith rose—[Interruption.]  
Mr. Speaker:  
Order. Please allow the Leader of the Opposition to ask his question.  
Mr. Duncan Smith:  
This issue goes right to the heart of the Government. While I fully respect what you say, 
Mr. Speaker, I must point out—[Interruption]—if I may—that it is about what is 
happening on the railways and in the Post Office. I am simply raising an issue, and 
asking a question about whether there are links with and reasons for government policy. I 
would like to pursue that line if you are agreeable, Mr. Speaker. Perhaps I can ask the 
question—[Interruption.]  
Mr. Speaker:  
Order. The Leader of the Opposition is using some ingenuity. Let us see how he puts his 
question—whether he puts it in another way.  
Mr. Duncan Smith rose—[Interruption.]  
Mr. Speaker:  
Order.  
 Mr. Duncan Smith:  
I will certainly ask the question, Mr. Speaker, but perhaps in a slightly different way.  
No wonder the Prime Minister grovels to the trade unions after having attacked them, 
from one day to the next. The truth is—this is the reality for the present Government, so 
heavily linked to the trade unions—that five years ago the Prime Minister used to talk 
about "24 hours to save the health service"; on Monday, it was 24 hours to save his 
donations. Instead of briefing and retreating, attacking and withdrawing, why does the 
Prime Minister not cut his links with the strikers and the wreckers?  
  (House of Commons official report, 2002) 
The exchange above is an example of common interventions that the Speaker of 
the House makes in order for the practice of Question Time to be a contribution 
to the aim of holding the Government to account. In this case, the Speaker does 
not see the relevance of the question that the Leader of the Opposition asks about 
the donations that the Labour Party received from trade unions to the performance 
of the Government. Mr. Duncan Smith responds by claiming that his question is 
definitely about the performance of the Government: it is about ‘links with and 
reasons for government policy’. In other words, as he reformulates it, Mr. Duncan 
Smith’s questions is about the reasons that made Mr. Blair change his mind, as 
Head of Government, about the trade unions on strike. 
Even though Question Time was established for the purpose of holding 




associated with the argumentative practice of these prominent parliamentary 
sessions. In addition to their collective aim that the performance of the 
Government is scrutinised, MPs and the Prime Minister have been using their 
argumentative exchanges in Question Time to pursue a multitude of other 
individual institution-related aims. Professor the Lord Norton of Louth, academic 
advisor for the House of Commons Procedure Committee, mentions a few. In the 
Select Committee report on parliamentary questions, Lord Norton is quoted to 
say: 
Question Time used to be an opportunity for backbenchers to seek 
information from Ministers. It has in recent decades become more an 
opportunity for frontbenchers to intervene and for opposition Members to 
try to catch Ministers, as well as for government backbenchers to support 
Ministers and put questions about Opposition policy. This change in 
nature has been a feature especially of Prime Minister’s Question Time. 
(House of Commons Procedure Committee, 2002: pp. 11-12) 
Furthermore, the Select Committee report on parliamentary questions 
observes that MPs have also been using Question Time as a means of ‘partisan 
point-scoring, of self-promotion, of promoting external interests’ (House of 
Commons Procedure Committee, 2002: p. 11). As observed in the report, MPs 
often use their questions to convey political statements that promote their party’s 
policies or to attack those of their adversaries, and similarly in his answers the 
Prime Minister often conveys pride in the achievement of his party’s policies or 
criticism of those of the Opposition.  
Using contributions in Question Time for such party-political purposes 
has increased significantly as a result of the wide media coverage of the House’s 
proceedings. The fact that the questions and answers can be followed by an 
external public made Question Time become an opportunity for both MPs and the 
Prime Minister to address and appeal to the general public of voters. In fact, it can 
sometimes be very obvious that a certain question by an MP or an answer by the 
Prime Minister is primarily concerned with conveying party-political statements 
to the public of voters. The following is an example: 
(4)  Mr. MacGregor 
As rail privatisation completes its final stages, does the Prime Minister agree that it 
already demonstrates substantial benefits for both passengers and taxpayers? Is not its 
success one of the main reasons why the Labour party, which bitterly opposed rail 
privatisation through all its parliamentary stages, as it did with nearly every other 






Mr. John Major:  
It is undoubtedly the case that the Labour party has not supported a single privatisation 
until it has proved to be a success, at which point it pays lip service to it. Under Labour, 
none of the privatisations would have taken place. It certainly bitterly attacked rail 
privatisation, which has now increased investment, increased rolling stock, improved 
services, provided extra service and saved the taxpayer a substantial amount. 
[Interruption.] It is, in short, a success, and no doubt that is why the Labour party wishes 
to shout it down.  
  (House of Commons official report, 1997) 
In the exchange above, which came shortly before the general elections as a result 
of which Labour came to power, Mr. John Major, the Prime Minister at the time, 
responds to a question by a fellow Conservative MP about the Government’s 
disputed policy of privatisation. In his response, Mr. Major advances 
argumentation in support of the standpoint that Conservatives, unlike Labour, are 
capable of providing good leadership for their country. He presents Labour as 
incapable, or even unwilling, to support policies that would bring good to the 
general public.  
Party-promoting contributions are not limited to the Prime Minister; the 
Leader of the Opposition also makes use of questions in order to appeal to the 
public of voters. The following is an example: 
(5)  David Cameron (Leader of the Opposition):  
I think that people watching this will just conclude that this Prime Minister cannot 
answer a question and cannot make a decision. People are starting to say about this 
Government, “Never mind the complete lack of vision, never mind the relaunches; just 
focus on keeping us safe.” In a week when the prisons adviser says that they have got no 
prisons strategy, when President Musharraf says that they have no terrorism strategy and 
when the only good idea that they have about police reform has come from the 
Conservative party, should he not just accept that people are not safe under Labour? 
(House of Commons official report, 2008a) 
In this exchange, Mr. Cameron, the Leader of the Conservative Opposition, 
employs his criticisms of the Government to support the standpoint that 
Conservatives, unlike Labour, would be able of keeping the British people safe. 
Starting the question with a reference to the ‘people’ watching makes it quite 
obvious that the main target of the Leader of the Opposition is the public rather 
than the Prime Minister. In questions and answers such as the above, which are 
very common in Question Time, both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the 




the one that deserves voters’ support. In spite of the importance of institution-
related aims such as the above, I will, in this study adopt a perspective in which 
the aim of holding the Government to account concerning its general performance 
is considered to be the institutional goal of the argumentative practice of Question 
Time.  
This choice of perspective is motivated primarily by my interest in 
accounting for the interaction between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the 
Opposition. My concern with providing an adequate account of the Prime 
Minister’s attempts to exclude the criticism of the Leader of the Opposition from 
the discussion requires me to focus my attention on the discussion in which the 
two politicians address each other rather than the simultaneous discussions in 
which each of them addresses third parties. Adopting a perspective in which the 
aim of promoting party interests is considered the institutional goal of the 
argumentative practice of Question Time would place the answers of the Prime 
Minister, in which he accuses the Leader of the Opposition of an inconsistency, in 
a discussion between him and the general public of voters. In this discussion, the 
Prime Minister attempts to convince the voters that his party is the one that is 
capable of leading the country. The Leader of the Opposition is, strictly speaking, 
not an arguer in this discussion. Even though one can think that the Prime 
Minister is trying to convince the voters by reporting to them the results of his 
discussion with the Leader of the Opposition, the relevance of an accusation of 
inconsistency to this discussion is far less obvious than its relevance in the 
discussion in which the Prime Minister directly defends the performance of his 
Government against the criticism of the Leader of the Opposition. 
The choice of the discussion to focus on is a mere choice of perspective –
made in view of a particular analytic interest– from which the argumentative 
practice of Question Time is to be examined. It does not, by any means, allege 
that the questions and answers of the Leader of the Opposition and of the Prime 
Minister contribute exclusively to either a discussion that is aimed at holding the 
Government to account or a discussion that is aimed at promoting their political 
parties. In fact, the different discussions run simultaneously and the aims are 
often pursued by means of the same exchanges. Yet, the discussions can be 




becomes more prominent.  
The choice of a perspective in which the argumentative practice of 
Question Time is aimed at holding the Government to account is not only 
beneficial to the examination of the argumentative move with which I am 
concerned. The choice is also instrumental to a critical examination of the 
institutional effectiveness of the argumentative practice of Question Time to 
achieve the purpose for which Question Time was established. Very often, 
failures to be argumentatively reasonable result in failures to achieve institutional 
aims. That is because the argumentative quality of the exchanges can be 
indicative, to a high extent, of their institutional quality. That this should be so 
can be supported by considering that in cases where argumentative exchanges are 
the primary means for achieving institutional aims, one may expect the 
institutional effectiveness of the exchanges to be highly dependent on the quality 
of the critical testing achieved in them. For example, if in Question Time the 
Government is held to account primarily by means of argumentative exchanges 
that scrutinise its performance: the more critical the exchanges that scrutinise the 
performance of the Government are, the better the Government is held to 
account.23 Of all the aims pursued in Question Time, the aim of holding the 
Government to account can be considered the purpose for which the institution 
was established. Therefore, the focus on this aim makes the examination of 
argumentative reasonableness in fact telling for the extent to which the practice of 
Question Time is instrumental for the achievement of the aim for which such a 
parliamentary session was established. 
Moreover, the adopted perspective can also be useful for a critical 
evaluation of the parliamentary procedure that regulates Question Time. Since, as 
mentioned earlier, some of the rules that regulate Question Time are motivated by 
concerns in processes other than holding the Government to account, it is very 
much possible that some of these rules and conventions do in practice obstruct the 
pursuit of the aim for which the institution was established. At least at first sight, 
the convention that allows the Prime Minister to refuse to address a particular 
question if that ‘would not be in the public interest’ is an example. Through the 
23 See Mohammed (2007b) for a discussion of how the quality of the critical testing of standpoints 
in a negotiation encounter can be indicative of the institutional effectiveness of the exchange, i.e. 




                                                 
examination of the effects that similar rules and conventions have on the critical 
testing procedure, it can be examined to what extent rules and conventions that 
regulate Question Time promote the holding of the Government to account.  
From a perspective in which the argumentative practice of Question Time 
is viewed to be aimed at holding the Government to account, I will, in the next 
section, characterise the argumentative practice as an argumentative activity type. 
Following van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005), the characterisation will highlight 
the different preconditions that result from the rules and conventions of Question 
Time. These preconditions apply to the initial situation that triggers the 
argumentative exchanges, to the procedural and material starting points that are 
mutually accepted by MPs and the Prime Minister, to the allowable 
argumentative means employed by them, and to the possible outcomes of their 
argumentative exchanges. 
 
3.4 The argumentative activity type of Question Time 
In the argumentative activity type of Question Time, the argumentative 
confrontation is triggered by the controversial nature of the performance of the 
Government typical of Question Time. While the Prime Minister and the MPs 
from his party are in favour of a positive evaluation of the performance of the 
Government, MPs from the Opposition are in favour of a negative evaluation.24 
The controversy about the performance of the Government underlies all 
argumentative exchanges of Question Time. In their questions, MPs imply and 
defend points of view in favour of either a positive or a negative evaluation of the 
performance of the Government. In his answers, the Prime Minister implies and 
defends a standpoint in favour of a positive evaluation of the performance of his 
Government. So, for example, when the Leader of the Opposition questions the 
24 While it is usually the case that MPs from the party of the Prime Minister are in favour of a 
positive view of the performance of the Government that need not always be the case. Unlike the 
Prime Minister, MPs from his party have no parliamentary obligation to defend the Government: 
their obligation is rather a party-obligation observed by whips, who are MPs appointed by each 
party to maintain party discipline. But in spite of the strictness of the whipping system, cases of no 
support for government decisions from MPs of the ruling party are not impossible. In 2002, for 
example, Labour MPs have openly criticised the decision of the Labour Government to go to war 
against Iraq. Although possible, cases of opposition from MPs from the ruling party are not 




                                                 
Prime Minister about alleged corruption, as he does in the exchange between Mr. 
Cameron and Mr. Brown about the police in London discussed in Chapter 2, the 
Leader of the Opposition implies that because of the alleged corruption the 
Government is not doing a good job. Also, when the Prime Minister answers by 
denying and refuting the allegations or by boasting about the achievements of his 
Government, as he does when he responds to Mr. Duncan Smith in the exchange 
about the National Health Service (NHS) also discussed in Chapter 2, the Prime 
Minister is in fact implying that, because of the achievements mentioned, his 
Government is doing well.  
The controversial performance of the Government is in fact a 
preconditioned topic for the initial disagreement that gives rise to argumentative 
confrontations in Question Time. The rules and conventions of this kind of 
parliamentary sessions require MPs to address in their questions only matters that 
relate to the responsibilities of the Prime Minister as Head of Government. As a 
result of the general and broad nature of the Prime Minister’s responsibilities and 
the practice of transferring specific questions to ministerial departments, both 
explained earlier, it has become conventional that the questions and answers 
express and defend standpoints in relation to the general performance of the 
Government. Over the years, the initial situation in the argumentative 
confrontations of Question Time has grown into an initial disagreement about 
whether or not the performance of the Government is up to standard. The answers 
that the Prime Minister gives defend a positive standpoint, i.e. the performance of 
the Government is up to standard, against the critical doubt of the Opposition. 
Also often, the Prime Minister’s answers attempt to refute the negative standpoint 
that the performance of the Government is not up to standard, which is defended 
by questions from MPs from the Opposition. Even though this initial 
disagreement underlies all argumentative exchanges of Question Time, the 
disagreement is seldom made explicit in the questions or in the answers. 
When in their questions and answers MPs or the Prime Minister address 
the public of voters and promote their parties, there seems to be a different initial 
situation: a disagreement that relates to the competence of a political party in 
leading the country. MPs from the Opposition seem to defend a standpoint such 




ruling party and the Prime Minister seem to defend a standpoint such as unlike the 
Opposition, our party can provide good leadership. However, as a result of rules 
and conventions of Question Time, this difference of opinion cannot be 
independent of the difference of opinion concerning the performance of the 
Government discussed above. Because questions of MPs and answers of the 
Prime Minister have to address the latter’s responsibilities only, MPs and the 
Prime Minister can eventually address the difference of opinion concerning the 
competence of a political party in leading the country only through addressing 
their difference of opinion concerning the performance of the Government. So an 
MP from the Opposition would need to base his defence of the standpoint that 
unlike the ruling party, we can provide good leadership mainly on a negative 
evaluation of the performance of the Government, and the Prime Minister or an 
MP from his party would need to base his defence of the standpoint that unlike 
the Opposition, our party can provide good leadership mainly on a positive 
evaluation of the performance of the Government. 
In addition to the preconditions they create for the topics of the initial 
disagreements, the rules and conventions of this kind of parliamentary session 
create preconditions for the types of disputes, i.e. the definitions of the 
differences of opinion that result from the argumentative confrontations between 
the parties as well. The Prime Minister has a parliamentary obligation to defend 
his Government, and MPs have party-obligations to either support him in 
defending the performance of the Government, in the case that they belong to his 
party, or to oppose him and criticise the performance of the Government, in the 
case that they belong to the Opposition. That means that, argumentatively, the 
Prime Minister and the MPs from his party are expected to advance and uphold 
the positive standpoint that the performance of the Government is up to standard 
and the MPs from the Opposition are expected to advance and uphold the 
negative standpoint that the performance of the Government is not up to standard. 
Consequently, the dispute that results from the confrontation is institutionally 
expected to be mixed: two opposite standpoints are advanced and upheld. 
Especially in the case of the argumentative exchanges between the Prime 
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, which are at the focus of my interest 




in a definition of the difference of opinion as a mixed dispute. As a result of his 
prominent political role, the Leader of the Opposition cannot be expected to do 
less than doubting the positive standpoint that the performance of the Government 
is up to standard and advancing and upholding the negative standpoint that the 
performance of the Government is not up to standard. When MPs from the Prime 
Minister’s party ask questions, the dispute might not appear to be mixed. 
However, taking the argumentative exchanges of Question Time as a whole 
makes the mixed dispute more apparent. 
Starting points in the argumentative activity type of Question Time, 
material and procedural alike, are highly preconditioned by parliamentary rules 
and conventions. All parliamentary rules and conventions, the general ones as 
well as those which are specific to Question Time, are mutually accepted as 
starting points for these argumentative exchanges. For example, the content of 
both questions and answers is preconditioned to conform to parliamentary 
conventions regarding parliamentary language and respect for the Crown, the 
judiciary and Members of the two Houses of Parliament. As a result, arguments 
hardly ever doubt the honesty or the motives of any of the arguers directly. The 
rules and conventions also prescribe a clear procedure and impose a clear 
assignment of roles. The Prime Minister is the main protagonist of the positive 
standpoint that the performance of the Government is up to standard, since he has 
the parliamentary obligation to defend his Government. MPs from his party are 
commonly assigned the same role since they are conventionally expected to 
support him. MPs from the Opposition and the Leader of the Opposition in 
particular are assigned the role of the protagonist of the negative standpoint that 
the performance of the Government is not up to standard, since they are 
conventionally expected to attack the performance of the Government. 
Furthermore, the question-answer format determines the division of the burden of 
proof. In general, the format stipulates that the argumentation is exchanged in an 
equal number of turns between MPs and the Prime Minister, and that the MPs 
advance their argumentation first while the Prime Minister concludes the 
exchanges. Accordingly, in the mixed dispute between the Prime Minister and the 
Leader of the Opposition, for example, the latter needs to defend his negative 





Rules and conventions make it also clear what kinds of contributions are 
allowed in the argumentative practice of Question Time: MPs pose questions and 
the Prime Minister provides answers. Argumentative means are thus 
preconditioned: MPs need to advance their argumentation in the form of 
questions that literally address the Speaker of the House, and the Prime Minister 
should formulate his argumentation in the form of answers that address the 
Speaker, too. Consequently, as observed by Wilson (1990: pp. 131-178), MPs’ 
argumentation is conventionally embodied in sets of assertions that precede the 
literal questions, and the Prime Minister’s argumentation is conventionally 
embodied in sets of assertions that constitute his answers. The fact that arguers 
defend their standpoints by means of arguments that either defend or criticise 
government policies and actions is a result of a conventional precondition created 
by the parliamentary rule that requires questions to relate only to the 
responsibilities of the Prime Minister, mentioned earlier. As explained, it is 
conventional that every question posed in Question Time conveys an argument 
about a certain policy or plan of the Government, advanced in support of either 
the implicit positive standpoint that the performance of the Government is up to 
standard or the likewise-implicit negative standpoint that the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard.  
MPs, who rightly expect that their arguments will be faced with challenge, 
rarely leave their arguments unsupported by further arguments. In other words, 
MPs usually anticipate that sub-disagreements will arise in relation to their 
arguments, and that they might need to engage into argumentative exchanges 
aimed at critically resolving such sub-disputes. Eventually, the arguments, which 
usually express an evaluation of a government policy or action, become sub-
standpoints about which a sub-disagreement develops. The following is an 
example. The exchange was also quoted in 1.1. 
(6)  David Cameron (Leader of the Opposition):  
First, may I join the Prime Minister in paying tribute to Corporal Damian Lawrence, who 
was killed in Afghanistan on Sunday? He died serving our country. May I also take the 
opportunity to wish the Prime Minister a happy 57th birthday? [Interruption.] Enough of 
that. 
In January last year, the Government were sent details of 4,000 dangerous foreign 
criminals and for an entire year they did absolutely nothing with that information. Can 








Gordon Brown (Prime Minister):  
The Attorney-General has asked the Crown Prosecution Service to conduct an inquiry 
into this matter. A request was made by the Dutch authorities for us to look through our 
DNA records. Some 4,000 names were put to us by the Dutch, and 11 cases have been 
discovered as a result of the investigation. The inquiry will cover all the details of what 
happened. I must tell the right hon. Gentleman that it was possible for the Dutch to ask us 
to look at our DNA records only because we are keeping full DNA records. The 
Conservatives opposed that legislation. 
 (House of Commons official report, 2008b) 
In this exchange, the Leader of the Opposition defends a negative standpoint 
about the performance of the Government by means of an argument concerning a 
lack of government actions to protect the British public. Mr. Cameron anticipates 
that the Prime Minister will not accept his argument that the government is failing 
to protect the people, so he presents, as an argument that supports it, the case of 
the Government’s failure to act upon information that was given by the Dutch 
authorities about 4000 foreign criminals. His argumentation can be reconstructed 
as following:  
(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1 The actions of the Government to protect the public are a 
catastrophic failure 
1.1.1 For an entire year, the Government has not done anything with 
the DNA information it has concerning 4000 foreign criminals 
Mr. Cameron rightly anticipates that Mr. Blair does not accept his argument that 
the actions of the Government to protect the public are a catastrophic failure and 
that a sub-disagreement concerning this argument, which then becomes a sub-
standpoint, will arise. The Prime Minister does not only reject the sub-standpoint, 
but he also advances his own (contrary) sub-standpoint in which he claims that 
the Government is adopting policies that protect the public and defends the latter 
by mentioning the example of the government policy of keeping full DNA 
records as a sub-argument.  
The response of the Prime Minister, above, is a good example of the kind 
of attempts to rule out a standpoint of the Opposition that I am interested in. Upon 
presenting the sub-argument that the Government is keeping full DNA records as 
a policy that protects the public, Mr. Brown emphasises that the Conservatives 
have opposed this policy. The Prime Minister attempts to avoid discussing the 
sub-argument of Mr. Cameron by claiming that the latter cannot criticise the 




past opposed the government policy of keeping full DNA records. In doing so, 
the Prime Minister implies that one cannot oppose a government policy and then 
criticise the Government for not implementing it. A detailed analysis of the case 
will follow in Chapter 4; for the moment I will restrict my attention to the sub-
disagreements that are institutionally anticipated in the argumentative practice of 
Question Time. 
Unlike the main dispute concerning the performance of the Government, 
the sub-disputes about government policies and plans are most of the time 
explicit. These sub-disputes are also often multiple and not necessarily mixed. 
Supportive questions, usually asked by MPs from the ruling party, give rise to 
non-mixed and sometimes multiple sub-disputes. Typically, supportive questions 
advance and support a sub-standpoint in which a positive evaluation of a certain 
government policy or action is expressed as an argument in support of the 
positive main standpoint that the performance of the Government is up to 
standard. The Prime Minister’s response to this kind of question is usually to 
advance further arguments in support of the sub-standpoint expressed in the 
question. In such cases, the Prime Minister and the MP do not disagree about the 
sub-standpoint which they both defend against anticipated doubt. Sometimes, 
instead of further supporting the sub-standpoint advanced by an MP from his 
party, the Prime Minister advances and defends another sub-standpoint in support 
of the positive main standpoint. The Prime Minister’s sub-standpoint needs to be 
related to the same issue as that addressed by the sub-argument of the MP. 
Together, the two sub-standpoints constitute a multiple sub-dispute.  
Unlike the sub-disputes arising from supportive questions, sub-disputes 
arising from critical questions are usually mixed. A critical question, usually 
asked by an MP from the Opposition, advances and supports a sub-standpoint in 
which a negative evaluation of a certain government policy or action is expressed 
in support of the negative main standpoint that the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard. In order to defend his Government, the Prime 
Minister is expected to refute the sub-standpoint advanced. He can do so by 
adopting and then defending an opposite sub-standpoint, in which case the sub-
dispute that arises is mixed. However, it is typical that the Prime Minister 




That leads the argumentative confrontation towards a multiple and mixed dispute.  
The responses of the Prime Minister, that are the subject of this study, 
occur most of the times in the course of sub-disputes of the second kind. For 
example, in response to the sub-standpoint that government policies are to blame 
for damaging the NHS, as part of the exchange between Mr. Blair and Mr. 
Duncan Smith about the NHS discussed in Chapter 2, Mr. Blair responds by 
advancing a contrary sub-standpoint that the NHS has a record to be proud of. 
The exchange between Mr. Cameron and Mr. Brown about foreign criminals 
discussed above is another example. In response to the sub-standpoint that the 
actions of the Government to protect the public are a catastrophic failure Mr. 
Brown advances the contrary sub-standpoint that the Government is adopting 
policies that further the protection of the public 
The way in which outcomes of argumentative exchanges are determined is 
highly preconditioned by the purpose and the format of Question Time. The main 
difference of opinion is hardly ever expected to be actually resolved. That is not 
only because of the limited time of the session, but also as a result of the 
institutional goal. In order to maximise political accountability, the performance 
of the Government needs to be scrutinised as clearly as possible, and that requires 
the highest possible degree of critical testing of the points of view concerning the 
performance of the Government. In some cases the sub-differences about certain 
policies or plans can be resolved, but such cases are rare. Often, the Prime 
Minister concludes his answers by presenting the sub-dispute as having been 
resolved, which he can do because the question-answer format gives him the 
advantage of having the last word. However, rarely do these claimed resolutions 






4 THE STRATEGIC FUNCTION OF RESPONDING TO CRITICISM WITH 
ACCUSATIONS OF INCONSISTENCY 
  
In the preceding chapter, I have described and discussed the argumentative 
practice of Prime Minister's Question Time and characterised it as an 
argumentative activity type. The characterisation of the activity type made it 
possible to identify a number of significant preconditions for argumentative 
confrontations that result from the rules and conventions of the parliamentary 
session. In this chapter, I shall take these institutional preconditions into account 
and re-examine the Prime Minister’s responses to criticism from the Opposition 
with accusations of inconsistency. The re-examination aims at providing a more 
empirically adequate (analytic) account of the Prime Minister’s responses at 
issue. The account pursued sheds light on the institutional dimension of the 
attempts, whose argumentative dimension has already been captured in the 
characterisation of the particular way of manoeuvring in Chapter 2. As a case in 
point, I will re-examine the exchange between Tony Blair and Ian Duncan Smith 
about the National Health Service (NHS), discussed in Chapter 2, and analyse 
Mr. Blair’s strategic manoeuvring in view of the institutional preconditions for 
argumentation identified in the argumentative activity type perspective, 
developed in Chapter 3.  
 
4.1 Pursuing an institutionally strategic outcome in argumentative sub-
confrontations  
As has become clear in Chapter 3, in this study, the sessions of Prime Minister's 
Question Time are to be viewed as argumentative discussions about the 
performance of the Government in pursuit of the institutional goal of holding the 
Government to account. The sessions consist of questions and answers that 
advance argumentation defending and attacking two main opposite standpoints: a 
positive standpoint that the performance of the Government is up to standard and 




standard. Guided by this characterisation, the question-answer exchange in which 
Mr. Blair accuses Mr. Duncan Smith of being inconsistent in his attitude towards 
the NHS, discussed in Chapter 2 and included again below for the sake of 
convenience, needs to be reconstructed as part of such a discussion.  
(1)   Ian Duncan Smith (Leader of the Opposition): 
[…] The answer that he did not give to my question is that hospital beds are in short 
supply because they are being blocked by people who cannot get a care home or nursing 
home bed. The figure that he did not want to provide is that 40,000—nearly 10 per 
cent.—fewer care home beds are available since 1997 when he took over. Age Concern 
says that the care sector is in crisis. The head of the Registered Nursing Homes 
Association said that Government policy was to blame. The Government's policies are 
damaging the NHS. Is not the Prime Minister's real achievement after five years to have 
increased both the queue to get into hospital and the queue to get out?  
Tony Blair (Prime Minister):  
Public sector investment in the health service has increased under the Government and is 
continuing to increase. We are roughly the only major industrial country anywhere in the 
world that is increasing expenditure on health and education as a proportion of national 
income. Is it the Conservative party's case that we are not spending enough on health and 
education? When we announced our spending plans, Conservatives called them reckless 
and irresponsible. We know that the right hon. Gentleman wants to run down the national 
health service because he does not believe in it. The clearest evidence of that came 
yesterday, when the Leader of the Opposition said:  
"The health service doesn't serve anybody . . . It doesn't serve doctors or nurses. 
It doesn't help the people who are treated."  
What an insult to the NHS and the people who work in it! Conservatives denigrate the 
health service because they want to undermine it. We want to increase investment, 
whereas the right hon. Gentleman would cut it. 
(House of Commons official report, 2002) 
In his question, Mr. Duncan Smith defends the negative main standpoint and in 
his answers, Mr. Blair defends the positive main standpoint. Mr. Duncan Smith 
defends the negative standpoint by saying that government policies are damaging 
the NHS. He cites the high number of cancelled operations among those 
scheduled by the NHS as evidence, arguing that government policies in the care 
sector have caused shortage in the supply of hospital beds, which has in turn lead 
to a problematic rise in the number of cancelled operations.  
In Chapter 2, the criticism of the Government for having policies that 
damage the NHS, advanced by Mr. Duncan Smith, was interpreted as the critical 
standpoint that government policies are to blame for damaging the NHS. The 
interpretation was guided by the knowledge that the claim comes in the context of 
criticising the Government.  The characterisation of the argumentative practice as 
an argumentative activity type allows, however, for a more precise interpretation 




Smith criticises the Government for having policies that damage the NHS can be 
interpreted as an argument advanced in support of the negative main standpoint. 
The argument would be something like government policies are damaging the 
NHS, which is in fact what the Leader of the Opposition actually says in his 
question. As a defence of the negative main standpoint, this argument gets a 
justificatory power ascribed to it. The justificatory power is expressed in a linking 
premise like if government policies are damaging the NHS, then the performance 
of the Government is not up to standard. The blame implied in the critical 
position of Mr. Duncan Smith is part of the justificatory power of the argument 
rather than its propositional content. Therefore, in light of the activity type 
perspective, the argumentation of Mr. Duncan Smith, in his question, is to be 
interpreted as follows: 
(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1 Government policies are damaging the NHS 
(1.1’) (If government policies are damaging the NHS, then the 
performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
As predicted by the activity type perspective, the argument that government 
policies are damaging the NHS becomes a sub-standpoint as a result of the Prime 
Minister’s institutionally anticipated challenge, typical of this type of 
parliamentary session.  
The insight that exchanges between the Prime Minister and his adversaries 
constitute sub-discussions, in which arguments are challenged and defended, 
often in anticipation of their being rejected (or at least not accepted) by the 
opponent, sheds significant light on the argumentative function of the Prime 
Minister’s accusation at issue. The analysis of the exchange about the NHS 
provided in Chapter 2 showed how the accusation attributes to the Leader of the 
Opposition two mutually inconsistent commitments and urges him to retract one 
of them. The accusation attributes to Mr. Duncan Smith a commitment to the 
NHS deserves to be taken care of as a proposition entailed by criticising 
government policies for damaging the NHS, as well as a commitment to the 
opposite proposition, i.e. a commitment to the NHS does not deserve to be taken 
care of, on the basis of other positions of the Conservative Party that undermine 
the NHS. The accusation is presented in a way that directs the Leader of the 




standpoint by which the commitment is entailed. Thus far the analysis in Chapter 
2; the insights gained from the argumentative activity type perspective, however, 
make clearer how exactly Mr. Blair attempts to lead his adversary to retract his 
criticism by leading him to retract his commitment to the NHS deserves to be 
taken care of.  
In light of the activity type perspective, it can be seen that the 
commitment to the NHS deserves to be taken care of, which is attributed to the 
Leader of the Opposition on the basis of his critical position, is in fact entailed by 
the linking premise of the argument of the Leader of the Opposition. By making 
Mr. Duncan Smith retract his commitment to the NHS deserves to be taken care 
of, Mr. Blair attempts to get the Leader of the Opposition to retract his 
commitment to the linking premise of his argument, i.e. the commitment to if 
government policies are damaging the NHS, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard. Mr. Blair’s accusation of inconsistency against 
Mr. Duncan Smith is therefore an attempt to dismiss an argument by dismissing 
its justificatory power. It is an attempt to define the sub-difference of opinion 
about the sub-standpoint, i.e. the argument, of the Leader of the Opposition as no 
dispute, in the argumentative sub-confrontation about it.  
The definition of the sub-difference of opinion about the argument of the 
Leader of the Opposition as no dispute is particularly strategic in this type of 
parliamentary sessions. The Prime Minister’s institutional obligation to defend 
the policies and actions of his Government imposes constraints on the definitions 
of the difference of opinion allowable as outcomes of the sub-confrontation 
between the Prime Minister and MPs from the Opposition about arguments 
advanced by these MPs. In view of the Prime Minister’s institutional obligation, 
the outcome of no dispute is the only alternative to a definition of the difference 
of opinion as a mixed dispute, often undesirable for the Prime Minister.  If the 
Prime Minister is to live up to his institutional obligation to defend the policies 
and actions of his Government, the Prime Minister is expected to challenge and 
refute arguments advanced by MPs from the Opposition, in which criticism is 
expressed concerning these policies, plans or actions. For example, in the case of 
the exchange about the NHS, Mr. Blair is expected to challenge and refute Mr. 




result, their sub-confrontation is preconditioned to result in a mixed sub-dispute 
concerning the argument he needs to refute, unless the argument is retracted. By 
re-examining the dialectical profile of the confrontation stage, designed in 
Chapter 2, in view of the Prime Minister’s institutional obligation to defend the 
policies and actions of his Government, I shall show that, unless the arguments 
advanced by MPs from the Opposition are retracted, the argumentative sub-
confrontations about them are preconditioned to result in mixed sub-disputes.  
In Chapter 2, it has been shown that an argumentative confrontation 
between two discussants (D1 and D2) concerning a certain positive standpoint 
(+/p), advanced by D1, can in principle result, within the boundaries of 
reasonableness, in any of the four following outcomes: first, a definition of the 
difference of opinion as no dispute to D2’s favour, second, a definition of the 
difference of opinion as no dispute to D1’s favour, third, a non-mixed dispute 
about the positive standpoint of D1 and fourth, a mixed dispute about the positive 
standpoint of D1 and its opposite advanced by D2.  
The confrontation can result in a definition of the difference of opinion as 
no dispute to the favour of D2 (turn 3, right branch) in the case that D1 retracts his 
positive standpoint (+/p) in response to the doubt of D2. The same outcome can 
be reached in the case that D1 retracts the advanced positive standpoint (+/p) in 
response to the advanced and maintained opposite standpoint (-/p) by D2 (turn 7, 
right branch). The confrontation can result in a definition of the difference of 
opinion as no dispute to the favour of D1 (turn 4, right branch) in the case that D2 
retracts his doubt in response to the maintained positive standpoint of D1. The 
confrontation can result in a non-mixed dispute concerning the standpoint of D1 
in the case that D2 maintains this doubt concerning the standpoint maintained by 
D1 (turn 4, left branch). The same outcome can be reached in the case that D2 
advances the opposite standpoint (-/p) but later retracts it in response to the doubt 
of D1 (turn 6, right branch). The confrontation can result in a mixed dispute in 
the case that both D1 and D2 advance opposite standpoints (+/p and -/p) and 






With the exchange about the NHS as a case in point, I shall show how the 
institutional obligations of the Prime Minister allow only for the first and the last 
of the outcomes above in the argumentative sub-confrontations about arguments 
from the Opposition.  In Figure 8, below, the dialectical profile suggested in 
Chapter 2 is reproduced with the institutionally excluded outcomes crossed out.  
 
By challenging the justificatory power of the argument from the Opposition, Mr. 
Figure 8:  A dialectical profile for sub-confrontations about 





D1 : MP from the Opposition 
D2 : The Prime Minister  
+/p : Advance a positive standpoint concerning the proposition p 
?/(+/p) : Cast doubt on the positive standpoint 
-/p : Advance a negative standpoint concerning the proposition p 
?/(-/p) : Cast doubt on the negative standpoint 
rud/p : Request a usage declarative concerning the proposition p 
+/p’ : Advance a reformulation of the positive standpoint by using a 
usage declarative 
 
The outcomes that have been crossed out are excluded as a result of 
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(Outcome 2: no dispute 
to the advantage of D1) 
retract +/p 
 (Outcome 1: no dispute 
to the advantage of D2) 
retract ?/(-/p) 
(Outcome 1: no dispute 




Blair expresses doubt concerning the linking premise that if government policies 
are damaging the NHS, then the performance of the Government is not up to 
standard, implied in the line of argument of his opponent, which initiates a sub-
confrontation about this premise.25  
In this sub-confrontation, the first outcome that is excluded is the 
definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute to the advantage of Mr. 
Duncan Smith (turn 4, right branch). If the Prime Minister is expected to defend 
government policies and actions, what is expected from Mr. Blair is at least that 
he will not accept arguments that criticise such policies or actions. The most 
straightforward way for him to express the non-acceptance expected is to express 
his critical doubt about the acceptability of the argument itself, i.e. its 
propositional content expressed in 1.1 in the argumentation structure. The indirect 
doubt cast upon the argument by doubting its linking premise (1.1’), however, 
expresses enough non-acceptance for Mr. Blair to live up to his duties as Prime 
Minister.  
The Prime Minister should maintain his critical doubt about the linking 
premise implied in the line of argumentation of the Opposition. Only if he is 
willing to proceed into a sub-discussion about the propositional content of the 
argument that government policies are damaging the NHS can the Prime Minister 
retract his doubt concerning the linking premise that if government policies are 
damaging the NHS, then the performance of the Government is not up to standard 
and end the sub-confrontation about the latter in a definition of the difference of 
opinion as no dispute to Mr. Duncan Smith’s advantage. In the exchange at issue, 
Mr. Blair’s critical doubt about the linking premise comes in fact after failed 
attempts to refute the propositional content of the argument (1.1). That would 
make the retraction of doubt concerning the linking premise go even more against 
his institutional obligations. It is, therefore, unlikely to happen.  
The second outcome excluded in the sub-confrontation about the linking 
premise that if government policies are damaging the NHS, then the performance 
of the Government is not up to standard, is the outcome of a non-mixed dispute 
about this linking premise. In the case that the Prime Minister does not manage to 
refute the propositional content of an argument from the Opposition, merely 




                                                 
doubting the justificatory power of this argument cannot lead to an adequate 
defence of the performance of the Government in the institutional sense. Having 
failed to refute the propositional content of the argument that government policies 
are damaging the NHS, Mr. Blair’s defence of the performance of his 
Government requires him to not only doubt, but also deny the justificatory power 
of the argument. A competent Prime Minister would not only doubt that the 
damages in the NHS referred to by the Opposition are signs that the performance 
of the Government is not up to standard, but would also oppose that and argue 
that the damages referred to are not signs that the performance is not up to 
standard as the linking premise claims. In other words, a non-mixed dispute 
resulting from the Prime Minister’s mere doubt concerning the linking premise is 
excluded if the Prime Minister is to live up to his institutional responsibilities. 
The outcome of a non-mixed dispute would have been even less expected, had the 
sub-confrontation been about the propositional content of the argument rather 
than its justificatory power. It is certainly not acceptable for Mr. Blair to merely 
cast doubt upon the argument that government policies are damaging the NHS. 
Unless he casts doubt on the justificatory power of the argument, Mr. Blair needs 
to challenge the propositional content of the argument and further advance and 
maintain its opposite, leading the sub-confrontation to a mixed dispute (the fourth 
outcome, turn 7, left branch). As long as Mr. Duncan Smith maintains his critical 
argument that government policies are damaging the NHS against the doubt of 
Mr. Blair, advancing and maintaining the opposite argument that government 
policies are not damaging the NHS seems to be the only way for Mr. Blair to live 
up to his institutional responsibility is to justify and defend the performance of his 
Government. 
Even though acting in accordance with his institutional obligations 
requires the Prime Minister to adopt positions that can lead to mixed sub-disputes 
about (the propositional content or the justificatory power of) arguments from the 
Opposition, this outcome need not always be the one reached in actual sub-
confrontations. The response of the MP from the Opposition advancing the 
argument can lead the argumentative sub-confrontation towards the definition of 
the difference of opinion as no dispute favourable to the Prime Minister, instead. 




branch), the sub-confrontation can result in the definition of the difference of 
opinion as no dispute even if the Prime Minister acts in accordance with his 
institutional obligation and expresses critical doubt concerning the argument from 
the Opposition (turn 2, right branch). The sub-confrontation can result in the 
same definition of the difference of opinion even after the Prime Minister 
advances and maintains the opposite sub-standpoint (turn 6, left branch), in 
accordance with his institutional obligations, namely in the case that the MP from 
the Opposition retracts his doubt concerning the Prime Minister’s opposite sub-
standpoint (turn 7, right branch). 
Compared with a mixed dispute as outcome, the outcome of no dispute is 
usually more advantageous to the Prime Minister. With a mixed dispute as an 
outcome, the Prime Minister is required to advance sub-argumentation in order to 
live up to his obligation to refute the Opposition’s implicit sub-standpoint, 
namely that if government policies are damaging the NHS, then the performance 
of the Government is not up to standard, incurred on him by his institutional 
obligation to refute the Opposition’s main standpoint that the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard. With a no dispute as an outcome, the Prime 
Minister is not required to do so. In cases where MPs from the Opposition retract 
their critical arguments, the Prime Minister has nothing against which he needs to 
defend the performance of his Government. In the exchange about the NHS, for 
example, Mr. Duncan Smith’s retraction of the argument that government policies 
are damaging the NHS, or equally of its justificatory power expressed in the 
linking premise that if government policies are damaging the NHS, then the 
performance of the Government is not up to standard, would require him to 
retract his standpoint that the performance of the Government is not up to 
standard without the need for Mr. Blair to advance refutatory arguments. As 
explained earlier, the charge of inconsistency advanced by Mr. Blair against Mr. 
Duncan Smith is an attempt to reach such a result at the first possible occasion 
(turn 3), by leading Mr. Duncan Smith to retract his argument. Even though 
reaching the outcome at the later occasion (turn 7) also spares the Prime Minister 
the need to argue against an argument from the Opposition, in view of 
institutional considerations, achieving the outcome at the first occasion appears to 




provides an example.  
In the exchange about the NHS, reaching a definition of the difference of 
opinion as no dispute at turn 7 is less advantageous to Mr. Blair because it 
requires him to advance and be ready to uphold the sub-standpoint that it is not 
the case that if government policies are damaging the NHS, then the performance 
of the Government is not up to standard as the opposite of the linking premise of 
Mr. Duncan Smith which he challenges. The expression of such a sub-standpoint 
is certainly not to the advantage of Mr. Blair, if only because it can easily be 
interpreted as a sign that the Prime Minister tolerates the act of causing damage to 
the NHS, an impression that the Prime Minister would not want to give. The 
definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute reached at turn 3 of the 
confrontation is definitely the most advantageous outcome for the Prime Minister 
given his institutional obligations and interests. 
The definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute pursued by Mr. 
Blair in the exchange about the NHS is advantageous, not only argumentatively, 
as has been shown in Chapter 2, but also institutionally, as I have made clearer 
above. The outcome affected by the retraction of a critical argument by an MP 
from the Opposition, is institutionally advantageous to the Prime Minister 
primarily because it allows him to act in accordance both with his institutional 
obligations and interests without incurring serious argumentative obligations. The 
outcome makes it possible for the Prime Minister to defend the performance of 
his Government without having to refute the argument from the Opposition which 
is usually necessary for refuting the standpoint of the Opposition that the 
performance of the Government is not up to standard.  
 
4.2 Handling the institutional obligation to address arguments from the 
Opposition 
In the exchange about the NHS, Mr. Blair employs an accusation of inconsistency 
aiming to lead Mr. Duncan Smith to retract his argument, in an attempt to handle 
his own institutional obligation to address arguments from the Opposition while 
incurring a minimum of argumentative obligations. Even though in the last two 




justificatory power of the argument from the Opposition, in previous turns, Mr. 
Blair has attempted to address the propositional content of the argument. In this 
section, I shall examine the whole exchange about the NHS trying to explore an 
additional strategic aspect of the Prime Minister’s accusations at issue.  
In his first question to the Prime Minister in Question Time session of 6 
February 2002, Mr. Duncan Smith addresses the issue of cancelled operations. 
The passage is also quoted in 2.1. 
(1a)  Ian Duncan Smith (Leader of the Opposition):  
May I join the Prime Minister in congratulating Her Majesty on the 50th anniversary of 
her accession? Will the Prime Minister tell the House whether the number of cancelled 
operations has risen or fallen since he came to power?  
Tony Blair (Prime Minister):  
It has risen; however—[Hon. Members: "How much?"] It has risen by about 20,000; 
however, the number of operations as a whole has also risen by more than 500,000; 19 
out of 20 operations are done on time; the average waiting time for an operation has 
fallen since 1997; and, therefore, although it is correct that the number of cancelled 
operations has risen, if we look at the number of operations as a whole—more than 5.5 
million in this country—I think that the national health service has a record to be proud 
of.  
 (House of Commons official report, 2002) 
As always in Question Time, the argumentation in support of the main 
standpoints develops gradually over turns, as a result of the question-answer 
format of the session. In his first turn, Mr. Duncan Smith asks the Prime Minister 
whether the number of cancelled operations has risen or fallen since the latter 
came to power. The Leader of the Opposition, who knows very well that the 
number has risen, considerably in fact, cannot be really asking for information. 
By asking the Prime Minister to tell the House whether the number has risen or 
fallen, the Leader of the Opposition attempts to elicit information that he can use 
as arguments to defend his standpoint that the performance of the Government is 
not up to standard. Already at his first turn, Mr. Duncan Smith can be seen to 
imply that  
(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1 There is a rise in the number of cancelled operations under this 
Government 
(1.1’) (If there is a rise in the number of cancelled operations under 
this Government, then the performance of the Government is not 





In his response to the question, Mr. Blair does not merely provide an answer. 
Realising that his answer to the question serves as an argument in support of his 
opponent’s standpoint, he includes in his response statements that challenge the 
justificatory power of such an argument. Mr. Blair responds by saying that even 
though the number has risen, such a rise cannot really be a sign of bad 
performance. He argues that the rise is trivial if compared to the achievements of 
the Government in the health sector, and gives examples of such achievements. In 
other words, Mr. Blair confirms the propositional content of his opponent’s 
argument that there is a rise in the number of cancelled operations under this 
Government, but rejects its justificatory power (by rejecting the propositional 
content of the linking premise that if there is a rise in the number of cancelled 
operations under this Government, then the performance of the Government is 
not up to standard).  
The positive records of the NHS under his Government listed by the 
Prime Minister not only supports his opposite sub-standpoint that it is not the 
case that if there is a rise in the number of cancelled operations under this 
Government, then the performance of the Government is not up to standard, but 
also his sub-standpoint that the NHS has a record to be proud of, which he 
expresses at the end of his turn. In view of the over-all discussion about the 
performance of the Government, the latter sub-standpoint can be considered as an 
argument in support of the positive main standpoint that the performance of the 
Government is up to standard. Mr. Blair’s argumentation in his first turn can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
(1) (The performance of the Government is up to standard) 
1.1 The NHS has a record to be proud of 
(1.1’) (If the NHS has a record to be proud of, then the performance of 
the Government is up to standard) 
1.1.1a The number of operations as a whole has risen by more than 
500,000 
1.1.1b 19 out of 20 operations are done on time 
1.1.1c The average waiting time for an operation has fallen since 1997 
1.1.1d The rise in the number of cancelled operations does not affect 
the record of the NHS significantly 





Mr. Blair, who cannot reject the propositional content of the argument that 
there is a rise in the number of cancelled operations under this Government, 
rejects the argument’s justificatory power. The Prime Minister rejects the 
argument’s linking premise, leading the argumentative sub-confrontation into a 
mixed sub-dispute about it. Furthermore, Mr. Blair attempts to defend his main 
positive standpoint that the performance of the Government is up to standard by 
an argument that is, given the rise in cancelled operations, contrary to the linking 
premise he rejects, namely that the NHS has a record to be proud of. With Mr. 
Blair’s contrary argument, the sub-dispute becomes also multiple, in a qualitative 
way.26 In this qualitatively multiple and mixed sub-dispute, Mr. Duncan Smith 
holds the sub-standpoint (+/p1) that if there is a rise in the number of cancelled 
operations under this Government, then the performance of the Government is 
not up to standard, while Mr. Blair holds the opposite sub-standpoint (-/p1) that it 
is not the case that if there is a rise in the number of cancelled operations under 
this Government, then the performance of the Government is not up to standard 
and the contrary sub-standpoint (+/p2) that the NHS has a record to be proud of.  
Advancing a contrary sub-standpoint is advantageous to the Prime 
Minister who, because of institutional obligations, has to refute the argumentation 
that the Leader of the Opposition advances in support of the negative main 
standpoint, as well as defend his own positive main standpoint. By choosing to 
defend his own positive standpoint by an argument that is contrary to the 
argument of the Leader of the Opposition, the Prime Minister attempts to defend 
his main standpoint and refute that of his opponent by means of the same sub-
arguments. 
By introducing this qualitatively multiple mixed dispute, the Prime 
Minister attempts to refute the argument from the Opposition by merely 
defending his own contrary argument. In the present case, a successful defence of 
the sub-standpoint that the NHS has a record to be proud of, i.e. one which leads 
26 In a qualitatively multiple and mixed dispute, as introduced by van Eemeren et al. (2007a, pp. 
22-24), a discussant responds to a certain standpoint (+/p1) by advancing a standpoint that is 
alternative to it (+/p2), i.e. a contrary standpoint. The dispute is multiple because two different 
propositions, p1 and p2, are discussed. The dispute is mixed, because the two proposition are 
related in a way that commits the proponent of (+/p2) to (-/p1), and the proponent of (+/p1) to (-




                                                 
the Leader of the Opposition to accept the sub-standpoint, requires the Leader of 
the Opposition to retract his sub-standpoint that if there is a rise in the number of 
cancelled operations under this Government, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard. Mr. Blair hopes that when Mr. Duncan Smith 
accepts that the NHS has a record to be proud of, he will also accept that the rise 
in the number of cancelled operations is trivial compared to the achievements of 
the Government in the health sector. That, if achieved, would require Mr. Duncan 
Smith to retract his linking premise and consequently the line of argument and the 
negative main standpoint it defends. Mr. Duncan Smith, however, does not do so. 
In his next turn, Mr. Duncan Smith reformulates his argument in a way that 
allows him to maintain it against the arguments of the Prime Minister. In fact, in 
his second turn, Mr. Duncan Smith argues that the rise in the number of cancelled 
operations is not trivial. 
(1b)  Ian Duncan Smith (Leader of the Opposition):  
The answer is quite correct: 50 per cent. I have to tell the Prime Minister that that is not 
just a figure. He talks about the rise in the number of operations done, but the numbers 
that have been cancelled have risen as well, and that is a real tragedy for those who have 
to wait. [Interruption.] Well, the reality—he may not want to hear this—is that this is not 
one or two cases, but 80,000 people who have had their operations cancelled on the day 
when they were expecting to have them. That is a matter of fear and anxiety for 80,000 
people—many more than when he came to power. So, as those numbers have risen and 
80,000 people have had their operations cancelled, will he now tell us the reason why?  
Tony Blair (Prime Minister): 
As I explained a moment ago, far more operations have been done by the national health 
service—about 500,000 more. Less than 2 per cent. of operations are cancelled, which 
should put the matter in perspective. The only answer is indeed to increase the capacity 
of the health service, including more nurses, doctors and consultants, as well as other 
staff, and more beds. That is precisely why we are increasing investment in the national 
health service. The right hon. Gentleman is in favour of cutting that investment. 
Therefore, whatever the problems of cancelled operations—I say that they should be put 
in perspective—the remedy that he has, which is to cut that investment, is the wrong 
remedy. The remedy that we have—invest and reform—is the right one.  
 (House of Commons official report, 2002) 
Mr. Duncan Smith defends his argument by saying ‘this is not one or two cases, 
but 80,000 people who have had their operations cancelled on the day when they 
were expecting to have them’. Furthermore, in this same turn, Mr. Duncan Smith 
asks the Prime Minister about the causes of the problematic rise. By means of the 
question-like imperative ‘will he now tell us the reason why?’ Mr. Duncan Smith 
subtly suggests that the causes of the problematic change are so clear that they 




perspective on Question Time, the imperative can be further interpreted as an 
argument that relates to government policies and supports a negative evaluation 
of the performance of the Government.  
Thus, the Leader of the Opposition can be viewed as suggesting that 
government policies are the cause of rising numbers of cancelled operations. A 
suggestion to which the Prime Minister responds in the turn that follows, as he 
compares the policies of his Government with those proposed as a solution to the 
problem by the Opposition. In his second turn, Mr. Duncan Smith’s 
argumentation in support of his negative main standpoint seems to develop to 
convey the following: 
(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1a There is a problematic rise in the number of cancelled 
operations under this Government  
(1.1a’) (If there is a problematic rise in the number of cancelled 
operations, then the performance of the Government is not up to 
standard)  
(1.1b) (Government policies are responsible for the problematic rise) 
1.1a.1 80,000 people suffered fear and anxiety as a result of their 
operations being cancelled on the day when they were expecting 
to have them 
 
Even though he accepts that the rise of cancelled operations can be 
considered a problem, Mr. Blair is not willing to accept it as a sign that the 
performance of the Government is not up to standard. As he asserts that 
‘whatever the problems of cancelled operations […] they should be put in 
perspective’, the Prime Minister is trying to say that once the problem of 
cancelled operations is put in perspective, the other records of the NHS would 
indicate that the performance of the Government is up to standard. Again, the 
Prime Minister is faced with an argument the propositional content (1.1a) of 
which he cannot challenge and, therefore, he challenges the argument’s 
justificatory power instead (1.1a’). 
Mr. Blair needs to respond also to the implicit argument that government 
policies are responsible for the problematic rise. Even though the argument is 
only implied, yet the Prime Minister has to address it. As the characterisation of 




session are (supposed to be) about government plans and policies and the Prime 
Minister is expected to address the critical reaction to these plans and policies if 
he is to live up to his responsibility as Head of Government. That makes it very 
hard for the Prime Minister to ignore an argument about the responsibility of the 
government policies for the problematic rise of cancelled operations, even if this 
argument is only suggested in his opponent’s question. Yet, because the argument 
has only been suggested and not expressed explicitly, Mr. Blair can afford to 
address it indirectly. Instead of opposing the argument that government policies 
are responsible for the rise of the number of cancelled operations, Mr. Blair 
chooses to argue that government plans, unlike those of the Opposition, can solve 
the problem of cancelled operations. By means of this argument, Mr. Blair 
attempts to change the topic of the sub-confrontation. Instead of addressing the 
argument from the Opposition, he addresses a closely related alternative. The 
topic shift is advantageous to Mr. Blair not only because it might allow him to 
avoid discussing an argument from the Opposition that he cannot refute, but also 
because his alternative argument contributes directly to the defence of his positive 
main standpoint. In this turn, Mr. Blair can be viewed to argue that  
(1) (The performance of the Government is up to standard) 
1.1 The government policy of increasing investment in the NHS, 
unlike policies of the Opposition, can solve the problem of 
cancelled operations  
1.1.1 Increasing investment in the NHS would increase its capacity 
1.1.1.1a Increasing investment in the NHS would increase the number of 
nurses, doctors and other staff 
1.1.1.1b Increasing investment in the NHS would increase the number of 
beds 
In this turn, it is clear that the Prime Minister is not only defending the 
performance of his Government, but also arguing that this Government, rather 
than one led by his opponent, is capable of solving the problem. His arguments as 
Head of Government can be also useful for him as party leader. The arguments do 
not only support a standpoint that expresses a positive evaluation of the 
performance of the Government, but also a standpoint that defends the fitness of 
his party for solving the problems of the country. The latter is to be understood as 
presenting an argument in the simultaneous discussion about the competence of 




activity type perspective (section 3.4) showed to be central to Question Time.  
The comparison the Prime Minister makes between his policies and those 
of the Opposition can be considered to be his first, mild, attempt to do away with 
discussing his opponent’s argument. As explained in the activity type 
characterisation, the Prime Minister is under the obligation to refute the 
Opposition’s negative main standpoint that the performance of the Government is 
not up to standard. Mr. Blair portrays the Opposition’s alternative plans as 
incapable of solving the problem of cancelled operations, thereby suggesting that 
the Opposition cannot really criticise the way the Government is dealing with the 
problem when their own policies would not have prevented it. The Prime 
Minister suggests that Mr. Duncan Smith cannot really maintain his argument that 
there is a problematic rise in the number of cancelled operations under this 
Government and can therefore not maintain his standpoint that the performance of 
the Government is not up to standard either. By attempting to make his opponent 
retract his argument, Mr. Blair aims to do away with the opponent’s standpoint 
without discussing his argument. 
Up to this point, Mr. Blair could afford to address the argument that 
government policies are responsible for the problematic rise only indirectly. In 
his next turn, however, the Leader of the Opposition asserts his claim very 
explicitly: government policies are damaging the NHS, he argues, forcing Mr. 
Blair to be more direct as well.  
(1c)  Ian Duncan Smith (Leader of the Opposition): 
[…] The answer that he did not give to my question is that hospital beds are in short 
supply because they are being blocked by people who cannot get a care home or nursing 
home bed. The figure that he did not want to provide is that 40,000—nearly 10 per 
cent.—fewer care home beds are available since 1997 when he took over. Age Concern 
says that the care sector is in crisis. The head of the Registered Nursing Homes 
Association said that Government policy was to blame. The Government's policies are 
damaging the NHS. Is not the Prime Minister's real achievement after five years to have 
increased both the queue to get into hospital and the queue to get out?  
Tony Blair (Prime Minister): 
Public sector investment in the health service has increased under the Government and is 
continuing to increase. We are roughly the only major industrial country anywhere in the 
world that is increasing expenditure on health and education as a proportion of national 
income. Is it the Conservative party's case that we are not spending enough on health and 
education? When we announced our spending plans, Conservatives called them reckless 
and irresponsible. We know that the right hon. Gentleman wants to run down the national 
health service because he does not believe in it. The clearest evidence of that came 




"The health service doesn't serve anybody . . . It doesn't serve doctors or nurses. 
It doesn't help the people who are treated."  
What an insult to the NHS and the people who work in it! Conservatives denigrate the 
health service because they want to undermine it. We want to increase investment, 
whereas the right hon. Gentleman would cut it  
 (House of Commons official report, 2002) 
With this point being made clear, Mr. Duncan Smith’s argumentation in support 
of the negative main standpoint can be reconstructed as follows: 
(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1 Government policies are damaging the NHS 
(1.1’) (if government policies are damaging the NHS, then the 
performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1.1a Government policies in the care sector have caused shortage in 
hospital bed supply 
1.1.1b Shortage in hospital bed supply has lead to a problematic rise in 
the number of cancelled operations among those scheduled by 
the NHS27 
It is in response to the explicit accusation that government policies are damaging 
the NHS that the Prime Minister responds by an explicit attempt to exclude the 
argument from the Opposition from the discussion. In his next turn, the Prime 
Minister challenges the justificatory power of his opponent’s argument by 
accusing him of being inconsistent in his attitude towards the NHS. The 
accusation is an attempt to lead this sub-confrontation concerning the linking 
premise of the challenged argument (1.1’) to the definition of the difference of 
opinion as no dispute, as an outcome which allows the Prime Minister to avoid 
the argumentative obligation to refute an argument from the Opposition, without 
compromising his institutional obligation to defend his Government.  
Knowledge of institutional considerations relevant to the argumentative 
practice in Question Time helps us see Mr. Blair’s accusation of inconsistency 
against Mr. Duncan Smith as an instance of a recurrent attempt of the Prime 
Minister to avoid discussion of  arguments from the Opposition he has the 
institutional obligation to address but has difficulty refuting. In the exchange 
about the NHS, the accusation of inconsistency seems to be the strongest among 
27 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b, being cumulatively coordinatively connected, are expressed in the ironic 
question is not the Prime Minister's real achievement after five years to have increased both the 




                                                 
the Prime Minister’s attempts. Prior to it, the Prime Minister tried, first, to avoid 
the direct refutation of the sub-standpoint that if there is a rise in the number of 
cancelled operations under this Government, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard, by advancing the contrary sub-standpoint that 
the NHS has a record to be proud of. Second, the Prime Minister attempted to 
change the topic of the sub-confrontation about the sub-standpoint that 
government policies are responsible for the problematic rise into a sub-
confrontation about the closely related sub-standpoint that government plans, 
unlike those of the Opposition, can solve the problem of cancelled operations. 
The resort to the accusation of inconsistency, the strongest of the attempts, does 
not come before other attempts have failed. 
 
4.3 Making strategic choices of topics, audience frames and stylistic 
devices   
Knowledge of institutional considerations sheds significant light not only on the 
strategic dimension of the outcome pursued by the accusation and the gradual 
development of it, but also on the way the outcome is pursued. Knowledge of the 
rules and conventions of Question Time and the preconditions they create for 
argumentative exchanges provide significant insights into the strategic choices of 
topics, audience frames and style the Prime Minister makes as he attempts to 
reach the favourable definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute. 
In Chapter 2, the analysis of the particular way of strategic manoeuvring 
employed by Mr. Blair in order to avoid discussing Mr. Duncan Smith’s 
standpoint, later reconstructed as an argument cf. p.45) that government policies 
are to blame for damaging the NHS unravelled the strategic function of Mr. 
Blair’s choices from the topical potential, audience frames and stylistic devices 
available to him. These choices were strategic in the sense that they contributed to 
at least one of the following: (a) attributing, beyond any doubt, a certain 
commitment to Mr. Duncan Smith based on another position he has assumed, (b) 
directing Mr. Duncan Smith towards maintaining this commitment and/or (c) 
portraying the current position of Mr. Duncan Smith to entail a commitment that 




commitment attributed. For example, the choice of attributing a commitment 
through quotation is a strategic choice of stylistic device because quotation gives 
a high degree of credibility to the attribution. The choice of referring to a position 
of Mr. Duncan Smith that is central to conservative policy, such as the Tory’s 
opposition to investment in the health sector, is a strategic choice of topic because 
it makes it quite hard for Mr. Duncan Smith to retract the commitment. The 
choices are strategic in the sense that they contribute to leading Mr. Duncan 
Smith to retract (the linking premise of) his argument and thereby to eliminating 
any disagreement about it, to the advantage of Mr. Blair.  
Mr. Blair’s choices would appear to be even more strategic, once 
institutional considerations and the resulting argumentative preconditions of the 
argumentative activity type of Question Time are taken into account. For 
example, once it is taken into account that differences of opinion about the 
leadership competence of political parties run simultaneously with the main 
difference of opinion concerning the performance of the Government, one 
becomes aware of an extra strategic aspect of the choice of the Prime Minister to 
refer to the Tory’s opposition to investment in the health sector in particular. As 
explained in Chapter 3, in Question Time, simultaneous to the main difference of 
opinion about the performance of the Government there are concurrent 
differences that relate to the competence of the different political parties in 
providing good leadership. Because Question Time sessions are supposed to be 
about the performance of the Government, simultaneous differences of opinion 
can be addressed only indirectly, by addressing the main initial difference about 
the performance of the Government. The choice of referring to the Conservatives’ 
position concerning investment in health becomes more advantageous in view of 
such a precondition. The choice of topic is opportune not only in the discussion 
about the performance of the Government, but also in the discussion about the 
competence of the Conservative party in providing good leadership. By 
emphasising the bad consequences that can result from the Tories’ opposition to 
investment in health care, Mr. Blair defends the point of view that the 
Conservatives cannot provide good leadership to the country. 
Taking into account the concurrent differences of opinion sheds 




device to express doubt concerning Mr. Duncan Smith’s argument as well. The 
accusation can play a role in the discussion of at least two differences of opinion. 
In the dispute concerning the performance of the Government, the accusation can 
lead in a potentially reasonable way to an outcome that is desirable to Mr. Blair. 
By appealing to the principle that one cannot maintain two mutually inconsistent 
commitments simultaneously, Mr. Blair attempts to direct Mr. Duncan Smith to 
retract his commitment to the NHS deserves to be taken care of, and consequently 
retract government policies are (to blame for) damaging the NHS as a line of 
argument advanced in support of the standpoint that the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard. In the dispute over the political competence of 
the Conservative party, the accusation of inconsistency constitutes an argument in 
support of a standpoint such as Conservatives cannot provide good leadership. 
After all, a political party that is inconsistent cannot provide good leadership. 
The interplay between political and argumentative roles, typical of 
Question Time, renders even more strategic the choice of Mr. Blair to address Mr. 
Duncan Smith in the audience frame of the Leader of the Conservative party. In 
Question Time, as in most parliamentary sessions, arguers conventionally (and in 
virtue of their political party obligations) adopt argumentative positions in line 
with the positions of their political parties. Being the leader of one’s party makes 
the obligation to stick to party positions even stronger. The previous position of 
Mr. Duncan Smith to which Mr. Blair refers is strategically chosen to be one that 
is central to Conservative policy: to reduce investment in the public sector. Had 
the previous position been more of a personal opinion of Mr. Duncan Smith and 
less of a position of the Tories, Mr. Duncan Smith would have had more freedom 
to retract his commitment to it and maintain his commitment to his current point 
of view, namely that the NHS deserves to be taken care of. But because the leader 
of the Conservative party cannot publicly renounce a central Conservative 
position without the risk of great political loss, Mr. Blair has more chances to get 
his opponent to maintain his previous commitment and thus to have no other 
option but to retract the commitment to the NHS deserves to be taken care of and 
therefore to the linking premise that if government policies are damaging the 





Mr. Blair takes advantage of the preconditions for argumentation imposed 
by the format of Question Time to reach this result. The Prime Minister has the 
last word, so Mr. Duncan Smith cannot respond by choosing which commitment 
to maintain, and the exchange is on view to a public that would, given the 
centrality to the Conservatives’ political program their opposition to investment 
in health to is, attribute to Mr. Duncan Smith the commitment Mr. Blair wants 
him to maintain. Had Mr. Duncan Smith been given the chance to respond to Mr. 
Blair, it is unlikely that he would have retracted any of his commitments, 
especially not his commitment to the NHS deserves to be taken care of, if only 
because such a retraction would work against him in the discussion about the 
competence of his party in leading the country. However, by lack of response, the 
retraction can easily be attributed to him by the public watching the session. The 
commitment attributed to Mr. Duncan Smith, by Mr. Blair, namely that it is not 
the case that the NHS deserves to be taken care of, works in favour of Mr. Blair 
in the concurrent dispute about the political competence of the Conservatives, 
too. 
 
4.4 Characteristics of a particular way of confrontational manoeuvring  
The examination of the exchange about the NHS sheds light on three main 
characteristics that are central to the particular way of strategic manoeuvring that 
is subject of this study. First, the exchange about the NHS shows that the Prime 
Minister can aim at leading MPs from the Opposition to retract the arguments he 
needs to refute, but wishes not to discuss, by challenging the commitment of his 
opponents to the justificatory power of the arguments after attempts to refute the 
arguments’ propositional contents have failed. Second, the case also shows that in 
the particular activity type of Prime Minister's Question Time, the retraction of 
the argument by the MP from the Opposition saves the Prime Minister from 
ending up with a mixed dispute about the argument from the Opposition, which 
can be institutionally undesirable to the Prime Minister. Third, the NHS case 
shows that the accusation of inconsistency is not only an argumentatively 
opportune choice of style in the discussion of the performance of the 




inconsistency constitutes an argument in support of the Prime Minister’s position 
in the concurrent discussion about the political competence of the Opposition to 
lead the country. With the help of some other exchanges in which this particular 
way of manoeuvring occurs, I shall show that the three characteristics above are 
not particular to the NHS case. 
In the exchange below, the first part of which was also examined in 
Chapter 2, Gordon Brown, the Labour Prime Minister, responds to the criticism 
of David Cameron, the Conservative Leader of the Opposition, by an accusation 
of inconsistency. 
(2)  David Cameron (Leader of the Opposition):  
There are currently six police investigations under way into the conduct of 
government in London. The most recent allegations are that the London Mayor’s 
director for equalities and policing has been channelling public funds into 
organisations run by friends and cronies. Does the Prime Minister agree with me that 
that is completely unacceptable? 
Gordon Brown (Prime Minister): 
As on any occasion when a matter referring to a police investigation is raised, I have 
to say this is a matter for the police. It should be fully investigated, but it is not a 
matter for this House until the police complete their investigations. 
Mr. Cameron:  
The point is that while these accusations are going on and this investigation is under 
way, the Mayor—the Labour Mayor—has said that he 
“trusts Lee Jasper with his life”, 
and last night he said that he is already planning to reappoint him. Does not every 
element of the Prime Minister’s moral compass tell him that this is wrong? 
Mr. Brown:  
As I understand it, the person whom the right hon. Gentleman is talking about has 
resigned and is no longer in that employment. If the right hon. Gentleman wishes to 
support the police in their investigation, why does his candidate for the Mayor of 
London say that the first target for cuts is transport and policing? That is the 
Conservative party—cutting transport and cutting policing. 
(House of Commons official report, 2008c) 
Mr. Cameron’s question to the Prime Minister addresses the conduct of the 
Government in London in light of a heated controversy over an alleged misuse of 
public funds by Lee Jasper, the London Mayor’s Senior Policy Advisor on 
Equalities.  
In his first question, Mr. Cameron argues that  
(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 





1.1.1 The London Mayor’s director for equalities and policing [Lee 
Jasper] has been channelling public funds into organisations run 
by friends and cronies 
An initial disagreement is triggered in relation to Mr. Cameron’s argument, which 
Mr. Brown is expected not to accept. Nevertheless, Mr. Brown attempts to avoid 
a discussion about the argument by appealing to the Parliament’s sub judice rule: 
the case mentioned should not be the subject of a discussion in Parliament 
because it is being investigated by the police, he argues.  
In response to the sub judice rule, Mr. Cameron reformulates his 
argument taking into account that the matter is under investigation. He 
reformulates the argument as the London Mayor’s director for equalities and 
policing has been accused of channelling public funds into organisations run by 
friends and cronies (1.1a.1 below), and in order to support this line of argument, 
which has become weaker, he complements it with the argument that the 
Government (London’s Labour Mayor) supports the accused director (1.1b 
below). Mr. Cameron implies that the support for the accused is in itself a sign of 
bad governance. In his second turn, Mr. Cameron argues that 
(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1a The conduct of the Government in London is under serious 
allegations 
(1.1a’) (If the conduct of the Government in London is under serious 
allegations, then the performance of the Government is not up to 
standard) 
1. 1b The Government (i.e. London’s Labour Mayor) supports the 
accused director for equalities and policing 
(1.1b’) (If the Government supports someone who is under police 
investigation for alleged corruption, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard) 
1.1a.1 The London Mayor’s director for equalities and policing has 
been accused of channelling public funds into organisations run 
by friends and cronies 
In his response, Mr. Brown reports that the accused is no longer in 
employment. Viewed as a response to the criticism, the Prime Minister’s answer 
can be interpreted as pointing out that the accused is no longer part of the 
Government in order to reject any association between what he does and the 
conduct of the Government. The answer can also be interpreted as an attempt by 




to refute Mr. Cameron’s argument 1.1b above. Yet, this is not a real refutation, 
especially considering the support quoted by Mr. Cameron. To compensate for 
this weak refutation, Mr. Brown resorts to the accusation of inconsistency to 
exclude from the discussion the argument that he cannot refute. 
Mr. Brown accuses Mr. Cameron of an inconsistency in relation to the 
issue of police investigation: while the Opposition opposes investment in 
policing, the Leader of the Opposition now claims that the police should be 
supported in their investigation. The Prime Minister suggests that the 
Conservative’s opposition to investment in policing implies that they do not 
support the police. Since Mr. Cameron’s party does not care to support the police, 
Mr. Cameron cannot claim that if the Government supports someone who is under 
police investigation for alleged corruption, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard, Mr. Brown argues.  
As in the exchange about the NHS, the Prime Minister challenges the 
justificatory power of an argument from the Opposition after he has proved 
incapable of refuting its propositional content. Also, as in the NHS case, the 
Prime Minister attempts to direct his sub-confrontation about the linking premise 
challenged towards the outcome of no dispute in order to avoid the institutionally 
undesirable outcome of a mixed dispute in which he has to advance and maintain 
the opposite of the linking premise he challenges. But it is not hard to see that Mr. 
Brown cannot commit himself to the opposite of the linking premise even though 
he challenges Mr. Cameron’s commitment to it.  
In fact, as a Prime Minister, Mr. Brown cannot advance the sub-standpoint 
that it is not the case that if the Government supports someone who is under 
police investigation for alleged corruption, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard, without the risk of a considerable political loss 
among the general public of voters. Unless Mr. Cameron retracts the linking 
premise, Mr. Brown would have either to accept the premise and fail in his 
institutional responsibility to defend his Government, or to oppose the linking 
premise and run the risk of losing the general public of voters. Taking such 
considerations into account, the definition of the difference of opinion as no 
dispute pursued by the accusation of inconsistency becomes particularly 




principle that one cannot commit oneself to two mutually inconsistent 
commitments simultaneously, Mr. Blair attempts to eliminate the argumentative 
obligation to refute a challenged argument without failing in his institutional 
obligation to address arguments from the Opposition. After all, if his opponent 
retracts his argument, Mr. Brown has nothing to refute. 
Also, similar to the NHS case, the strategic dimension of the accusation of 
inconsistency is central to the concurrent discussion about the competence of the 
Opposition in leading the country. The accusation of inconsistency counts as an 
opportune choice of a stylistic device to express the doubt of Mr. Brown 
regarding the commitment of Mr. Cameron to the linking premise. The alleged 
inconsistency of the leader of the Conservative party constitutes an argument in 
favour of the point of view that the Conservatives cannot provide good leadership 
to the British people. This is the main standpoint Mr. Brown adopts in the 
discussion concurrent with the discussion about the performance of the 
Government. 
The three characteristics above, central to the way of strategic 
manoeuvring at issue, can also be observed in the case below about the EU 
referendum. 
(3)  Peter Bottomley (MP, Conservative Party):  
To return to the European treaty, what polling or survey evidence did the Prime 
Minister have on what the result of a referendum would have been? 
Gordon Brown (Prime Minister):  
The one poll that people look at is an actual referendum. In 1975 there was a 
referendum that recorded a yes vote, with more than two thirds of the population 
voting yes. I remind Conservative Members that most of those who were here in 1992 
walked through the Lobby to oppose a referendum on Maastricht, and now they want 
a referendum on a treaty that is far less significant. They should think again about 
their position. 
(House of Commons official report, 2008d) 
This short exchange comes after a long and heated exchange between Mr. 
Brown and the Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron, about the 
Government’s decision to cancel a referendum on the ratification of the Lisbon 
treaty and to have the decision taken by Parliament instead. In the exchange 
between Mr. Cameron and the Prime Minister, the former fiercely criticised the 
Government for cancelling the referendum they had promised in their election 




referendum because he was not confident that he would win it. Mr. Bottomley’s 
question above comes to add to the same discussion. In his question, the MP from 
the Opposition suggests that a referendum would have shown that British people 
oppose the EU treaty. He implies that because the Government plans to ratify the 
treaty against the preference of the British people, the performance of the 
Government can be judged as not up to standard. In light of earlier discussions 
about the referendum, the question of the MP from the Opposition also implies 
that the Government’s unwillingness to organise the referendum on the treaty is 
in itself an indication that its performance is not up to standard, especially since 
the Government has, in its elections manifesto, promised that they would hold a 
referendum on the EU treaty. Mr. Bottomley’s argumentation can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1 The Government plans to ratify the Lisbon Treaty against the 
preference of the British people  
(1.1’) (If the Government plans to ratify the Lisbon Treaty against the 
preference of the British people, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard) 
(1.2) (The Government has cancelled the promised referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty) 
(1.2’) (If the Government has cancelled the promised referendum on 
the Lisbon Treaty, then the performance of the Government is 
not up to standard) 
In his answer, Mr. Brown tries first to refute the argument that the 
Government plans to ratify the Lisbon Treaty against the preference of the British 
people. He rejects the suggestion that a referendum would have shown that the 
British people oppose the treaty on the ground that the results of surveys and polls 
cannot to be considered a reliable source of evidence; only the results of actual 
referenda can be such a source, he argues. He then refers to the referendum of 
1975, which showed that British voters were in favour of UK’s membership in 
the European Economic Community. Mr. Brown implies that if one considers 
those results, one would tend to think that British voters would approve the new 
EU treaty if a referendum were to take place.  
The Prime Minister also needs to refute the argument that the Government 




cancellation of the referendum is a fact that cannot be denied, the Prime Minister 
can defend his Government only by challenging the justificatory power of the 
argument. In fact, the heated discussion between the Prime Minister and Mr. 
Cameron was about the linking premise that if the Government has cancelled the 
promised referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard. In that discussion, Mr. Brown tried repeatedly 
(without success) to argue that it is not the case that if the Government has 
cancelled the promised referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, then the performance of 
the Government is not up to standard because the Lisbon treaty does not have any 
constitutional nature anymore. Mr. Brown’s attempts did not seem to succeed 
and Mr. Bottomley’s question implies the same argument.  
In response to the argument from the Opposition about cancelling the 
referendum implied in Mr. Bottomley’s question, Mr. Brown responds with an 
accusation of inconsistency. Mr. Brown accuses the Conservatives of being 
inconsistent concerning referenda: they have voted against having a referendum 
on the Maastricht treaty in 1992, and now they claim that not holding a 
referendum is an indication of bad government performance. Mr. Brown distrusts 
the Opposition’s belief in referenda given their previous actions, and suggests that 
because the justificatory power of the arguments from the Opposition entails such 
a belief, the MP from the Opposition cannot maintain his linking premise, and 
therefore, has to retract the argument he has advanced. By means of this 
accusation, the Prime Minister attempts to direct the sub-confrontation about the 
linking premise of Mr. Bottomley’s argument towards the definition of the 
difference of opinion as no dispute, which is advantageous to him.  
In this case as well, the Prime Minister employs the accusation of 
inconsistency in an attempt to exclude from the discussion the linking premise of 
his opponent’s argument after failing to refute the argument’s propositional 
content. In this case, unlike in the exchanges about the NHS and the London 
police, the Prime Minister has no political interest in avoiding commitment to the 
opposite of the linking premise. However, Mr. Brown’s failure to refute the 
linking premise in his earlier exchange with the Leader of the Opposition makes 
the definition of the difference of opinion as a mixed dispute still undesirable. 




MPs, the accusation not only helps the Prime Minister lead his opponent to retract 
an argument which he would have had to refute otherwise, but it also contributes 
to the Prime Minister’s defence of his position that the Conservatives cannot 







5 THE REASONABLENESS OF RESPONDING TO CRITICISM WITH 
ACCUSATIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  
  
In the previous chapters, I have analysed the Prime Minister’s responses with 
accusations of inconsistency to criticism as instances of a particular way of 
strategic manoeuvring in argumentative sub-confrontations. The analysis has 
made clear the strategic function of the accusation by showing how the Prime 
Minister employs it to make an MP from the Opposition to retract his argument, 
and consequently, eliminate the initial disagreement concerning this argument. 
Even though it is necessary for a reasonable discussant to be consistent in the 
positions he holds,28 the attempt to lead a discussant to retract a current position 
because it is inconsistent with another one that he also assumes is not always 
reasonable. The tu quoque variant of the ad hominem fallacy might be the most 
salient example of unreasonable accusations of inconsistency employed to silence 
an opponent.  
In this chapter I shall investigate the reasonableness of the Prime 
Minister’s responses at issue. I start from the view that a particular instance of 
strategic manoeuvring is dialectically sound as long as an arguer’s attempt to lead 
the discussion to a favourable outcome does not overrule his commitment to the 
critical testing of the points of view at issue (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007c). 
Based on this view, I aim to formulate the soundness conditions for the particular 
way of strategic manoeuvring to rule out a standpoint by means of an accusation 
of inconsistency. These conditions will be discussed in light of political 
institutional considerations central to the activity type of Question Time, in order 
to arrive at a view of the reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s responses at 
issue that is sensitive to the institutional point of the argumentative practice 
28 Unlike van Laar (2007), I understand that consistency in one and the same discussion is a 
dialectical requirement for the protagonist of a standpoint (Barth and Martens, 1977: p. 88). Van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst make it clear that “admitting inconsistent statements within one and 
the same discussion makes it impossible to resolve the dispute” (1992a: 114). I take cases of 
provocative thesis (Krabbe, 1990) to be exceptions, especially since, as noted by Krabbe, in such 
cases, the thesis does not reflect the position of its proponent but rather that the opponent is being 




                                                 
concerned. 
 
5.1 The reasonableness of strategic manoeuvring to rule out a standpoint 
When viewed as instances of strategic manoeuvring, argumentative moves are 
considered reasonable as long as the pursuit of winning the discussion, typical of 
strategic manoeuvring, does not hinder the critical testing procedure (van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002b). As explained earlier, in every move in an 
argumentative discussion, arguers manoeuvre strategically to reconcile a 
dialectical concern with critically testing a standpoint and a rhetorical concern 
with winning the discussion. When, in a particular case, the attempt to steer the 
discussion towards a favourable outcome constitutes a hindrance to the critical 
testing procedure, the strategic manoeuvring in the move is said to have derailed 
and the instance of strategic manoeuvring is considered fallacious (van Eemeren 
& Houtlosser, 2002c, 2003b, 2007b).  
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser explain that the dialectical and rhetorical 
concerns that arguers attempt to reconcile in their strategic manoeuvring relate to 
the outcome of the dialectical stage in which the manoeuvring occurs. For 
example, in argumentative confrontations, arguers attempt to reconcile concerns 
that relate to the definition of their difference of opinion as the outcome of the 
confrontation stage. Dialectically, arguers are assumed to be aiming at defining 
their differences of opinion in a way that does not hinder the critical testing 
procedure. Arguers are, for instance, assumed to attempt ‘to achieve clarity’ 
concerning the specific issues about which they have a difference of opinion as 
well as the positions they assume in relation to these issues. Rhetorically, arguers 
are expected to be aiming at steering the argumentative confrontations towards a 
definition of the difference of opinion that is favourable to them. Each of the 
arguers is assumed to pursue such a rhetorical aim by attempting, for example, to 
achieve a particular definition of the disagreement or to take up a particular 
position that would increase the chances of his own point of view being accepted 
(van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002c). Thus, in light of van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser’s view on the reasonableness of strategic manoeuvring, in order for 




to reach a definition of the difference of opinion that is opportune should not 
hinder the critical testing procedure. 
In order for a move in an argumentative confrontation not to hinder the 
critical testing procedure, two requirements need to be met. First, the move needs 
to constitute a contribution to at least one of the definitions of the difference of 
opinion that are allowed in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. That is 
mainly because, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst observe, for an argumentative 
move to be sound, the move needs to further the achievement of the dialectical 
objective of the stage in which it occurs. A reasonable move in an argumentative 
confrontation needs, accordingly, to contribute to the development of the 
confrontation towards at least one of the possible definitions of the difference of 
opinion as non-mixed, mixed or as no dispute. The second requirement that a 
move in an argumentative confrontation needs to meet, in order not hinder the 
critical testing procedure, is that the move does not hinder the development of the 
argumentative confrontation towards any of the outcomes that are allowed in the 
confrontation stage of a critical discussion. A reasonable move in an 
argumentative confrontation needs, accordingly, to let any of the definitions of 
the difference of opinion to come about. The two general requirements that need 
to be met in order for a move in an argumentative confrontation to be considered 
a dialectically sound instance of confrontational strategic manoeuvring can be 
formulated as follows 
(1)  The move needs to constitute a contribution to at least one 
definition of the difference of opinion that does not hinder the 
critical testing procedure, and  
(2)  The move must not prematurely preclude any other definition of 
the difference of opinion that furthers the critical testing 
procedure. 
Once a move in an argumentative confrontation is viewed as an instance 
of a particular type of confrontational strategic manoeuvring, the pursuit of one 
particular outcome, i.e. a favourable outcome, is attributed to the move, so that 
the move is eventually viewed as an attempt to bring about the favourable 
outcome within the boundaries of reasonableness. As instances of the type of 




criticism with accusations of inconsistency are attempts to bring about, within the 
boundaries of reasonableness, the definition of the difference of opinion as no 
dispute as an outcome of the confrontation. As it has been characterised in section 
2.4, the type of strategic manoeuvring to rule out a standpoint is the attempt of an 
arguer, who casts doubt on an expressed opinion, to lead the proponent of this 
opinion to take the dialectical route that leads to the definition of the difference of 
opinion as no dispute. This outcome, favourable to the arguer, can be achieved by 
making the proponent retract the expressed opinion in the turn that follows 
(Figure 3, reproduced below for convenience).  
 
In order for an instance of the type of strategic manoeuvring at issue to be 
reasonable, the actual move that functions as an expression of doubt in the 
confrontation needs to be a dialectically sound argumentative move. 
By taking into account the particular type of confrontational manoeuvring 
of which an argumentative move is a case, the general requirements for a 
dialectically sound case of confrontational manoeuvring above can be further 
specified. Focusing on a particular type of confrontational manoeuvring would 
make it possible for example to be more specific about how a particular move 
contributes to a certain definition of the difference of opinion, or how it precludes 
another. That is mainly because in the characterisation of a particular type of 
strategic manoeuvring, the pursuit of a favourable outcome of the pertinent 
argumentative stage is expressed in terms a preference for a particular sequence 
of analytically relevant moves, i.e. a preference for a dialectical route that leads to 
the favourable outcome.  
In view of the first requirement for reasonableness suggested above, a 
reasonable instance of strategic manoeuvring to rule out a standpoint needs to 
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does not hinder the critical testing of the point of view at stake. That is to say that 
the move that functions as an expression of doubt needs to be a contribution to at 
least one dialectical route of the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. This 
first requirement is in fact two-fold: a sound expression of doubt needs (a) to 
constitute a relevant response to the expressed point of view, which I will 
hereafter refer to as the responsiveness requirement, and (b) to enable a 
continuation of at least one dialectical route of the confrontation stage, which I 
will hereafter refer to as the continuity requirement.29 
The second general requirement for reasonableness is meant to eliminate 
any hindrance to achieving definitions of the difference of opinion that can in 
principle be achieved within the boundaries of reasonableness. More specifically, 
the requirement is intended to guarantee that none of the definitions of the 
difference of opinion that are unfavourable given the type of strategic 
manoeuvring at issue is blocked. In the type of confrontational manoeuvring at 
issue, these are definitions of the disagreement as a non-mixed or a mixed 
dispute. The unfavourable definitions usually come into being via dialectical 
routes that are different from the one that leads to the favourable definition. 
Hereafter, I shall refer to such routes as non-preferred dialectical routes. Usually 
too, at the slot of analytically relevant moves that the case of strategic 
manoeuvring instantiates, the dialectical route followed so far branches out into 
preferred and non-preferred routes. In order to guarantee that none of the 
definitions of the difference of opinion allowed in a critical discussion is blocked 
by the manoeuvring, the expression of doubt should not hinder the continuation 
of any of the non-preferred dialectical routes that branch out from this juncture of 
the dialectical procedure. To this requirement, I shall hereafter refer as the 
freedom requirement. 
To recapitulate, an argumentative move that functions as an expression of 
doubt that aims at defining the difference of opinion as no dispute by leading the 
29 Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) suggest that a dialectically sound case of strategic 
manoeuvring needs to be (a) “chosen in such a way that it enables an analytically relevant 
continuation at the juncture concerned in the dialectical route […]”, (b) “in such a way adapted to 
the other party that it responds to the preceding move in the dialectical route […]” and (c) 
“formulated in such a way that it can be interpreted as enabling a relevant continuation and being 
responsive to the preceding move”. Even though I do not at this stage associate -as van Eemeren 
and Houtlosser do- the requirements I suggest with the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring, the 




                                                 
proponent of an expressed opinion to retract it, is a sound case of confrontational 
manoeuvring if the following requirements are met: 
(1a) the move needs to be an expression of doubt that is responsive to 
the expressed opinion; 
(1b) the move needs to have the potential to bring about either the 
maintenance or the retraction of the standpoint in the turn that 
follows, in order to enable a continuation of at least one dialectical 
route of the confrontation stage; and 
(2) the move must not preclude the possibility that the expressed 
opinion is maintained in the turn that follows, i.e. that the non-
preferred analytically relevant response is opted for, in order to 
guarantee the freedom of the other party to take the non-preferred 
dialectical route that might lead to the definition of the difference 
of opinion as a non-mixed or a mixed dispute. 
 
5.2 Soundness conditions for strategic manoeuvring to rule out a 
standpoint by means of an accusation of inconsistency 
As suggested by the requirements above, an attempt of the Prime Minister to rule 
out a standpoint of the Opposition is reasonable only if the Prime Minister’s 
attempt to lead the MP from the Opposition to retract his standpoint constitutes an 
expression of relevant critical doubt that does not prevent the MP from 
maintaining his standpoint, if he wishes to. By taking into account the pragmatic 
aspect of the actual move that functions as an expression of doubt, i.e. in the case 
studied here, the accusation of inconsistency, the suggested requirements can 
become more tuned to the evaluation of the particular way of strategic 
manoeuvring in which accusations of inconsistency are employed to rule out a 
standpoint. In order to arrive at a set of soundness conditions for this particular 
way of strategic manoeuvring, I shall in what follows further specify the three 
requirements of responsiveness, continuity and freedom in light of insights gained 






5.2.1 Requirement of responsiveness 
In view of the requirement of responsiveness, the accusation of inconsistency, 
employed by the Prime Minister to rule out a standpoint reasonably, must be a 
responsive expression of doubt concerning the standpoint advanced by the 
Opposition to which it reacts. In line with van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jacobs and 
Jackson (1993: p. 10), the accusation of inconsistency counts as a relevant 
response to a standpoint if it expresses any of the following: that the standpoint is 
understood as such, that it is accepted or that it is rejected.30 However, given that 
the accusation needs to be a relevant expression of critical doubt, i.e. an 
illocutionary negation of acceptance, it is the non-acceptance of the standpoint 
advanced that the accusation needs to express.  
As the characterisation of the particular way of strategic manoeuvring to 
rule out a standpoint by means of an accusation of inconsistency (section 2.5) 
shows, in this particular way of manoeuvring, the accusation attributes to the 
proponent of a standpoint two mutually inconsistent commitments 
simultaneously, and urges him to retract one of them in order to remove the 
(alleged) inconsistency. The accusation attributes to the proponent of the 
standpoint a commitment to A on the basis of the standpoint advanced and a 
commitment to –A on the basis of another position the proponent assumes. In 
order for the accusation to express non-acceptance of the standpoint, the 
attribution of the simultaneous commitment to A and –A, taking place in it, needs 
to be correct. That is to say that in order for the accusation of inconsistency to 
count as a non-acceptance of the standpoint it challenges, the following 
soundness conditions need to be fulfilled: 
(i)  The accuser should be justified in attributing to the accused a 
commitment to A on the basis of the standpoint challenged,  
(ii)  The accuser should be justified in attributing to the accused a 
commitment to –A on the basis of the other position assumed,   
and  
30 Van Eemeren et al. (1993: 10) suggest that the relevance of a speech act can be judged 
according to the contribution it makes to the achievement of the communicative and interactional 
goals of the preceding speech act. A speech act is a relevant response to another if it expresses that 
the other speech act is understood (the communicative goal of the speech act) or that it is either 




                                                 
(iii)  The accuser should be justified in attributing to the accused the 
commitments to A and to –A simultaneously. 
In the following I shall show why each of these conditions is necessary, and 
together, they are sufficient, for the accusation of inconsistency to be a reasonable 
expression of doubt concerning the standpoint it reacts to.   
Unless the accuser is justified in attributing to the accused a commitment 
to A on the basis of the standpoint of the accused, i.e. unless condition (i) is 
fulfilled, the accusation of inconsistency cannot be a relevant response to the 
standpoint it reacts to. The accusation of inconsistency about whether or not the 
National Health Service (NHS) deserves to be taken care of is relevant to the sub-
standpoint that if government policies are damaging the NHS, then the 
performance of the Government is not up to standard because a commitment to 
the NHS deserves to be taken care of can indeed be attributed to Mr. Duncan 
Smith on the basis of this sub-standpoint.  
The irrelevance of the accusation that results from failing to fulfil 
condition (i) is of the kind associated with the straw man fallacy. If the accuser 
cannot, on the basis of the standpoint of the accused, justifiably attribute to the 
accused a commitment to A, the accuser distorts the standpoint by making it seem 
as if commitment to A follows from it. Failure to fulfil condition (i) thus violates 
the third rule of a critical discussion, the standpoint rule, which stipulates that 
“attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been 
put forward by the other party” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: p. 191). The 
exchange between Peter Bottomley and Gordon Brown about the EU referendum, 
analysed in 4.5 and included below for convenience, is an example of the straw 
man fallacy resulting from a failure to fulfil condition (i).  
(1)  Peter Bottomley (MP, Conservative Party):  
To return to the European treaty, what polling or survey evidence did the Prime 
Minister have on what the result of a referendum would have been? 
Gordon Brown (Prime Minister):  
The one poll that people look at is an actual referendum. In 1975 there was a 
referendum that recorded a yes vote, with more than two thirds of the population 
voting yes. I remind Conservative Members that most of those who were here in 1992 
walked through the Lobby to oppose a referendum on Maastricht, and now they want 
a referendum on a treaty that is far less significant. They should think again about 
their position. 




As the analysis of this exchange earlier shows, Mr. Bottomley’s sub-
standpoint that if the Government has cancelled the promised referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty, then the performance of the Government is not up to standard gets 
challenged by means of an accusation of inconsistency concerning whether or not 
referenda on EU treaties should be held. Mr. Brown challenges Mr. Bottomley’s 
sub-standpoint on the ground that while the sub-standpoint commits Mr. 
Bottomley to the proposition that referenda on EU treaties should be held, i.e. to 
A, the opposition of Mr. Bottomley’s party to a referendum on the Maastricht 
Treaty allows the assumption that Mr. Bottomley is committed to it is not the case 
that referenda on EU treaties should be held, i.e. to –A.  
However, Mr. Brown is not justified in attributing to Mr. Bottomley the 
commitment to referenda on EU treaties should be held, at least not on the basis 
of the sub-standpoint that if the Government has cancelled the promised 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, then the performance of the Government is not 
up to standard.   The commitment to A does not follow from Mr. Bottomley’s 
sub-standpoint. What follows from Mr. Bottomley’s sub-standpoint is in fact a 
commitment to a promised referendum should be held rather than a commitment 
to referenda on EU treaties should be held. By over-generalising the commitment 
that follows from the sub-standpoint, Mr. Brown’s accusation distorts the sub-
standpoint. Mr. Brown casts doubt on a sub-standpoint that is not advanced by 
Mr. Bottomley, namely that if the Government has cancelled the referendum on 
an EU treaty, then the performance of the Government is not up to standard. The 
standpoint to which the accusation reacts is easier to attack than the one indeed 
advanced. The accusation of inconsistency would, hence, have been stronger as 
an attack on this sub-standpoint than on the one actually advanced by Mr. 
Bottomley. 
Unless the accuser is also indeed justified in attributing to the proponent 
of the standpoint a commitment to –A simultaneously with his commitment to A, 
i.e. unless conditions (ii) and (iii) are also fulfilled, the accusation of 
inconsistency cannot count as an expression of critical doubt concerning the 
standpoint it responds to. Again, this is mainly because the accusation must 
express the unacceptability of the standpoint it responds to in order for it to count 




function as an illocutionary negation of acceptance (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1984), the accusation must express the unacceptability of the 
standpoint. The accusation conveys such unacceptability by implying that a 
commitment to the standpoint cannot be held simultaneously with a commitment 
that is inconsistent with it.  
The accusation of inconsistency functions as an expression of doubt on 
the basis of the assumptions that there is a commitment which is inconsistent with 
the standpoint challenged and which can indeed be attributed to the proponent of 
the standpoint on the basis of the other positions he has assumed, and that the 
proponent is holding the two commitments simultaneously. Unless these 
assumptions are defended by the accuser, the assumptions are taken to be starting 
points acceptable for the accused. Hence, unless the accuser is justified in 
assuming that the other position of the proponent of the standpoint commits the 
proponent to –A now, casting doubt by means of the accusation would count as a 
case of considering as an accepted starting point something that is not an accepted 
starting point. In that sense, failure to meet conditions (ii) and (iii) results in the 
violation of the sixth rule of a critical discussion, the starting-point rule, which 
stipulates that “discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted 
starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point” (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: p. 193).31 
The need for the two inconsistent commitments to be held simultaneously, 
expressed in condition (iii), has already been highlighted by van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser (2003b). In their discussion of the soundness conditions for strategic 
manoeuvring by pointing out an inconsistency, they explain that ‘from a pragma-
dialectical point of view, an inconsistency between something that is presently 
said and something that was said on a different occasion matters only if it 
involves an inconsistency in one and the same critical discussion’. Van Eemeren 
and Houtlosser suggest criteria for determining whether or not it is possible to 
take as parts of the same discussion what is presently said and something that was 
31 Even though the starting point rule pertains usually to the argumentation stage (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1992a: pp. 149-157), the rule can also be applied to exchanges that exemplify 
argumentative confrontations. Especially in argumentative exchanges that occur in 
institutionalised contexts, arguers do not enter confrontations with an empty commitment store. 
Reference to commonly accepted starting points is therefore possible in argumentative 




                                                 
said on a different occasion. According to them, it is possible to take two pieces 
of argumentation as parts of the same discussion if the pieces are aimed at 
resolving the same difference of opinion and have the same material and 
procedural starting points (2003b: p. 7). Even though van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser’s conditions are primarily formulated for pointing out inconsistencies 
as a means of justifying the non-acceptance of a certain proposition as a starting 
point, their criteria can be very helpful in evaluating the accusations employed to 
rule out a certain (sub-)standpoint from the discussion.  
In view of van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s criteria for what counts as part 
of one and the same discussion, Gordon Brown’s accusation against David 
Cameron in the exchange about the police investigation, analysed previously in 
section 4.5 and included below for convenience, seems to fail to fulfil condition 
(iii). 
(2)  David Cameron (Leader of the Opposition):  
There are currently six police investigations under way into the conduct of 
government in London. The most recent allegations are that the London Mayor’s 
director for equalities and policing has been channelling public funds into 
organisations run by friends and cronies. Does the Prime Minister agree with me that 
that is completely unacceptable? 
Gordon Brown (Prime Minister): 
As on any occasion when a matter referring to a police investigation is raised, I have 
to say this is a matter for the police. It should be fully investigated, but it is not a 
matter for this House until the police complete their investigations. 
Mr. Cameron:  
The point is that while these accusations are going on and this investigation is under 
way, the Mayor—the Labour Mayor—has said that he 
“trusts Lee Jasper with his life”, 
and last night he said that he is already planning to reappoint him. Does not every 
element of the Prime Minister’s moral compass tell him that this is wrong? 
Mr. Brown:  
As I understand it, the person whom the right hon. Gentleman is talking about has 
resigned and is no longer in that employment. If the right hon. Gentleman wishes to 
support the police in their investigation, why does his candidate for the Mayor of 
London say that the first target for cuts is transport and policing? That is the 
Conservative party—cutting transport and cutting policing. 
(House of Commons official report, 2008c) 
Mr. Cameron’s question to the Prime Minister criticised the performance of the 
Government by reference to an alleged misuse of public funds by Lee Jasper, the 
London Mayor’s Senior Policy Advisor on Equalities. According to the findings 





(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1a The conduct of the Government in London is under serious 
allegations 
(1.1a’) (If the conduct of the Government in London is under serious 
allegations, then the performance of the Government is not up to 
standard) 
1. 1b The Government (i.e. London’s Labour Mayor) supports the 
accused director for equalities and policing 
(1.1b’) (If the Government supports someone who is under police 
investigation for alleged corruption, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard) 
1.1a.1 The London Mayor’s director for equalities and policing has 
been accused of channelling public funds into organisations run 
by friends and cronies 
Mr. Brown’s response, that the accused is no longer in employment, can 
be seen as an attempt to deny that the accused is supported by the Government, 
which is in turn an attempt to refute Mr. Cameron’s argument 1.1b above. Yet, as 
argued earlier, considering the support quoted by Mr. Cameron, Mr. Brown’s 
answer does not seem to amount to a solid refutation. It is to compensate for this 
weak refutation that Mr. Brown points out the alleged inconsistency in Mr. 
Cameron’s position, aiming to avoid the discussion of the argument that he 
cannot properly refute. He suggests that Mr. Cameron cannot claim that if the 
Government supports someone who is under police investigation for alleged 
corruption, then the performance of the Government is not up to standard, 
considering that the Conservative candidate running for the post of the Mayor of 
London expressed plans to cut expenditure on policing in case he would win. The 
two positions are presented as inconsistent regarding the attitude towards the 
police. While the criticism of the Government entails support for the police, the 
Conservative candidate’s position implies the opposite, Mr. Brown suggests. 
According to the conditions set by van Eemeren and Houtlosser, the 
mutually inconsistent attitudes towards the police attributed to Mr. Cameron do 
not seem to occur in one and the same discussion. The two attitudes are not 
expressed in the course of discussing the same difference of opinion. Lack of 
support for the police is attributed to Mr. Cameron on the basis of a policy of 
cutting expenditure on policing promoted by the Conservative Party, and can 




difference of opinion that relates to a matter of policy: something about the 
budget or police reforms. The commitment to an attitude that supports the police 
is held in the context of a difference of opinion that relates to a matter of 
accountability: the police is investigating the conduct of the Government.  
The two attitudes seem to be related to two different disputes. While the 
commitment to a supportive attitude towards the police, i.e. commitment to a 
proposition like the police should be supported, is held in relation to a difference 
of opinion regarding accountability, the commitment to a non-supportive attitude 
towards the police, i.e. commitment to a proposition like it is not the case that the 
police should be supported, is held in relation to a difference of opinion regarding 
expenditure. Being related to two different differences of opinion, the two 
commitments cannot be considered to be held in one and the same discussion: 
they cannot therefore be considered to be held simultaneously. Mr. Brown’s 
accusation would function as an expression of critical doubt only by virtue of the 
two commitments being held simultaneously. By falsely presenting this to be the 
case, the accusation violates the starting point rule and fails accordingly to be a 
reasonable instance of the strategic manoeuvring at issue.32 
 
5.2.2 Requirement of continuity 
In view of the requirement of continuity, the accusation of inconsistency, 
employed by the Prime Minister to rule out a standpoint reasonably, must enable 
a continuation of at least one of the dialectical routes of the confrontation stage. 
For that, the accusation needs to be performed in a way that has the potential to 
bring about a response that functions as either the maintaining of the standpoint 
or the retraction of it. In an argumentative interaction in which an accusation of 
inconsistency functions as an expression of doubt, the maintaining or the 
retraction of the standpoint that the accusation doubts are realised through the 
perlocutionary effects of the accusation. The standpoint can be maintained by 
32 The exchange can also be analysed as a failure to meet condition (ii). The analysis would take a 
commitment to A to be a commitment to the police should be supported in their investigations. In 
this case, the previous position of Mr. Cameron does not imply commitment to the opposite, since 
opposing investment in policing cannot be taken to imply a commitment to it is not the case that 
the police should be supported in their investigations. However, in my analysis I opt for a more 
general reconstruction of the commitments the Prime Minister attributes to his opponent, i.e. I 
take a commitment to A to be a commitment to the police should be supported, which I think is 




                                                 
means of any of the two following perlocutionary effects: first, the accusation of 
inconsistency is not accepted by the proponent of the standpoint, and second, the 
accusation is accepted and the accused prefers to retract commitment to –A rather 
than retracting his commitment to A.  
If the accused does not accept the accusation, he has no obligation to 
retract anything. An accused who does not accept the accusation of inconsistency 
responds in such a way that the minimal perlocutionary effect non-preferred by 
the accuser is achieved. He can express his non-acceptance by denying that his 
standpoint commits him to A, that his other position commits him to –A or that 
his commitments to A and –A are held simultaneously. By doing so, the 
proponent of a standpoint attempts to justify that his position is consistent in 
order to be able to maintain his current standpoint.33 
Maintaining the standpoint is also possible if the accused accepts the 
accusation of inconsistency. By accepting the accusation, the accused admits the 
alleged inconsistency as well as the necessity to repair it by retracting, at least, 
one of the inconsistent commitments, i.e. he commits himself to act in accordance 
with the optimal perlocutionary effect of the accusation. Such a commitment 
would be in line with van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s characterisation of (the 
perlocutionary illocution of) accepting the speech act of argumentation as 
expressing concurrence with the preparatory conditions of the speech act accepted 
(1982: 14). By retracting the commitment to –A, the proponent of the standpoint 
challenged eliminates the inconsistency by conveying that he has changed his 
mind about his previous position in order to be able to maintain the current 
standpoint. The acceptance of the accusation can also lead to the retraction of the 
standpoint by the accused. A proponent of a standpoint challenged, who accepts 
the accusation of inconsistency against him, can eliminate this inconsistency by 
retracting his commitment to A. By retracting his commitment to A, the accused 
retracts the standpoint and avoids having to retract the other position he assumes. 
In order for the accusation to have the potential to bring about any of the 
perlocutionary effects above, it needs to be performed in a recognisable way. That 
is to say that it is necessary that the accusation of inconsistency is performed in 
33 Dissociation is one of the ways to express non-acceptance of the accusation. By means of 
dissociation, the alleged inconsistency is denied by dissociating between different interpretations 




                                                 
an understandable way if any of the perlocutionary effects is to be rationally 
expected. The expectation of any of the perlocutionary effects above is not 
justified if the accused does not understand that commitments to A and to –A are 
attributed to him simultaneously and that he is required to retract one of them to 
eliminate the inconsistency. In other words, a clear performance of the accusation 
is necessary in order for any relevant continuation of the confrontation. In order 
to ensure the continuation of any of the dialectical routes of the confrontation 
stage, the accusation of inconsistency therefore needs to fulfil the following 
soundness condition.  
(iv)  The accusation of inconsistency needs to be performed clearly 
enough for the accused to understand that the accuser attributes to 
him commitments to A and to –A simultaneously and demands 
him to retract one of them to eliminate the alleged inconsistency. 
Failure to fulfil the condition can be associated with violations of the tenth 
rule of a critical discussion, the language usage rule, according to which 
“discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or 
confusingly ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other 
party’s formulations” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: p. 195). Clarity, as 
required in the rule, does by no means rule out indirectness and implicitness as 
unreasonable (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1987: pp. 293-296). In fact, 
advancing an accusation of inconsistency to express critical doubt is in itself an 
instance of indirectness that is not unreasonable as such. And as long as the 
speech act is identifiable, implicitness is no obstacle to critical testing. However, 
lack of clarity can have direct consequences for the critical testing procedure, for 
example, by masking failures to meet other requirements for reasonableness. 
The exchange between Mr. Brown and Mr. Cameron, about the police in 
London, is an example of insufficiently clear formulations of the accusation can 
for example mask failures to meet other soundness conditions. The vagueness in 
expressing the commitments attributed to Mr. Cameron makes it more difficult to 
detect that the alleged inconsistency is unreasonable as a result of failure to meet 
not only condition (iii) as discussed in section 5.2.1, but also condition (i), as it 
will be shown below. By means of the accusation, Mr Brown attributes to Mr. 




Prime Minister attributes to the Leader of the Conservative Party a commitment 
to a supportive attitude towards the police on the basis of the latter’s criticism of 
the Government, and a commitment to a non-supportive attitude on the basis of 
plans of Boris Johnson, the Conservative candidate for the Mayor of London, to 
cut expenditure on policing. On the basis of Mr. Johnson’s plans, Mr. Brown 
attributes to Mr. Cameron commitment to it is not the case that the police should 
be supported. He argues that in view of such a commitment, his opponent cannot 
be committed to the sub-standpoint that if the Government supports someone who 
is under police investigation for alleged corruption, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard because such a sub-standpoint entails the 
opposite commitment.  
Mr. Brown seems to take supporting someone who is under police 
investigation for alleged corruption, i.e. not supporting the police in their 
investigations, to mean merely not supporting the police. He consequently 
distorts his opponent’s sub-standpoint by attributing to him a more generalised 
version of it. However, the distortion is not easy to detect because Mr. Brown 
does not make it sufficiently clear what the inconsistency is about. All he says is 
that ‘if the right hon. Gentleman wishes to support the police in their 
investigation, why does his candidate for the Mayor of London say that the first 
target for cuts is transport and policing?’ It is not clear whether the alleged 
inconsistency is about the general attitude towards the police, i.e. something like 
the police should be supported, or about the attitude towards police investigation 
in particular, i.e. something like the police should be supported in their 
investigation. In fact, Mr. Brown’s accusation conveys a combination of the two, 
which makes it difficult for his opponent to recognise the unreasonableness of the 
alleged inconsistency. 
The mere recognisability of the accusation of inconsistency is sufficient 
for a justified expectation of only the non-acceptance of the accusation of 
inconsistency. The accusation needs to be also acceptable in order for it to have 
the potential to bring about the other, optimal, perlocutionary effects, i.e. a 
retraction of one of the two mutually inconsistent commitments. Given that the 
acceptance of the accusation of inconsistency commits the accused to the 




accusation to be accepted only if the preparatory conditions of the accusation are 
acceptable to the accused. The conditions need to belong to the commonly 
accepted starting points, in order for the accuser to be justified in expecting the 
accused to retract one of the allegedly inconsistent commitments. The latter, as I 
have argued earlier, is necessary for the continuation of the dialectical route 
towards the retraction of the standpoint. Soundness conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), 
above, see to it that this requirement is met. 
 
5.2.3 Requirement of freedom 
In view of the requirement of freedom, the accusation of inconsistency, employed 
by the Prime Minister to reasonably rule out a standpoint, must not preclude the 
possibility for the accused to maintain rather than retract the standpoint in the turn 
that follows. That is to say that the accusation must preclude none of the 
accused’s options to perform a non-preferred response to the accusation. As 
explained earlier, the non-preferred (analytically relevant) response of 
maintaining the standpoint, by the accused, can be realised either by not accepting 
the accusation of inconsistency or by accepting the accusation but retracting the 
commitment to –A. In response to the accusation, the proponent of a standpoint 
must be allowed to express either of the two.  
An accusation that is made in a reasonable way should not violate the 
freedom of the accused to express his non-acceptance of the accusation. The 
accused should be allowed to (justifiably) deny that his standpoint commits him 
to A, that his other position commits him to –A or that his commitments to A and 
to –A are simultaneously held. Nor should the accusation violate the freedom of 
the accused to maintain the commitment to A in case he accepts the accusation 
and is willing to retract the commitment to –A and acknowledge that he has 
changed his mind about the other position he assumes. In order for the accusation 
not to constitute such a violation, the following condition needs to be fulfilled:    
(v)  The choice of topic, audience frame, and stylistic devices of the 
accusation of inconsistency must not preclude the possibility for 
the accused to either express non-acceptance of the accusation or 





Exactly because the accuser makes his choice of topics, audience frames and 
stylistic devices so that the accused is directed towards retracting commitment to 
A, it should be observed that such a choice does not violate the freedom of the 
accused to opt for a different response. 
An accusation of inconsistency that fails to fulfil the condition specified 
above violates the first rule of a critical discussion, the freedom rule, which 
stipulates that “discussants may not prevent each other from advancing 
standpoints or from calling standpoints into question” (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004: p. 190). The violation results in a case of the ad hominem 
fallacy. The exchange, below, between David Cameron and Gordon Brown is an 
example. The exchange forms part of a discussion about the Government’s policy 
to tackle the effects of the global financial crisis on the British economy. Mr. 
Cameron, who has repeatedly blamed the Government’s borrowing policy to 
combat the recession, now opposes the Government’s plan of unfunded tax cuts. 
He argues that such cuts cannot be made possible without further borrowings, 
which would only add to the problem since the current unfunded cuts can only be 
compensated by later tax rises. 
(3)  David Cameron (Leader of the Opposition):  
 […] He was asked about the Government’s claim that this recession was largely not of 
their making. His answer was that that was “largely drivel, frankly”. That is what he said. 
Let me use some words that the Prime Minister might be very familiar with. They are 
these: 
“unfunded...tax promises...simply do not add up”. 
They mean 
“tax cuts before the election”, 
leading to tax rises after an election. That is what he said as Chancellor just a few years 
ago. If he does not agree with his employment Minister, if he does not agree with his 
Chancellor and if he does not agree with his Trade Secretary, perhaps he can tell us—
does he agree with himself?  
Gordon Brown (Prime Minister):  
 […] only a few days ago the Leader of the Opposition himself was saying that 
borrowing had to be allowed to happen. Then he changed his mind, and he is depriving 
people of real help for businesses and families. The issue will come down to this: do we 
want to help people through difficult times, a downturn that every country in the world 
has faced? It is a downturn, by the way, that even the Americans agree started in 
America. Do we want to help people through difficult times, or do we want to take the 
advice that was followed in the 1980s and 1990s by the then Conservative Government 
and do absolutely nothing to help people in time of need? […] 
(House of Commons official report, 2008g) 
To the criticism advanced by Mr. Cameron, Mr. Brown responds by accusing the 




Government’s borrowing policy while a few days ago he himself said that 
borrowing had to be allowed. The Prime Minister goes on by attacking the 
Conservative Opposition for what is according to him a refusal to help the needed 
in a time of crisis. He attempts to justify his Government’s policies but without 
directly addressing the criticism expressed by his adversary.34 
Viewed in the context of discussing the performance of the Government, 
Mr. Cameron’s question can be interpreted as expressing the following line of 
argumentation:  
(1) (The performance of the Government is not up to standard) 
1.1 The Government’s borrowing policy contributes to the recession 
(1.1’) (If the Government’s borrowing policy contributes to the 
recession then the performance of the Government is not up to 
standard) 
Mr. Brown challenges the justificatory power of Mr. Cameron’s argument 
by the alleged inconsistency he attributes to him. The Prime Minister reminds his 
opponent that he had previously expressed the point of view that borrowing had 
to be allowed, and suggests that, therefore, he cannot be now claiming that if the 
Government’s borrowing policy contributes to the recession then the 
performance of the Government is not up to standard. By means of the alleged 
inconsistency, Mr. Brown urges Mr. Cameron to retract his current position in 
order not to hold two mutually inconsistent commitments simultaneously. After 
all, Mr. Cameron cannot think that borrowing should not have been allowed 
(commitment to A, entailed by his current criticism of the Government) and that 
borrowing had to be allowed (commitment to –A, expressed a few days ago) at 
the same time. 
The way Mr. Brown presents the accusation of inconsistency violates Mr. 
Cameron’s freedom to choose how to respond to it. In his attempt to avoid a 
discussion of the criticism against his Government, Mr. Brown attempts to direct 
Mr. Cameron towards the retraction of the commitment to A, as a way to lead 
him to retract the linking premise he challenges. By presenting the commitment 
34 It is interesting that Mr. Cameron’s criticism of the Government involves an accusation of 
inconsistency, too. The Government’s plan criticised is presented as inconsistent with Mr. 
Brown’s previous opposition to unfunded tax cuts. However, because in this study I am interested 
in accusations of inconsistency retorts, I shall restrict my attention to the accusation expressed by 




                                                 
to A (borrowing should not have been allowed) as a commitment that would 
deprive families and businesses of real help, Mr. Brown makes Mr. Cameron’s 
option of maintaining a commitment to A almost impossible. Given that 
politicians are required to care about people’s problems, Mr. Cameron’s choice to 
maintain a commitment to A and retract a commitment to –A instead can be 
considered almost precluded by the association Mr. Brown makes between the 
commitment to A and insensitivity towards people’s problems. The association 
puts pressure on Mr. Cameron. It restricts his freedom of choosing the way to 
eliminate the alleged inconsistency concerning whether borrowing had to be 
allowed or not, and consequently violates his freedom to express the point of 
view that if government policies contribute to the recession then the performance 
of the Government is not up to standard.35 
 
5.3 Institutional considerations for reasonableness 
In applying the conditions formulated above, characteristics of the activity type of 
Prime Minister's Question Time need to be taken into account in order for the 
evaluation of the particular way of manoeuvring at issue to be sensitive to the 
institutional point of the argumentative discourse examined. An important 
element that needs to be taken into account, which has to do with the political 
nature of the parliamentary session, is that in the political context, actions, 
policies, and plans are discussed in relation to available alternatives. That is to 
say that, in Question Time, the performance of the Government is often judged in 
comparison to the alternative provided by the Opposition. Another important 
characteristic that needs also to be taken into account is the political basis for the 
assignment of roles and the attribution of commitments. Government policies, 
actions and plans are defended by MPs from the ruling party against the criticism 
of MPs from the Opposition, each attempting to promote their party as the more 
competent leader of the country. In the context of such a discussion, namely the 
35 Mr. Brown’s accusation of inconsistency against Mr. Cameron is combined with an appeal to 
emotions. By associating the commitment to A with insensitivity towards people’s problems, Mr. 
Brown appeals to his adversary’s fear of being associated with insensitivity in order to lead him to 





                                                 
discussion about the leadership competence of political parties, it seems 
necessary to hold MPs accountable for commitments derived from positions 
assumed by other MPs from their parties. For the sake of maximising the 
accountability of political parties, it can even be claimed that the positions 
assumed by individual politicians are in fact positions that can be attributed to 
their political parties. In what follows, I shall discuss the implications of the 
considerations above for the general conditions formulated earlier, hoping to 
make the conditions more tuned to the context in which they are to be applied. 
In line with van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2004), I take it that the political 
context in which the Prime Minister’s accusations occur determines to a great 
extent whether the Prime Minister is indeed justified in attributing to his 
adversaries the commitments he attributes to them on the basis of the positions he 
refers to. For example, considering that political plans and actions are to a great 
extent judged in relation to the alternatives provided by rivals, what appears like 
an over-generalised interpretation of the standpoint challenged might well be a 
justified interpretation. That is to say, that when applying soundness condition (i), 
i.e. that the accuser should be justified in attributing to the accused a commitment 
to A on the basis of the standpoint challenged, one needs to take into account that 
the performance of the Government is often discussed in relation to the 
alternative that the Opposition would provide, had it been the party in power.   
For example, Mr. Brown’s accusation of inconsistency regarding the 
police, discussed earlier, does not necessarily distort Mr. Cameron’s position 
even if it derives from it a slightly over-generalised commitment. As long as the 
performance of the Government is being discussed independently of what the 
Opposition would have done had it been in power (as it has been done in section 
5.2.1), the attribution to the Opposition of a general commitment to the police 
should be supported will count as distorting the sub-standpoint advanced by the 
Opposition. The attribution generalises the sub-standpoint that if the Government 
supports someone who is under police investigation for alleged corruption, then 
the performance of the Government is not up to standard to something like if the 
Government does not support the police, then the performance of the Government 
is not up to standard. However, in a context of discussing the performance of the 




over governance, the over-generalisation seems to be justified. Mr. Brown’s 
accusation is an attempt of the Prime Minister to argue that, given that the Tories 
plan to cut expenditure on policing, the police would not have been better 
supported had the Conservatives been in power. That, consequently, undermines 
the criticism the Tories advance concerning the performance of the Government 
with respect to supporting the police in their investigations. That does not mean 
that the Prime Minister is justified in disregarding the Opposition’s criticism of 
the Government, but his accusation can be viewed as an attempt to discuss the 
criticism advanced by the Opposition in perspective.  
The extent to which it is justifiable for the Prime Minister to derive a 
certain commitment from a certain other position of the Opposition (soundness 
condition (ii)) is also highly influenced by the perspective from which 
Government policies are discussed in relation to the alternative offered by the 
Opposition. For example, Mr. Blair seems to be justified in attributing to Mr. 
Duncan Smith a commitment to the NHS does not deserve to be taken care of  on 
the basis of his quoted words that ‘The health service doesn't serve anybody . . . It 
doesn't serve doctors or nurses. It doesn't help the people who are treated’ in the 
context of Question Time. But the attribution might not have been so justified had 
it happened in another context where the discussion is not about policy. 
For the application of soundness condition (ii), the political nature of 
assignment of roles and attribution of commitments is also significant. In 
determining whether or not the Prime Minister is justified in holding his 
adversary to be committed to a certain proposition on the basis of the position he 
refers to, such a political nature is crucial. In principle, it is necessary, in order to 
hold political parties to account, to consider that the commitments that can be 
attributed to a certain MP are not restricted to those deriving from his own 
positions. It should be possible, to different degrees of justifiability, to attribute to 
MPs from a certain political party commitments deriving from positions that have 
been assumed by the leaders of their parties, election manifestos, or other public 
expressions of opinion made in the name of the Party. Only by considering all 
these together as sources of commitments, can the examination of political 
argumentative discourse give due consideration to the dynamics that shape such 




through the action and interaction of political parties rather than individuals.  
While it is crucial to give due attention to the group dynamics of political 
organisation in deriving commitments for argumentative discussions, it is still 
debatable to which extent commitments of MPs can be justifiably attributed to 
their fellow Party members. Are the commitments assumed by party member 
equally transferrable? This would be difficult to establish. Take, for example, the 
case of the London police. Is the Leader of the Opposition accountable for what a 
fellow Party member, Boris Johnson, expresses? On the one hand, the often 
extreme views of Mr. Johnson undermine the legitimacy of transferring his 
commitments to fellow Tories. Yet, on the other hand, Mr. Johnson’s position 
was assumed in his capacity as the Conservative Party’s candidate for the Mayor 
of London. The latter makes it actually imperative to consider his positions as 
representative of the policies of the party he represents.  
In considering whether or not the Prime Minister is justified in attributing 
the two mutually inconsistent commitments to the accused simultaneously, i.e. in 
establishing whether soundness condition (iii) is fulfilled, political characteristics 
of the discourse are again crucial. Where do we draw the boundaries of one and 
the same discussion? Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s general conditions for what 
counts as one and the same discussion need to be tailored to the particularities of 
the political context. Argumentative parties need to be seen in terms of political 
parties rather than as individuals and the discussion of the performance of the 
Government needs to be viewed in relation to the alternative the Opposition 
would provide. But here again, in pursuing maximum political accountability one 
risks distorting politicians’ individual responsibility as well as overlooking the 
necessity to consider political actions in perspective. For example, one might 
wonder if the commitment derived from the Conservatives’ opposition to a 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992, can be attributed to Mr. Bottomley, 
sixteen years later. On the one hand, the position was not only one of the 
Conservative Party, of which Mr. Bottomley is a member; Mr. Bottomley himself 
was one of those who walked through the no lobby opposing the referendum. And 
yet, on the other hand, in the sixteen years that separate the two discussions, so 
many starting points have changed that the question becomes legitimate whether 




not be held is simultaneously held with his commitment to a referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty should be held.  
It would contribute to holding the Conservative Party to account for its 
political program to extend the scope of what can be considered as one and the 
same discussion and include in one discussion the two discussions about 
referenda: the one on the Maastricht Treaty as well as the one on the Lisbon 
Treaty. Especially given the change of position of the Tories from Government to 
Opposition, it is a way of holding them accountable to seek for justification for 
what seems like a change of policy. However, one should be careful that the 
pursuit of a greater accountability of the Opposition is not achieved on the 
expense of the accountability of the Government. Separating the two discussions, 
at a certain level, and discussing the performance of the Government 
independently, is sometimes necessary for holding the present Government to 
account. In the case of the exchange with Mr. Bottomley, for example, in order to 
hold the Government to account, one needs to consider the argumentative 
discussion about the performance of the Government as a primary discussion, and 
consider that the previous position of Mr. Bottomley occurs in a different 
discussion. That would not be unreasonable, especially given the different time 
and political context in which that position was assumed.  
In determining whether or not a certain choice of topic, audience frame, or 
stylistic device of the accusation of inconsistency restricts the accused freedom to 
choose the way to react to the accusation, i.e. whether or not soundness condition 
(v) is fulfilled, due attention needs to be given to the political implications of the 
choices made. Whether or not a certain choice precludes the possibility for the 
accused to express non-acceptance of the accusation or to retract the expressed 
commitment to –A in case the accusation is accepted is highly dependent on the 
political implications of the reaction opted for. For example, crucial in detecting 
the violation of Mr. Cameron’s right to maintain his commitment to borrowing 
should not have been allowed and be accountable for it is the fact that to be 
regarded as insensitive to people’s needs in times of crisis is particularly 
undesirable for a party that aspires to take over Government. The particular 
choice of presenting the commitment to borrowing should not have been allowed 




(political) context than it could have been in other (personal) ones. Had the same 
presentation been used in an ordinary interpersonal conversation, in which the 
political implications play a less important role, the accused would have had more 
freedom to maintain his standpoint. After all, sensitivity to people’s problems 
matters considerably less when no responsibility is assumed towards these 
people.  
As the discussion above shows, political institutional considerations play a 
crucial role in determining the reasonableness of argumentative moves. Only if 
such considerations are taken into account when applying the general soundness 










6.1 Findings of the study 
In this study, I have attempted to provide an empirically adequate account of 
accusations of inconsistency advanced by the Prime Minister in response to 
criticism from the Opposition in Prime Minister's Question Time in the British 
House of Commons. I have characterised the accusations as a particular way of 
confrontational strategic manoeuvring (Chapter 2) and I have suggested a set of 
soundness conditions for judging the (actual) (un)reasonableness of the 
accusations at issue (Chapter 5). In order for the analysis and the evaluation of 
the accusations to be faithful to the institutional particularities of the 
argumentative practice concerned, I have characterised the parliamentary session 
of Question Time as an argumentative activity type and identified the 
preconditions that the rules and conventions of Question Time create for 
argumentative confrontations in the parliamentary session (Chapter 3). While the 
characterisation of the Prime Minister’s responses at issue as a particular way of 
strategic manoeuvring, in Chapter 2, sheds light on the argumentative function of 
the accusations, significant insights into the institutional function of the 
accusations are gained by taking the preconditions identified in Chapter 3 into 
account. These institutional insights are instrumental for a more refined analysis 
of the accusations at issue (Chapter 4) as well as for an evaluation that does not 
overlook the institutional concerns of the arguers in the parliamentary session of 
Prime Minister's Question Time (Chapter 5).  
In Chapter 2, the Prime Minister’s responses with accusations of 
inconsistency to criticism are characterised as a particular way of confrontational 
strategic manoeuvring in which the Prime Minister attempts to steer his 
argumentative confrontations with MPs from the Opposition towards a favourable 
outcome within the boundaries of reasonableness. In this way of manoeuvring, 
the Prime Minister casts doubt on a standpoint of the Opposition that expresses 




of inconsistency. The Prime Minister challenges his adversary’s commitment to 
the criticism expressed by accusing him of being inconsistent with regard to the 
subject matter of the criticism: while the adversary’s critical standpoint commits 
him to A, another position with which he can be associated commits him to –A. 
By pointing out the (alleged) inconsistency, the Prime Minister, who does not 
accept the criticism expressed, attempts to lead his adversary to retract this 
criticism. The retraction of the critical standpoint eliminates the initial 
disagreement that has given rise to the argumentative confrontation and closes the 
argumentative confrontation with a definition of the difference of opinion as no 
dispute.  
In principle, the definition of the difference of opinion as no dispute is 
within the boundaries of reasonableness. The definition can be affected by a 
discussant who retracts a standpoint in order to avoid holding two mutually 
inconsistent positions simultaneously. The definition is also favourable to the 
Prime Minister. Once the MP from the Opposition retracts his standpoint the 
Prime Minister is no longer under the obligation to refute the criticism that he 
does not accept. The Prime Minister attempts to steer his argumentative 
confrontations with MPs from the Opposition towards this favourable outcome by 
making choices of topics, audience frames and stylistic devices that lead the MP 
towards the retraction of the critical standpoint, rather than the retraction of the 
other position inconsistent with it, as the means to repair the alleged 
inconsistency.  
In Chapter 3, the institutionally conventionalised argumentative practice 
of Prime Minister's Question Time is characterised as a multi-layered 
argumentative activity type that is governed by parliamentary rules and 
conventions as well as by political considerations. In this activity type, the Prime 
Minister engages in argumentative exchanges about policies, plans and actions of 
the Government with his fellow MPs, in a well-regulated question-answer format. 
In these exchanges, interrelated differences of opinion are discussed, as the MPs 
and the Prime Minister pursue a number of interrelated institutional aims. 
Of the several institutional aims pursued by argumentation in Question 
Time, holding the Government to account can be considered the institutional goal 




for which Question Time was established as a parliamentary session and to which 
the discussants can be collectively held committed by virtue of their participation 
in the session. By discussing the government plans, policies or actions, and 
subjecting the performance of the Government to argumentative scrutiny, MPs 
and the Prime Minister pursue this goal. The argumentative exchanges between 
MPs and the Prime Minister can be viewed as an attempt to resolve a main 
difference of opinion about a standpoint like the performance of the Government 
is up to standard by means of arguments that relate to policies, plans or actions of 
the Government. In the course of discussing this main difference of opinion, sub-
differences arise when the Prime Minister does not accept arguments advanced by 
the Opposition in which criticism is expressed concerning certain policies, plans 
or actions of his Government. 
In addition to the institutional goal of holding the Government to account, 
a number of other institution-related aims can be associated with the 
argumentative practice of the parliamentary session. The most important of these 
aims is the promotion of party political interests. The questions of MPs convey 
political statements that promote their party’s policies or attack those of their 
adversaries. Similarly, the answers of the Prime Minister often convey pride in 
the achievements reached by his party’s policies, or express criticism of the 
policies of the Opposition. In their pursuit of promoting their party interests, MPs 
and the Prime Minister engage in the discussion of differences of opinion 
concerning the competence of political parties in leading the country. 
Accordingly, the argumentative exchanges between the Prime Minister and MPs 
can also be viewed as an attempt to resolve a difference of opinion about a 
standpoint like unlike the other party, we can provide good leadership.  
The rules of Question Time stipulate that the questions of MPs and the 
answers of the Prime Minister address only matters that relate to the 
responsibilities of the Government. Consequently, MPs and the Prime Minister 
need to address the differences of opinion concerning the competence of political 
parties only through addressing their difference of opinion concerning the 
performance of the Government. An MP from the Opposition needs to defend the 
standpoint that unlike the ruling party, we can provide good leadership by means 




Prime Minister or MPs from his party need to defend the standpoint that unlike 
the Opposition, we can provide good leadership by means of a positive 
evaluation of the performance of the Government. 
The characterisation of the argumentative practice of Question Time as an 
argumentative activity type identifies several significant institutional 
preconditions for argumentative confrontations. For example, the main initial 
difference of opinion, i.e. the difference concerning the performance of the 
Government, is expected to be mixed. The Prime Minister and MPs from his 
party are in favour of the positive standpoint, i.e. the performance of the 
Government is up to standard, and MPs from the Opposition are in favour of the 
negative standpoint. The sub-disagreements about arguments from the Opposition 
are also expected to be mixed. The Prime Minister has the institutional obligation 
to defend his Government and must therefore advance and defend a sub-
standpoint that is opposite to the standpoint advanced by the Opposition in which 
criticism of his Government is expressed. 
In Chapter 4, the Prime Minister’s responses to criticism with accusations 
of inconsistency are re-examined in light of the insights gained from the 
characterisation of the argumentative practice of Question Time as an 
argumentative activity type, carried out in Chapter 3. This re-examination sheds 
significant light on the strategic institutional function of the responses at issue as 
attempts of the Prime Minister to manage his institutional obligation to defend his 
Government when refuting the criticism advanced by the Opposition is not easy. 
As the characterisation of the argumentative activity type of Question Time 
shows, MPs from the Opposition express criticisms of government policies, plans 
or actions as arguments in support of their negative standpoint concerning the 
performance of the Government. Consequently, the Prime Minister’s responses to 
criticism with accusations of inconsistency are instances of strategic manoeuvring 
that come in response to such arguments.  
On the basis of a detailed examination of the exchange between Tony 
Blair and Ian Duncan Smith about the National Health Service (NHS), three main 
characteristics that are central to the Prime Minister’s strategic manoeuvring are 
identified. First, the accusation of inconsistency challenges the commitment of 




argument, often after attempts to refute the arguments’ propositional contents 
have failed. Second, the accusation of inconsistency can save Mr. Blair from what 
is an institutionally undesirable outcome in the particular activity type of Prime 
Minister's Question Time. If it leads Mr. Duncan Smith to retract (the 
justificatory power of) his argument, the accusation saves Mr. Blair from having a 
mixed dispute about it. In such a dispute Mr. Blair would have to assume the 
politically undesirable position of defending the premise that it is not the case 
that if government policies are damaging the NHS, then the performance of the 
Government is not up to standard. Third, the accusation of inconsistency is not 
only an argumentatively opportune choice in the discussion about the 
performance of the Government, but it is also an institutionally opportune choice 
in the discussion about the political competence of the Opposition to lead the 
country. The alleged inconsistency constitutes an argument in support of the 
standpoint that unlike the Opposition, the ruling party can provide good 
leadership.  
In Chapter 5, the reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s responses to 
criticism with accusations of inconsistency is discussed and soundness conditions 
are formulated for this particular way of manoeuvring. Guided by the view that a 
case of confrontational strategic manoeuvring is dialectically sound as long as the 
pursuit of a particular definition of the disagreement does not hinder the critical 
testing procedure, five conditions were formulated that need to be fulfilled in 
order for accusations of inconsistency employed by the Prime Minister to exclude 
from the discussion a point of view of the Opposition to be reasonable.  
First, the accuser should be justified in attributing to the accused a 
commitment to A on the basis of the standpoint challenged. Unless this condition 
is fulfilled, the Prime Minister’s accusation risks distorting the standpoint it 
responds to thereby giving rise to cases of the straw man fallacy. Second, the 
accuser should be justified in attributing to the accused a commitment to –A on 
the basis of the other position the accused assumes. Third, the accuser should be 
justified in attributing to the accused the two mutually inconsistent commitments 
to A and to –A simultaneously. Unless the last two conditions are fulfilled, the 
accusation risks falsely considering as mutually accepted starting points 




from failing to meet the three conditions above are in fact cases in which the 
accusation fails to be a responsive expression of doubt concerning the standpoint 
it challenges.  
Fourth, in order for the accusation to be reasonable, the accusation needs 
to be performed clearly enough for the accused to understand that the accuser 
attributes to him a commitment to A and a commitment to –A and requires him to 
retract one of the commitments in order to repair the inconsistency. Unless this 
condition is fulfilled, the argumentative confrontation cannot be expected to 
proceed to any clear definition of the disagreement at stake. Fifth, the choice of 
topic, audience frame and stylistic devices of the accusation must not preclude the 
possibility for the accused to either express non-acceptance of the accusation or to 
retract the commitment to –A in case the accusation is accepted. Unless this 
condition is fulfilled, the accused’s freedom of expressing points of view will be 
violated, giving rise to instances of the ad hominem fallacy. 
In applying the five soundness conditions above, institutional 
characteristics of the argumentative practice need to be taken into account. 
Particular attention should be given to the fact that in political argumentative 
discourse political affiliation is commonly accepted as a legitimate source of 
deriving commitments. An MP is not only committed to positions that he has 
assumed himself but is also committed by affiliation to the positions of his 
political party, usually expressed by fellow party members. Moreover, account 
should be taken not only of the main discussion about the performance of 
Government, but also of the discussion about the political competence of political 
parties to lead the country. In the particular context of Question Time, the fact 
that the performance of the Government is not assessed independently from the 
alternative offered by the Opposition is crucial to the judgment of reasonableness 
of the accusations at issue. Unless these two points are taken into account when 
applying the soundness conditions above, the evaluation of the responses at issue 







6.2 Discussion of the findings 
This study provides a fairly detailed account of the Prime Minister’s responses to 
criticism with accusations of inconsistency. Even though it may seem like an 
empirical study of Prime Minister’s Question Time, the study is rather a 
theoretical study of strategic manoeuvring in (a particular argumentative move 
typical of) this kind of parliamentary session. For the purpose of analysing and 
evaluating the Prime Minister’s responses at issue, pragma-dialectical tools and 
concepts are discussed and further developed. In particular, the relationship is 
explored between van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s concepts of strategic 
manoeuvring (1999, 2007) and argumentative activity types (2005), and between 
these two concepts and the earlier pragma-dialectical concept of a critical 
discussion as an ideal of reasonable argumentative discourse (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1984, 2004). New insights are gained into the possible application 
of these concepts to account for the Prime Minister’s responses subject of 
examination. In spite of the marginality of these responses, as attempts to avoid 
rather than to engage in an argumentative discussion the account is significant for 
argumentation theory. The attempt to avoid a discussion is not always 
unreasonable, and yet, when it is fallacious, its consequences on argumentative 
discourse are dire. The examination carried out in this study is useful for 
understanding the Prime Minister’s attempts, so that they can be properly 
assessed and the reasonable among them can be distinguished from the fallacious.  
The present examination of the Prime Minister’s responses with 
accusations of inconsistency to criticism as instances of confrontational strategic 
manoeuvring (Chapter 2) connects the pragmatic characteristics of the moves to 
their dialectical function. Dialectically, the responses are identified as instances of 
strategic manoeuvring to rule out a standpoint. They are expressions of critical 
doubt that attempt to lead the proponents of the standpoints doubted to retract 
them in order to define the difference of opinion concerning these standpoints as 
no dispute. Pragmatically, the responses are identified as instances of doubt that is 
expressed indirectly by means of the speech act of accusation of inconsistency. 
The accusations attempt to bring about the retraction of the standpoint doubted as 
one particular perlocutionary effect of the speech act, namely repairing the 





In the present examination of the Prime Minister’s responses with 
accusations of inconsistency to criticism as instances of confrontational strategic 
manoeuvring, the Prime Minister is assumed to be trying to eliminate an initial 
disagreement about the criticism advanced by the Opposition. Several 
considerations, applicable to the cases analysed in this study, lend support to this 
assumption. In the cases analysed, the Prime Minister employs accusations of 
inconsistency in response to some criticism that he does not accept, or is at least 
expected not to accept. That justifies the understanding of the accusations as 
indirect expressions of doubt concerning the criticism. Thus understood, the 
accusation can be viewed as either an attempt to get the criticism maintained, in 
the next turn, and start an argumentative discussion about it, or an attempt to get 
it retracted and eliminate the initial disagreement about it. In view of political 
considerations pertinent to the exchanges examined, it seems advantageous for 
the Prime Minister, to avoid rather than to engage into the discussion of the 
criticism. The Prime Minister’s choices of topics, audience frames and stylistic 
devices support the assumption: these choices direct the MPs from the Opposition 
towards retracting rather than maintaining the criticism advanced.  
However, it might be necessary to consider whether the accusations 
cannot in fact be attempts to get the Opposition to retract the previous position 
rather than the current criticism. Given the political nature of the argumentative 
exchanges of Question Time, the accusations can sometimes be understood as an 
expression of critical doubt concerning the position of the Opposition that is 
inconsistent with the current one. For example, Mr. Brown’s accusation to the 
Tories of being inconsistent in their attitude towards the NHS can maybe be 
understood as an attempt to get the Tories to change their mind about their policy 
of cutting investment in Health. Empirical research into the outcomes actually 
pursued by the Prime Minister’s responses at issue seems necessary in order to 
further support the assumption that underlies the analysis and the evaluation in 
this study. Further research must also be conducted in order to develop a set of 
criteria that can be used to determine what the favourable outcomes pursued by 





In order to identify the dialectical function of the Prime Minister’s 
responses at issue, a dialectical profile of the confrontation stage was designed 
(section 2.3). The profile represents in a dialogue-like tree and at a certain level of 
abstraction, all the different ways a confrontation can develop within the 
boundaries of reasonableness. The profile is instrumental for the analysis of the 
Prime Minister’s responses as it represents the dialectical interaction involved in 
them.  
Taking types of strategic manoeuvring to represent, as this study suggests, 
instances of strategic manoeuvring, at a certain level of abstraction, i.e. in terms 
of slots for dialectically relevant moves, the profile can, in principle, also be the 
basis for designing a typology of confrontational strategic manoeuvring. The 
profile presents a finite number of slots for analytically relevant moves available 
to arguers, a finite number of dialectical routes that can be followed and a finite 
number of outcomes that can be pursued in an argumentative confrontation. In 
principle, it should be possible, by taking these three factors as parameters, to 
derive a finite number of types of confrontational strategic manoeuvring that are 
distinguished according to the dialectical functions underlying them. Because the 
dialectical profile of the confrontation stage represents all the moves that play a 
role in the critical testing procedure, such a typology would in principle represent 
all the instances of confrontational strategic manoeuvring. Further research 
should be conducted in order to check the actual feasibility of such an endeavour. 
Also worth investigating in further research is whether or not dialectical 
profiles can be of use in analysing instances of strategic manoeuvring that relate 
to other stages of the critical testing procedure. The dialectical profiles of (parts 
of) other dialectical stages, already suggested by van Eemeren, Houtlosser and 
Snoeck Henkemans (2007a), can be used for that. However, it might be the case 
that for typologies of other categories of strategic manoeuvring, e.g. a typology of 
opening-stage related strategic manoeuvring, complete dialectical profiles are 
needed in which all the moves in the stages concerned are represented. In this 
case, it becomes relevant to investigate the possibility of designing complete 
dialectical profiles for the opening, argumentation and concluding stages. The 
confrontation stage, for which a profile has been designed in this study, is the 




in its profile are far fewer that the options that need to be accommodated in 
profiles for other stages.  
The characterisation of Prime Minister’s Question Time as an 
argumentative activity type (Chapter 3) sheds light on how aims intrinsic to 
argumentation, i.e. dialectical and rhetorical aims, are influenced by extrinsic 
aims pursued by means of argumentation, which are institutional aims in the case 
studied. The characterisation incorporates several different institutional aims that 
are pursued by means of argumentation, but prominence is given to the aim of 
holding the Government to account, as the institutional goal of the argumentative 
practice of the parliamentary session. As a result, in this study, the analysis and 
evaluation of the argumentative practice is carried out from the perspective of a 
particular institutional concern in the accountability of the Government. The 
strategic function of argumentative moves is analysed in terms of their 
contribution to this aim, and such a contribution is also taken into account when 
assessing the reasonableness of the moves.  
In giving prominence to one institutional aim in the characterisation of the 
argumentative practice as an activity type, I followed Levinson (1992) and van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005), who suggest that the practice of an activity type 
is “rationally and functionally adapted to the point or goal of the activity in 
question” (Levinson, 1992: p. 71). However, because in Question Time a number 
of different institutional aims are significant to the argumentative practice, the 
activity type was characterised as multi-layered: one of the institutional aims was 
made prominent without ignoring the other aims. It is yet worth investigating 
whether or not such prominence is at all necessary, from the perspective of 
argumentation theory. Can the institutional aims not be considered all at an equal 
level, without giving prominence for one over the others? The merits of giving 
prominence can be investigated by looking into the possibility of characterising 
an activity type, Question Time for example, in terms of all the institutional aims 
pursued in it and the argumentative means available to realise these aims given 
the institutional rules and conventions of the practice concerned. 
In any case, the prominence given in this study to the goal of holding the 
Government to account should by no means be taken to reflect a hierarchy of 




Question Time, arguers pursue the different institutional aims simultaneously and 
their order of importance varies from one exchange to the other. The prominence 
given should rather be understood as a matter of perspective from which an 
analyst approaches the practice when aiming to shed light on a particular 
empirical phenomenon. An analyst could also choose to give prominence to the 
aim of promoting party interests, and examine how the concern with such an aim 
influences politicians’ argumentative choices. 
The observations made about the strategic function of Mr. Blair’s strategic 
manoeuvring in the exchange about the NHS (Chapter 4) can in principle be 
generalised to sketch an analytic account of the Prime Minister’s response with 
accusations of inconsistency to criticism. As the discussion of the exchange 
between Mr. Brown and Mr. Cameron about the London Police and the exchange 
between Mr. Brown and Mr. Bottomley about the referendum shows, it is not 
unusual for the Prime Minister to employ the accusation of inconsistency to 
challenge the justificatory power of the critical argument. Given the rules and 
conventions of Question Time, it seems also typical for this kind of exchanges 
that the elimination of the dispute is the only outcome of the argumentative 
confrontation that is politically desirable for the Prime Minister. It is also quite 
realistic to assume that the accusation of inconsistency constitutes an argument in 
support of the standpoint that unlike the Opposition, the ruling party can provide 
good leadership. Yet, the analysis of more exchanges is certainly necessary in 
order to provide a better supported general account of the strategic function of the 
accusations at issue. Further research could for example investigate whether or 
not it is typical for accusations of inconsistency to challenge the justificatory 
power of the critical argument rather than its propositional content. Research 
could also be conducted to investigate the role the accusation plays in the 
discussion about the political competence of the Opposition to lead the country 
and sketch a more refined account of the strategic function of the accusations at 
issue.  
The general soundness conditions formulated for assessing the dialectical 
reasonableness of the strategic manoeuvring in the responses at issue (section 5.2) 
bring the evaluation closer to argumentative moves as they actually occur in 




(2004) rules for a critical discussion (pp. 135-157) and code of conduct for 
reasonable discussants (pp. 190-196), but they are tuned to the particular speech 
act actually performed by the Prime Minister, namely the accusation of 
inconsistency. Similar to the code of conduct and the rules for a critical 
discussion, the conditions assess the reasonableness of argumentative moves 
based on their contribution to the critical testing procedure: a move is reasonable 
if it does not hinder the procedure and fallacious otherwise. However, the 
conditions are formulated to apply to the speech act of accusation of 
inconsistency rather than its reconstructed analytically relevant counterpart, 
namely the illocutionary negation of a commissive as an expression of doubt. 
Consequently, the conditions enable the analyst to trace back the dialectical (un-
)reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s responses to aspects that relate to the 
accusation of inconsistency he advances. For example, condition (v) shows how a 
certain choice of topics, audience frames or stylistic devices that the Prime 
Minister employs in his accusations of inconsistency eventually obstructs the 
critical testing procedure, namely by restricting freedom of the accused to choose 
the way of responding to the accusation. 
The discussion of the soundness conditions in light of institutional 
considerations (section 5.3) emphasizes the complex multi-layered nature of the 
argumentative activity type of Question Time. Moreover, the discussion reveals a 
difficulty in arriving at a well defined set of specific conditions that can be 
applied in the particular context of Prime Minister's Question Time to yield a 
clear cut evaluation of the responses at issue. It becomes clear that any judgment 
concerning the dialectical reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s responses is 
presumptive rather than definitive: the appropriateness of the verdict of 
reasonableness is dependent on the appropriateness of certain assumptions that 
need to be made. For each instance of the responses, the analyst needs to assume, 
for example, a certain position concerning whether it makes more sense to extend 
the set of commitments that can be attributed to the accused to include 
commitments incurred by his fellow party members or to limit the set and exclude 
such commitments. The analyst also needs to assume a certain position about 
whether it is, in the situation at issue, more important to hold the Government to 




argumentative judgment of reasonableness to be in line with what is also 
politically rational, factors from political theory need to be taken into 
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This study is an attempt to provide an elaborate argumentative account of a 
particular move in Prime Minister's Question Time in the British House of 
Commons. It is a pragma-dialectical examination of the Prime Minister’s 
responses with accusation of inconsistency to standpoints advanced by Members 
of Parliament (MPs) from the Opposition in which criticism is expressed 
concerning policies, actions or plans of the Government. Typically, the Prime 
Minister challenges the MPs’ commitment to their critical standpoints, on the 
basis of an alleged inconsistency between the MPs’ current criticism and some 
other positions with which they can be associated. In this study, basic pragma-
dialectical tools are employed and further developed in order to offer an account 
that is both empirically adequate and critically insightful of the responses. 
The Prime Minister’s responses at issue are characterised as a particular 
way of confrontational strategic manoeuvring in which a favourable outcome of 
the argumentative confrontation is pursued within the boundaries of 
reasonableness (Chapter 2). The characterisation reveals the strategic function of 
the responses as attempts from the Prime Minister to get his adversaries to retract 
their critical standpoints on the in-principle fair ground that one cannot hold two 
mutually inconsistent commitments simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
characterisation sheds light on the Prime Minister’s strategic choices of topics, 
audience frames and of stylistic devices, in his attempt to direct the MPs towards 
the retraction of the current criticism, rather than the retraction of the other 
position, as the means to repair the alleged inconsistency.  
In order for the analysis of the responses to be faithful to the 
particularities of the institutional context in which the responses occur, the 
argumentative practice of Question Time is characterised as an argumentative 
activity type (Chapter 3). The institutionally conventionalised practice is 
characterised as a multi-layered activity type that is governed by parliamentary 
rules and conventions as well as by political considerations. The characterisation 




Government is up to standard as a well as another discussion about a standpoint 
like unlike the other party, we can provide good leadership, which runs 
simultaneously to the main discussion. Because the rules of Question Time 
stipulate that the MPs and the Prime Minister address only matters that relate to 
the responsibilities of the Government, the difference of opinion concerning the 
political competence of political parties can be addressed only through addressing 
the difference concerning the performance of the Government. 
The activity type perspective sheds significant light on the institutional 
strategic function of the responses at issue (Chapter 4). For example, the activity 
type perspective makes it clear that the Prime Minister employs accusations of 
inconsistency in an attempt to live up to his institutional obligation to defend his 
Government in those situations where, on the one hand, refuting the criticism 
advanced by the Opposition is not easy, but on the other hand, the Prime Minister 
cannot just accept it. Furthermore, getting the MP from the Opposition to retract 
his criticism is often the Prime Minister’s only alternative to an institutionally 
undesirable outcome in which he would have to assume politically undesirable 
positions. In view of the activity type perspective, it becomes also evident that the 
accusation of inconsistency is not only an argumentatively opportune choice in 
the discussion about the performance of the Government, but is also an argument 
that the Prime Minister employs in support of the standpoint that unlike the 
Opposition, the ruling party can provide good leadership. An inconsistent 
Opposition can obviously not provide good leadership. 
The in-principle reasonable ground that one cannot hold two mutually 
inconsistent commitments simultaneously does not guarantee reasonableness for 
the Prime Minister’s responses. Guided by the view that cases of strategic 
manoeuvring are reasonable only as long as they do not hinder the critical testing 
procedure, soundness conditions are formulated (Chapter 5). Institutional 
characteristics of the argumentative practice need to be taken into account in 
applying these conditions. The activity type perspective shows that particular 
attention needs to be given to the discussion of the competence of political parties 
to lead the country. Considerations that relate to this discussion can be crucial in 
judging whether a particular accusation is a fallacious attempt to silence criticism 




Question Time, the performance of the Government is not assessed independently 









Deze studie beoogt een uitgebreide argumentatieve uiteenzetting te geven van een 
specifieke discussiezet in Prime Minister’s Question Time, het vragenuurtje van 
de minister-president in het Britse Lagerhuis. Het behelst een pragma-dialectisch 
onderzoek naar beschuldigingen van inconsistentie die de minister-president doet 
in reacties op standpunten die door parlementsleden (MP’s) van de oppositie naar 
voren zijn gebracht en waarin zij kritiek uiten op beleid, acties of plannen van de 
regering. In zulke zetten is het gebruikelijk dat de minister-president de 
gebondenheid van de MP aan het kritische standpunt bestrijdt door te wijzen op 
een vermeende inconsistentie tussen de huidige kritiek van de MP en een andere 
positie die aan hem kan worden toegeschreven. In deze studie wordt het pragma-
dialectische instrumentarium toegepast en verder ontwikkeld om zowel een 
empirisch adequate uiteenzetting te geven als een uiteenzetting die kritisch inzicht 
biedt in dergelijke reacties. 
De onderzochte reacties van de minister-president worden 
gekarakteriseerd als een specifieke manier van strategisch manoeuvreren in de 
confrontatiefase waarmee een gunstige uitkomst van de argumentatieve 
confrontatie wordt nagestreefd die binnen de grenzen van de redelijkheid blijft 
(Hoofdstuk 2). De karakterisering toont de strategische functie van de reacties 
aan: zij gelden als pogingen van de minister-president om zijn tegenstanders 
zover te krijgen om hun kritische standpunten in te trekken op basis van de in 
principe redelijke grond dat iemand niet tegelijkertijd twee mutueel-exclusieve 
gebondenheden kan hebben. Bovendien werpt de karakterisering licht op de 
strategische keuzen die de minister-president maakt voor bepaalde onderwerpen, 
aanpassingen aan het publiek en stilistische middelen in zijn poging om de MP de 
vermeende inconsistentie te laten repareren door zijn huidige kritiek, in plaats van 
zijn eerdere positie, in te trekken. 
Om ervoor te zorgen dat de analyse van de reacties trouw is aan de 
specifieke eigenschappen van de institutionele context waarin de reacties 




als een argumentatief actietype (Hoofdstuk 3). De institutioneel 
geconventionaliseerde praktijk wordt gekarakteriseerd als een gelaagd actietype 
dat wordt gereguleerd door zowel parlementaire regels en conventies als politieke 
overwegingen. In de karakterisering wordt een hoofddiscussie geïdentificeerd 
over een standpunt als de prestatie van de regering voldoet en een andere 
discussie over een standpunt als in tegenstelling tot de andere partij kunnen wij 
goed leiderschap bieden, die parallel loopt aan de hoofddiscussie. Volgens de 
regels van Question Time kunnen MP’s en de minister-president alleen kwesties 
aankaarten die te maken hebben met de verantwoordelijkheden van de regering. 
Er kan daarom alleen worden verwezen naar het verschil van mening over de 
politieke bekwaamheid van politieke partijen door te verwijzen naar het 
meningsverschil over de prestatie van de regering.  
Het actietypeperspectief verheldert de institutionele strategische functies 
van de reacties in kwestie op significante wijze (Hoofdstuk 4). Dit perspectief 
maakt bijvoorbeeld duidelijk dat de minister-president beschuldigingen van 
inconsistentie gebruikt om te voldoen aan de institutionele verplichting om zijn 
regering te verdedigen in die situaties waarin enerzijds het weerleggen van de 
kritiek van de oppositie lastig is en anderzijds de minister-president die kritiek 
niet zomaar kan aanvaarden. Bovendien is het voor hem vaak het enige alternatief 
om ervoor te zorgen dat een MP zijn kritiek intrekt, opdat er geen institutioneel 
onwenselijke uitkomst volgt waarin de minister-president politiek onwenselijke 
posities in moet nemen. Vanuit het oogpunt van het actietype wordt het tevens 
duidelijk dat een beschuldiging van inconsistentie niet alleen een voordelige 
argumentatieve keuze is in de discussie over het functioneren van de regering, 
maar ook een argument dat de minister-president gebruikt ter ondersteuning van 
het standpunt dat in tegenstelling tot de oppositie de regerende partij goed 
leiderschap biedt. Een inconsistente oppositie kan uiteraard geen goed 
leiderschap bieden. 
 De in principe redelijke grondslag dat men niet tegelijkertijd twee mutueel 
exclusieve gebondenheden op zich kan nemen, garandeert niet dat de reacties van 
de minister president redelijk zijn. Op basis van het idee dat strategische 
manoeuvres alleen redelijk zijn zolang ze de kritische toetsingsprocedure niet 




toepassen van deze voorwaarden moet er rekening worden gehouden met de 
institutionele kenmerken van de argumentatieve praktijk. Het actietypeperspectief 
laat zien dat er in het bijzonder aandacht moet worden geschonken aan de 
discussie over het vermogen van politieke partijen om het land te regeren. 
Overwegingen die gerelateerd zijn aan die discussie kunnen cruciaal zijn voor het 
beoordelen of een specifieke beschuldiging een drogredelijke poging vormt om 
de tegenstander het zwijgen op te leggen of juist een redelijke poging om de 
kritiek in zijn context te bespreken. In Question Time worden de prestaties van de 
regering immers niet onafhankelijk van het alternatief dat de oppositie biedt 
beoordeeld.  
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